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ABSTRACT 
 
While a significant proportion of terrorist attacks have always gone unclaimed scholarship has 
noted an increasing number of such acts over the past half-century, which appears to indicate that 
the claiming of violence may no longer constitute an essential terrorist strategy. The increasing 
gap between claimed and unclaimed attacks (where “unclaimed” is understood as a terrorist 
attack for which no credible assertion is issued by the perpetrating individual or group) cannot be 
explained by existing assumptions, which posit that terrorist groups will seek to advertise their 
success. This thesis attempts to develop a more complete understanding of this phenomenon by 
examining al Qaeda’s claim variation within a series of paired case studies to explore the 
presumption of narrative difference between the two types of attacks. Findings indicate that 
claimed acts of terrorism tend to be presented via a framework of uncertainty whereas unclaimed 
acts are presented within a framework of ambiguity. The distinction of ambiguous frameworks is 
that they allow the terrorist to operate in a newly created narrative space to perpetuate and 
expand the fear-provoking effects of violence by destabilizing mutually exclusive identities of 
blame and rendering attacker and victim indistinct, while at the same time confirming the 
imminent possibility of lethal harm. The variation between models has significant implications 
for policymakers given that the choice of framework limits or guides one towards particularized 
courses of action. Given the creative authority of the targeted society as definer of this 
framework, it remains within the attacked population’s power to eliminate the narrative 
advantage allotted terrorist actors under conditions of ambiguity. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
A. History of Anonymity in Terrorism 
While a significant proportion of terrorist attacks have always gone unclaimed (see Cordes et al. 
1985; Pluchinsky 1997), scholarship has noted an increasing number of unclaimed acts of 
terrorism over the past half-century (Gearson 2002; B. Hoffman 1996, 1997, 1999, 2006; Rorie 
2008) that appears to indicate that the claiming of violence may no longer be an essential 
terrorist strategy. An average of 60% of terrorist attacks from 1970 to 1979 were claimed; this 
proportion dropped to 39% between 1980 and 1982 (Cordes et al., 1985, p.23), and has further 
declined in subsequent decades. LaFree and Dugan (2008) note the percentage of claimed attacks 
between the late 1990s and 2004 fell to 14.5% (p.28-9). In a study of terrorist claim staking 
between 1970 and 1997, Rorie (2008) finds evidence of a definitive shift towards anonymity 
over time with 1982 as the median of claimed attacks and 1993 as the median of unclaimed 
attacks (p.38). Contrary to conventional wisdom regarding the presumed publicity ambitions of 
terrorist organizations, there has been a similar drop in the claiming of the “terrorist spectacular” 
(B. Hoffman 1997). This is particularly unusual given that previous examinations of unclaimed 
attacks have found the majority of such incidents to be low-level actions that are not intended to 
cause casualties (Cordes et al., 1985, p.15). 
 
The increasing gap between claimed and unclaimed attacks cannot be explained by existing 
assumptions, which posit that terrorist groups will seek to advertise their success so as to 
establish themselves as a threat, call attention to their cause, and generate support amongst 
sympathetic populations (Crenshaw 1995; A.M. Hoffman 2010; Knutson 1980; LaFree & Dugan 
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2004; Nacos 2002; Picard 1993; Staun 2009; Waugh Jr. 1983). Explanations involving the 
advent of new technologies—such as remote time bombs that eliminated the “personal heroism” 
required by the anarchist bomb thrower of the 19th century and allowed for a less discriminating 
and more anonymous attack (Wardlaw, 1989, p.31)—also cannot explain the variation in 
claiming behavior between the late 1970s, 1980s and subsequent decades, given that such 
technologies existed throughout the aforementioned period. The decline in claiming tendency has 
persisted despite the fact that, due to the supposedly poor communicative properties of violence 
(Cordes et al. 1985; Johnston 1995; Sper 1995), anonymity and lack of context have been found 
to generate confusion with regard to actor, motive, and message content that undermines the 
terrorist’s ability to gain support/understanding and elicit policy concessions from governments 
(A.M. Hoffman 2010). Furthermore, this tendency towards anonymity has increased in spite of 
the knowledge that the absence of media coverage (and the publicity it brings) is repeatedly cited 
as a factor in the decline of terrorist groups (Cordes et al. 1985; DeGhetto 1994; Horowitz 1983; 
Lockett 1995) and that the media is more likely to report on attacks in which responsibility has 
been established (Bockstette, 2008, p.19; Weimann & Winn 1993). This behavior is particularly 
puzzling in the case of large-scale or high-profile attacks, as current logic dictates that such an 
event requires a higher level of planning, expertise, and execution from which a successful 
terrorist group would benefit in terms of audience outreach through greater media coverage.   
 
B. Statement of Purpose 
This thesis seeks to develop a more complete understanding of terrorists’ decision-making 
strategies in relation to the planning and execution of acts of violence by examining the variation 
in credit taking behavior of a single terrorist organization and developing an account of the 
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fluctuating relationship between terrorists’ conflicting desire for publicity and anonymity. 
Specifically, discourse analysis situated within a constructivist framework will be used to 
explore paired claimed/unclaimed1 acts of terrorism to investigate the presumed difference in 
terrorist identity narratives attached to both types of attacks and determine whether claim status 
is correlated with certain actor characterizations that may attest to the increase in unclaimed 
attacks.  
 
It should be noted that the use of a case study approach in the instance of a singular organization, 
though providing valuable insight from the perspective of “building-block” theory development, 
does caution against the overgeneralization of findings to all unclaimed terrorist acts. 
Furthermore, the study does not profess to evaluate the effect of claim status on actors outside of 
the perpetrating terrorist organization and the target audience/government, such as sympathetic 
constituencies or rival terrorist groups. It is hoped that the foundational research conducted by 
this study will assist with the future development of a broader theoretical model for unclaimed 
terrorist attacks, particularly those that are religiously motivated.  
 
C. Value of Research 
Claims of responsibility provide a more complete understanding of the terrorists’ decision-
making and planning strategy, as well as insight into variations between terrorist groups 
(Rapoport 1997). According to A.M. Hoffman (2010), credit taking has the potential to reveal a 
great deal about the nature of the threat groups pose, their ultimate aims, the incentives affecting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Unclaimed” is understood to mean a terrorist attack for which no credible, formal claim of 
responsibility has been issued by the author(s). Consequently, it does not imply an absolute lack 
of claims issued, simply that the validity of said claims has been discounted by authorities.   
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their behavior, and the adequacy of government and audience response to their attacks. For 
instance, Enders and Sandler (2006) suggest that anonymous attacks presume groups are 
disinterested in establishing grassroots support and do not place value in the possibility of future 
compromise, whereas claimed attacks are viewed as signaling a lack of fear of government 
counter-terrorism efforts (as cited in B. Hoffman 1997). According to Clarke and Newman 
(2006), choice-structuring properties not only provide information regarding the incident but also 
testify to the criminal offender (e.g. his/her needs, preferences, personal characteristics, and 
perceptions); understanding how acts of violence are driven and exploited by terrorist 
motivations will enable law enforcement to manipulate situations to increase risk and difficulty 
of execution while minimizing rewards (as cited in Rorie 2008). The proposed comparative 
format allows for the empirical identification and investigation of circumstances under which a 
group will seek to formally claim their attacks as well as variation in the reception and 
interpretation of such acts by the target government and mass public, information that may prove 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF SCHOLARSHIP 
 
A. The Communicative Nature of Terrorism 
There is a dispute in both the academic and political world over who or what qualifies as worthy 
of the label “terrorism”; however, one of the most common elements of these varied depictions is 
the phenomenon’s communicative nature. Terrorism is conceptualized most broadly as a public 
act intended to coerce an audience (A.M. Hoffman 2010; Horgan, 2004, p.31; Weinberg et al. 
2004). Scholarship has documented various aspects of this communicative function, including its 
manipulative power over audience perception (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p.28), dependence 
upon context reading (Crelinsten 1989a), and its claim for attention and legitimacy (Crelinsten 
1989b). According to Louise Richardson, “the point of terrorism is to communicate a message. It 
is not violence for the sake of it, or even violence in the expectation of defeating the enemy; 
rather it is violence to convey a political message” (2006, p.21). It is in fact this characteristic, 
the tendency to seek maximum attention and exposure as well as the necessity of justifying the 
violence in terms of social values, political or religious meaning, that distinguishes terrorism in 
the amorphous world of violent crime (Crenshaw, 1995, p.15; LaFree & Dugan, 2004, p.59; 
Staun, 2009, p.11).  
 
Based upon terrorism’s communicative tendencies, acquiring and maintaining publicity is 
essential to terrorist legitimacy, garnering attention and fear-inspiring potential (Nacos 2002; 
Picard 1993; Wardlaw 1989), securing a favorable understanding of the terrorist cause (Perl 
1997), recruitment and support (A.M. Hoffman 2010; Waugh Jr., 1983, p.7) and justifying the 
use of terror in societies where alternative means of redress are ever more accessible (Apter, 
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1997, p.2,5; Cordes, 1987, p.2; Rapoport, 2004, p.1502). The absence of media coverage has 
been cited as a factor in the downfall of terrorism (see Cordes et al., 1985, p.17; DeGhetto, 1994, 
p.17); as Lockett (1995) notes, “[a]n ignored terrorist group does not influence” (p.20). Failure to 
attract media attention may stem from the group’s failure to provide the extraordinary (Horowitz 
1983; Knutson, 1980, p.206) or from credit claiming; Weimann and Winn (1993) find that the 
media is more likely to report on attacks in which responsibility has been established (see 
Bockstette, 2008, p.19; Rorie, 2008, p.8). However, the consequences of a poorly communicated 
message may outweigh even a lost media opportunity. Instances in which the audience fails to 
interpret or attributes an incorrect interpretation to an act of violence may result in the loss of 
popular sympathy as well as group legitimacy, decreasing the pool of potential recruits and 
available resources and posing a threat to organizational sustainability. This is especially true 
when the public perceives the victims of terrorist attacks to be entirely random (Ross & Gurr, 
1989; USIP, 1999, p.4). 
 
B. Contextualizing the Terrorist Message 
In order to engender psychological effects that will translate into political gains for the terrorist 
group, the audience who receives the terrorist message must “know or have a good idea who is 
responsible for the act, and (…) must understand the message, that is, why the terrorists attacked 
that target” (Cordes et al., 1985, p.15). Yet on their own, acts of violence appear to be a poor 
means of expression that often require clarification through other means. Decker and Rainey 
(1980) argue that terrorism has become a “carefully designed and rhetorically sophisticated 
attempt at communication” (p.3). However Cordes (1987) appears less optimistic at the 
transmitting potential of violence, judging it to be a crude method of communication capable of 
READING ANONYMITY 11	  
sending only as complicated a message as “be afraid.” Sper (1995) concurs that “one cannot 
assume a terrorist group’s intent by its actions alone” (p.17). Without a clarifying discursive 
element, the terrorist act is left to speak for itself—a feat which it appears ill-equipped to 
accomplish. 
 
According to Cordes et al. (1985), the principal method by which terrorists attempt to influence 
the behavior of their target audience is via the claiming of an act of terrorism (p.15). Claims add 
additional information to attacks (Wright, 2009, p.6) and are helpful in providing insights into 
the mindset of those who view violence as an effective and justified instrument in pursuing their 
aims (Kellen, 1982, p.2). Claims of responsibility reflect the plans upon which terrorist groups 
rely in ways that warnings cannot, given the control the terrorist exercises over their timing and 
content; claims are not filtered through governing authorities who possess editing potential 
(A.M. Hoffman, 2010, p.6). 
 
Claiming responsibility for an attack is further attractive to terrorist groups because of the 
difficulty of credibly claiming acts committed by others given temporal proximity (A.M. 
Hoffman, 2010, p.7). As many groups have a vested interest in similar targets and tactical 
innovations can be copied (Fleming et al. 1988; B. Hoffman, 2006, p.148; Jenkins, 1981, p.6; 
Nacos 2009), credit taking allows groups to distinguish themselves from other publicity seekers 
and reap the presumed benefits thereof. Furthermore, given the constraints under which terrorist 
organizations function, credit claiming is an inexpensive and comparably simple method of 
projecting influence whereas alternative methods—such as attack signatures or specially 
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designed bombs—require highly trained operatives that are both difficult to recruit and 
exceedingly hard to retain and or replace (A.M. Hoffman, 2010, p.6). 
 
C. Current Explanations for Unclaimed Attacks 
Given the perceived benefits—even necessity—of claiming an attack, what circumstances would 
deter a terrorist group from making such a claim? The following paragraphs review the limited 
yet contested scholarship addressing explanations of such groups’ propensity to anonymously 
commit acts of violence.   
 
The New Religious Character of Terrorism 
In comparison to previous secular ethno-separatist or left-wing terrorist groups, the religious 
character of the “new terrorism” does not necessitate the justification of violence to an earthly 
audience. With regard to political ideology, Rapoport (1997) argues that groups driven by 
ideologies championing material goals and the notion of mass support (e.g. Marxism or 
nationalism) are more likely to take credit, as it serves to generate popular support for the 
movement. In turn, Crenshaw’s (1996) research on terrorist renunciation of violence counters 
that ideologies stressing mass involvement (e.g. communism or socialism) may reject terrorism 
on principle due to its “elite” character (p.252). 
 
Likewise, terrorists adhering to religious and millenarian beliefs are less likely to claim credit as 
they lack a real-world constituency to whom they can be held accountable (Enders & Sandler, 
2000, p.311; Post, 2005, p.461; Rapoport 1984, 1997). Post (2007) asserts that none of the rules 
developed for “ordinary” terrorists apply to religiously motivated groups as they “are not 
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constrained by their audience on earth” (p.240); rather, they place service to God over political 
ambitions (Ranstorp 1996) and thus have no need of justifying the commitment of violence in 
service of an approving omniscient deity (Post, 2005, p.452; Rapoport 1984; Wright, 2009, 
p.18).  
 
However, this sharp dichotomy between “religious” and “political” terrorism—and indeed 
between all general categories of non-state terrorist groups—as discrete and mutually exclusive 
is untenable. Neumann (2009) asserts that “if the objective is to change or transform societies by 
introducing aspects of religious law, creating a theocracy or even a caliphate (…) the political 
nature of the terrorist campaign can no longer be in doubt” (p.95). As with other politically 
motivated terrorist organizations, regardless of the grounds for their impetus, “[terrorists’] 
political programmes are violent expressions of ideological currents which are located on the 
radical fringes of mainstream society. In other words, they reflect broader political and/or social 
trends” (Neumann, 2009, p.95). This notion was confirmed by B. Hoffman (2006) in his 
observation of the preeminence of the ethno-nationalist and/or irredentist aims over religious 
motives in groups such as the PLO, the IRA, and the FLN (p.82) 
 
This blurring of boundaries is further documented in that essentially “religious” terrorist groups, 
such as Hamas or Palestine’s al-Jihad al-Islam, have displayed nationalist sentiments. Groups 
such as al Qaeda express a consistent ideological agenda targeting the expulsion of foreign forces 
and influences from Islamic nations and the creation of an Islamic caliphate ruled by sharia law, 
but the foundation of their rhetoric (which has remained constant over the past decade) is that 
Muslims, considering themselves as a single nation, should unite to resist anti-Islamic aggression 
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based upon the principle of defensive jihad (Blanchard, 2005, p.6). This may necessitate joining 
al Qaeda and likeminded organizations in opposing those attempting to construct secular 
democratic governments or seeking to prop up existing regimes deemed non-Islamic (Blanchard, 
2005, p.8)—a task that requires recruiting from sympathetic populations in much the same 
manner as any politically-oriented group. One may well argue that this goal (though perhaps 
grounded on religious principles) is clearly political in its objective, the pursuit of which requires 
public support in the same manner as a secular campaign. 
 
Media Coverage and the Establishment of Legitimacy  
Media attention does not automatically confer legitimacy, and the risk of inaccurately 
communicating the terrorist message may provide an advantage to policymakers and depress the 
terrorists’ desire to claim responsibility. Risk of erroneous communications or interpretations by 
the media may lead to a loss of support for the terrorist group (Abrahms 2006). Due to the event-
oriented and for-profit nature of the media (Rorie, 2008, p.10), publicity of a terrorist act may 
cover tactics used and their fallout but is unlikely to review the conditions that precipitated the 
attack (Altheide 1987). As Rapoport (1997) notes, “legitimizing terror is a difficult, usually 
impossible, always problematic task (…) to those who think justification is possible, very special 
circumstances are required: no alternatives, a desperate and/or exceedingly propitious situation, 
monstrous enemies unwilling to recognize limits who by their actions have made the terrorist in 
fact the true victim” (p.12). Unlike legislators—who possess large media relations 
departments—terrorist-media relations are furtive and provide less opportunity to refine 
communications (Altheide 1987; Clarke & Newman 2006; Rorie, 2008, p.10). Likewise, the 
limited nature of terrorist media coverage allows policymakers to detract attention from the 
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underlying issues and focus on punishing the perpetrators (Chermak & Gruenewald 2006; Picard 
1993).  
 
However, this argument does not take into account that terrorists are capable of, and often 
engage in, clarifying interpretations of violent acts; in fact both small and large organizations 
conduct a wide variety of formal press relations activities (Picard 1989). Note the videotapes 
publicized by Osama bin Laden, a more recent example of which attempted to direct audiences 
to the proper sources of interpretation and “clarify the ‘message’” of the September 11th terrorist 
attack (VOA 2009). Furthermore, terrorist organizations often have significant media resources 
at their disposal, possibly through a political arm2 that has full access to legitimate media sources 
and is capable of marshaling its own resources. Indeed, the asymmetry of media coverage in the 
terrorists’ favor (Bockstette 2008) has led policymakers to express concern at such groups’ 
ability to manipulate the media in the way they desire (see Isbell et al. 2006). The use of the 
Internet as a means of communication is also considered central to terrorist communications 
(Talbot 2005, p.48), and offers a broad publicity tool that is free of the media’s interpretive 
constraints. There have furthermore been instances in which terrorists were granted media 
opportunities to freely air their grievances; recall, for instance, the 1-hour uninterrupted 
interview of Osama bin Laden by CNN’s Peter Arnett in 1997, wherein the Saudi exile was free 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 e.g. Sinn Fein and the IRA (see Horgan 2004). 
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The Interpretive Power of Audience 
One argument against the utility of claiming is that it is unnecessary; the message will reach the 
intended audience in any case (e.g. B. Hoffman, 1997, p.4). As Gearson (2002) suggests, “[t]he 
need to claim ‘credit' for an attack is not as important if, in the minds of the terrorists, the act 
speaks for itself” (p.11). Following the September 11th attacks, for instance, even Osama bin 
Laden trumpeted “[t]hose young men [inaudible] said in deeds, in New York and Washington, 
speeches that overshadowed all other speeches made everywhere else in the world. The speeches 
are understood by both Arabs and non-Arabs—even by Chinese” (USDOD 2001). Yet a quick 
survey of notable terrorist incidents contests this assumption. In the case of Pan Am Flight 103—
unaccounted for until Libya’s 2003 admission of responsibility—investigators in the immediate 
wake of the attack were unable to pinpoint either perpetrator or grievance (USCIA 1988), 
leaving press and public alike speculating as to message and motive. As previously noted, this 
also occurred in the case of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings, which provided no contextual 
clues pointing to Timothy McVeigh’s anger at the federal government and the handling of the 
1993 Waco Siege and the Ruby Red incident. This confusion was further compounded by 
various expert misattributions that the bombing was the product of Islamist militarism. 
Furthermore, as described in the previous literature on credit claiming (e.g. Wright 2009), 
common attack techniques (e.g. bombings) are not easily distinguished from one another, 
requiring groups to differentiate themselves via credit claiming or expensive signature attacks. 
As the organizations with the resources to continuously fund such signature attacks are arguably 
outweighed by those who must rely upon more resource-conserving methods, no such 
distinguishing element of violence can be expected. 
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The Embarrassment of Failure 
An argument put forth by Pluchinsky (1997) in the case of the failed terrorist attempt is that 
organizations may be too embarrassed to claim credit; terrorism is not for amateurs, and the 
benefits of being viewed as such by potential supporting communities and sponsors may be 
detrimental to the terrorist’s resource pool. Yet events over the past decade have demonstrated 
otherwise—such organizations appear to find utility in associating themselves even with failed 
plots, which calls into question whether it is the quantity or quality of media coverage that is 
most important. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for a failed mail bomb 
plot on American cargo planes in November 2010 as well as failed attempts to shoot down the 
Saudi royal family’s plane in October 2010 and assassinate the nation’s Anti-Terrorism 
Campaign head in August of the previous year. The Pakistani Taliban claimed ownership of a 
failed September 2008 bombing of Barcelona trains and more recently the attempted May 2010 
attempted car bomb in New York City’s Times Square. Even al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden 
claimed the failed 2009 Christmas Day Flight 253 bombing plot. Nor is this phenomenon limited 
to Islamist terrorist organizations; Continuity IRA claimed multiple failed attacks on police bases 
in April 2000 and June 2009, while the Real IRA accepted responsibility for a 2002 attempted 
police car bombing and 2004 bomb attempt in Derry. Thus, groups appear to derive some benefit 
from associating their names even with failed acts of violence; rather than hiding their 
involvement, many go out of their way to advertise it. 
 
Fear of Retaliation by Authorities 
This line of argument maintains that claiming exposes terrorist organizations to counter-
terrorism measures (B. Hoffman 1996, 1997; Rapoport 1997) by providing governments with 
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otherwise unavailable materials for destroying terrorists. According to Rapoport (1996), 
publicity “helps an outraged public to mobilize its vast resources and produces information that 
the public needs to pierce the veil of secrecy all terrorist groups require” (p.viii).  
 
However, scholarship has noted that high-profile methods such as hijackings, kidnappings, 
barricade-and-hostage events, and suicide attacks are claimed nearly all of the time—whether 
due to the possible link between, for instance, suicide and cultures of martyrdom (Hafez 2006, 
cited in A.M. Hoffman 2010) or due to the fact that high-profile methods often require the 
perpetrator to identify him/herself (Cordes et al., 1985, p.25)—whereas low-profile methods 
such as hit-and-run attacks are the least likely to be claimed. Assumption of responsibility for 
terrorist acts and exposure to government recrimination neither necessarily signals the end of an 
organization nor poses a significant hindrance to the ability to launch attacks. For instance, 
groups such as ETA, the IRA, and FARC were targets of government counter-terrorism efforts 
for significant lengths of time yet continued to conduct operations that impacted the target 
audience. Furthermore, heightened environmental pressure or governmental retaliatory measures 
often serve as predictors of increased internal cohesion (Bjorgo, 2009, p.34) by suppressing 
internal group conflict (Crenshaw 1992) while justifying and reaffirming the terrorist 
organization’s views (Post 1987). As Sper (1995) notes, “creating a common enemy (…) draws 
group members together and increases group cohesion by increasing the salience of intra group 
bonds and core values as a source of security (p.72). Post (1987) does indicate, however, that 
retaliatory measures may have some effect on state-sponsored violence, as the survival of the 
state and furtherance of national goals are paramount; in instances where terrorist activity 
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threatens those goals it can be reduced or abandoned, as the state does not require violence to 
justify its existence (p.488).  
 
Scholars have noted that attacks on the public at large may pressure governments to increase 
counter-terrorism measures, which may diminish the utility of claiming authorship of an attack 
(Gearson 2002; B. Hoffman 1996, 1997; Rapoport 1997). Yet conflicting literature cites that the 
general populace is less likely to be seen as a “legitimate” target and thus such an attack will 
result in greater backlash and compel the perpetrating group to publicly justify their target 
selection (B. Hoffman 1999; Picard 1993; Ross & Gurr 1989), which inevitably requires 
assumption of responsibility. Rorie’s (2008) study on terrorist target selection finds that an attack 
on a specific target, as opposed to the general public, does not decrease the likelihood that it will 
be claimed.    
 
In turn, the literature offers a relatively uniform prediction that state sponsorship of terrorism 
reduces the probability of credit taking as governments generally find little utility in associating 
themselves with perceived illegitimate actors (Cordes et al. 1985; Pluchinsky 1997; Post 1987). 
Yet the effect of state retaliation in response to an act of terrorism remains indeterminate. B. 
Hoffman (1997) argues that terrorists prefer not to shoulder blame when governments retaliate 
indiscriminately—yet the direction of public anger in such instances may not target the terrorist 
organization at all but rather the offending government. Public resentment may delegitimize the 
government and lead to greater constituent support for the terrorist group (Frey 2004) as well as 
increased internal cohesion and a rise in the organization’s terrorist activity (Post 1987). Bueno 
de Mesquita (2005) identifies a U-curve with respect to government action; infrequent military 
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responses allow terrorists to claim credit with little fear of retaliation, whereas frequent 
counterstrikes allow groups to capitalize on public outrage.  
 
Even given the premise that claim making provides otherwise unknown information to 
authorities, one must consider that terrorist groups may be functioning on organizational rather 
than individual rationality; acts of violence, though possibly unrelated to the group’s professed 
agenda, are therefore critical to its identity and legitimacy and may cause the group to continue 
such activities despite additional risks (Crenshaw 2001; DeGhetto 1994; Post 1987; Sper 1995; 
Waugh Jr. 1983). In such instances, the compulsion of organizational maintenance may diminish 
the cost of harsher counter-terrorism penalties given the comparative need to provide a source of 
validation and purpose for group members.  
 
Public Relations Maintenance 
A further argument in favor of anonymous attacks asserts that in cases where the action either 
conflicts with the established group image or produces casualties over the acceptable level, 
groups tend not to stake claims (DeGhetto, 1994, p.10; Pluchinsky, 1997, p.7). However, this 
does not explain the general declining tendency among organizations to claim attacks; to allow 
for this argument, one must make the case that terrorist attacks have become bloodier across the 
spectrum, suppressing the claiming tendency. Yet if the level of violence spiked across the entire 
gambit of terrorist organizations over the past few decades (and it would have to have done so, in 
order to exhibit an overall decline in claim making), one can also assume that societies exposed 
to such violence for a protracted period adjusted their accepted level of violence accordingly, 
rendering such terrorism routine and mundane (Horowitz 1983).  
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Additionally, empirical studies indicate that the idea terrorists will damage their image by killing 
is not supported by hard evidence. In a study of public attitudes towards terrorism in Uruguay, 
Spain, Italy, Germany, and Northern Ireland, Hewitt (1990) observes that it is rather those groups 
that kill the most (e.g. ETA and the IRA) that have the most positive ratings, while groups who 
have killed far fewer (e.g. the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Red Brigades) have the most 
unfavorable image. (p.142-3). The study finds that attitudes towards political violence depend 
primarily upon structural-historical elements, and are therefore “little affected by either terrorist 
actions or by government policies”; moreover, “those (…) who assume that terrorist 
sympathizers will be alienated by atrocities are equally deluded” (p.155). 
 
Greater Fear-Inciting Potential   
This strand of scholarship cites that terrorists maximize the element of surprise which—
combined with the random targeting of victims—evokes higher levels of public anxiety 
(Garrison 2003; Gearson 2002; B. Hoffman 1997, 2006; Perl 1997; Wardlaw 1989) and 
presumably makes a greater contribution towards the furthering of the terrorist agenda. As an 
aside to her investigation of domestic terrorist targets, Rorie (2008) notes that in a comparison of 
claimed/unclaimed violence in newspaper reports, the media focused on the pervasiveness of 
public fear in the instance of anonymous terrorist acts. In the case of the former, the public was 
not as generally apprehensive but instead channeled their fear towards specific locations while 
expressing contempt for those responsible (p.52-3). According to Wardlaw (1989), if a victim of 
terrorism cannot understand the source of danger it is likely s/he will turn to a leader who 
appears to be knowledgeable and competent; if the incumbent forces prove unable to provide this 
interpretive framework and guarantee personal security, the fear and panic inspired by an attack 
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may be heightened (p.34-5). Cordes et al. (1985) observes that in the context of major terrorist 
unclaimed events the offender’s anonymity “enhances the confusion and tension surrounding the 
attack. Speculation abounds and theories of attribution are batted back and forth” (p.15), as was 
borne out in the previously mentioned 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and Pan Am Flight 103.  
 
Yet there are problematic elements within this theory as well. According to Cordes et al. (1985), 
a number of unclaimed attacks achieve greater publicity than they would have had they been 
claimed due to public fear of a repeat performance by a mysterious and seemingly more effective 
unidentified perpetrator (p.15). Yet this finding conflicts with that of Weimann and Winn (1993), 
who note that the main benefit—increased publicity—of formally claiming responsibility for a 
terrorist attack derives from the fact that the media is more likely to report on attacks in which 
responsibility is known. Even if one assumes that anonymous terrorist acts are more adept at 
inciting fear, if the phenomenon’s primary purpose is to communicate or further a particular 
agenda (rather than mindless fear mongering), given the assumed limited communicative nature 
of violence it would appear that not claiming an attack may be counterproductive to the terrorist 
agenda. 
 
Impact of Environmental Characteristics  
Environmental characteristics, such as geographic/cultural factors or competition between 
terrorist groups, may suppress claiming behavior. Assumption of responsibility may vary 
according to competition for supporters and resources; A.M. Hoffman (2010) finds that credit 
taking is dependent upon the number of active terrorist groups in a given theater of operations. 
Given relatively low competition an organization may not have incentive to claim attacks, 
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whereas in areas of high competition it will choose to advertise its accomplishments to 
supporters and potential recruits. A.M. Hoffman’s study, however, limits itself to a single 
country (Israel); Wright’s (2009) multi-country analysis finds little support for this conclusion.  
 
Wright instead explains claim variation based upon cultural discrepancy in the utility of claiming 
as a signaling mechanism. Yet Cordes et al. (1985) find no correlation between the geographic 
theater of the attack and its claim status; neither is any explanatory power inherent to the 
nationality of the target itself (p.25). Furthermore, in cases where those responsible are 
eventually discovered, unclaimed attacks have not demonstrated a statistical proclivity to be the 
product of any particular ethnic or religious group.   
 
D. Another Look at Credit Claiming 
Existing claim making literature tends to assume the poor communicative ability of acts of 
violence, yet anonymity is often cited as one of the primary strengths of violent non-state actors 
(see Kiras, 2009, p.189; Mulaj, 2010, p.19). It is unlikely, given the frequency of the strategy’s 
use and the agenda-driven nature of terrorism, that an organization would repeatedly select an 
attack style bereft of communicative potential or utility. A significant oversight (given its 
presumed theoretical importance) throughout the existing literature is the untested presumption 
of qualitative difference and causal linkage between the claimed/unclaimed status of an attack 
and its impact on an audience. There is a broad assumption that unclaimed attacks, lacking the 
context provided by association with a named group or cause, cannot effectively communicate a 
political message or that terrorists must choose between inspiring fear and avoiding government 
retaliation and conveying a message to constituencies and potential recruits. 
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Scholarship generally refers to formal claims of responsibility only in passing, focusing instead 
on the propensity of terrorist groups to issue warnings prior to or manifestoes following an act of 
violence; indeed, compilations of these communiqués are not uncommon3. Instances where 
publicity is not sought by an organization are generally not discussed in relation to the terrorist 
decision-making strategy4, and where present are couched within a review of other 
circumstantial factors (e.g. Pape 2003 and suicide terrorism)5. Within this literature, failure to 
take credit for a violent act tends to be based upon theoretical supposition6. Those few studies 
that do empirically analyze claim making are furthermore often applicable only as it relates to a 
particularized case or country of study (e.g. A.M. Hoffman 2010, Rorie 2008), and there appears 
yet to have been an examination of a single terrorist organization’s claiming patterns, which 
might provide insight into the circumstantial factors that influence claim making. A satisfactory 
explanation of unclaimed attacks, their communicative potential, and their place as a strategic 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Alexander & Pluchinsky 1992; Baader-Meinhof/Red Army Faction 1977; Smith & 
Moncourt 2009.  
4 Exceptions include B. Hoffman 1997, Pluchinsky 1997 
5 As noted by Rorie, 2008, p.17	  
6 Exceptions include Rorie 2008, Wright 2009	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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH QUERY AND METHODS 
 
A. Query 
Identity, as it is socially constructed by humans, is relational (in that the understanding of oneself 
is predicated on the creation of another grouping of characteristics of which one is not a part and 
the inclusiveness of each group is affected by social interaction) and cognitively processed based 
upon habit or prior experience (e.g. humans categorize experiences under a limited number of 
models that can be readily applied to new situations in order to organize and understand stimuli). 
It stands to reason that a society’s relationship with terrorism and its proponents consists of a 
cyclical application and re-definition/application of such frames based upon an amalgam of past 
and present experience. Consequently, the nature of terrorist actors should function as a research 
question rather than an assumption; not all terrorists may be “created equal” in the mind of the 
public (Klotz & Lynch 2007). The British public’s post-ceasefire understanding of and 
relationship with the IRA, for instance, may differ widely from their understanding of the same 
group during The Troubles or their comparative conceptualization of al Qaeda following the 
2005 London bombings. 
 
This research seeks to explore the presumed difference in meaning attached to 
claimed/unclaimed acts of terror by examining the identity of a single terrorist group under both 
conditions so as to determine whether claim status is correlated with certain characterizations of 
the terrorist actor that may assist in explaining the increasing prevalence of unclaimed attacks.  
 
 
READING ANONYMITY 26	  
The thesis addresses the following questions: 
• Do claimed/unclaimed acts of terrorism differ in their depictions of the terrorist actor 
with regard to intrinsic characteristics, ascribed motivation, attack brutality, or the 
breadth of power attributed to the perpetrators? How is this understanding conveyed to 
the audience? 
• Who is the “we” functioning as the counter to the terrorist “other,” and how are certain 
understandings of both actors encouraged or limited by the discourse? How does the 
emphasis or omission of certain aspects regarding the terrorist group affect the resulting 
identities? 
• How does the resulting discourse affect the meaning attached to the event and the 
resulting significance of the perpetrators as defined by the target audience?  
• How does the understanding of al Qaeda’s identity as well as that of the “other” fluctuate 
over time given continued attacks? How does this speak to the evolving relationship 
between a terrorist group and society? 
 
B. Case Study Design and Selection  
The use of the comparative case study format is appropriate for multiple reasons; first, the 
theoretical understanding of identity used here is predicated on the intersubjective, structural, 
social identity proposed by Hopf (2009). This necessitates the assumption that identities operate 
independently of whomever occupies the position of head of state—continuity in identity 
relations across governments—and excludes approaches rooted in the presence or absence of any 
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one leader or administration (Hopf, 2009, p.286).7 The comparative structure permits 
examination of the phenomenon of interest within its original context, yet the inclusion of 
several case studies as part of a single investigation provides a body of alternative explanations, 
preventing the frequent interpretivist trap of defining terms in such a specific manner that 
parallels to other situations are unfeasible (Lin 1998). 
 
It is understood among social scientists that the ideal conditions for paired comparisons rarely 
exist, and that the distinction between cases and non-cases may not be well defined (Klotz & 
Prakash, 2009, p.46). Certainly, in the case of “claimed” and “unclaimed” attacks, the dividing 
line is not always clear; claim issuance may be delayed, which renders problematic the case’s 
categorization under one mutually-exclusive label. For instance, in the case of the September 
11th, 2001 attacks, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden denied responsibility for the bombings until 
a sudden video broadcast established his authorship in October 2004; should the attacks then be 
labeled as claimed, or divided into separate segments with October 29th, 2004 as the dividing 
point? What of those attacks claimed under a pseudonym, or attempts by non-credible or false 
actors to assume responsibility? Or, if the attack is committed anonymously, what of authorities’ 
identification of the perpetrator immediately or shortly after the attacks; does true anonymity 
matter, or is it simply public attribution of ownership that tips the balance between claimed and 
unclaimed acts of violence? 
 
Given this constraint, Goertz (2006) proposes a case selection based upon a synthesis of the 
typology and “fuzzy set” approaches as it concerns “defining ideal types in terms of the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This assumption was borne out in Hopf’s own research, which found that Soviet identity did 
not alter significantly following the removal of Khrushchev (2009, p.303).	  
READING ANONYMITY 28	  
exclusive features (‘and’) while recognizing that cases will evince a subset (‘or’) of those 
characteristics” (p.84, cited in Klotz & Prakash, 2009, p.57). The demarcation of “claimed” and 
“unclaimed” attacks is similarly “fuzzy” and necessitates definition as it is applied to the 
research presented here. Yet as Klotz and Prakash (2009) recognize, “the tendency to 
contextualize concepts need not be an insurmountable problem for comparing across cases (…) 
even an elusive concept like ‘regime’ has fuelled reams of insightful research on international 
cooperation and global governance, despite abiding definitional disputes” (p.45). Thus, even 
within the contested area of terrorism studies, scholarly and policy-related gains may be made 
despite the absence of absolute consensus as to definitional particulars, both as it concerns claim 
status as well as the subject of terrorism itself.  
 
This study posits an understanding of a “claimed” terrorist attack as follows: any attack 
committed by a terrorist actor8 for which a credible and authentic claim of responsibility9 was 
issued by the perpetrator. An “unclaimed” attack is understood as follows: any attack by the 
aforementioned range of actors for which no credible or verified claim was issued, including 
those claims made via a pseudonym, false claiming by a group not responsible for the attack, or 
those groups to whom an attack is attributed solely on the basis of material evidence, political 
speculation, or historic behavioral patterns rather than formal claim making. An attempt was 
made to minimize the time lapse between attack execution and any issued claim of responsibility 
in order to preserve the integrity of distinct categories. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As defined by the 2010 United States list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations and the University 
of Maryland START database, or those homegrown groups inspired/trained by an actor 
contained therein. 
9 As determined by investigating authorities 	  
READING ANONYMITY 29	  
With regard to the dimensions along which the cases were paired, care was taken to match the 
attacks according to Mill’s Method of Difference by selecting from the gambit of al Qaeda 
attacks (or those of homegrown cells whit it trained or inspired) those cases sharing similar 
circumstantial factors aside from claim status.  In particular, the researcher attempted to account 
for those characteristics identified by previous scholarship as having an effect on claim making 
behavior, such as group ideology, attack method, target type, degree of state sponsorship, nature 
of the proffered grievance, and cultural roots of both attacker and attacked. With the exception of 
the 2004 Madrid bombings, each unclaimed case is furthermore one for which al Qaeda founder 
Osama bin Laden explicitly denied involvement. The particulars of each pairing are related 
below. 
 
Table 1: Selected Pairs of Unclaimed/Claimed Case Studies 
 
Unclaimed Attacks Claimed Attacks 
1998 US Embassy bombings, 
Nairobi, Kenya & Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania 
2008 Danish Embassy 
bombing, Islamabad, Pakistan 
2000 USS Cole bombing, Aden, 
Yemen 
2005 Aqaba rocket attacks, 
Jordan 
2004 Madrid train bombings, 
Spain 
2005 London subway 
bombings, United Kingdom 
 
 
1998 US Embassy Bombings vs. 2008 Danish Embassy Bombing 
Both operations appear to have been conducted by the Afghanistan-based al Qaeda faction and 
were similarly executed through the use of late-morning suicide truck bombers. Perpetrated by 
the same group of actors and without the benefit accorded by state sponsorship, the two cases 
control for religious and ideological doctrine as well as motivating grievance. The bombings 
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were conducted in response to a perceived slight against the Muslim nation and galvanized by 
the “plight” of the terrorists’ “Muslim brothers and sisters.” In turn, the attacked states ascribe to 
similar Western-democratic values or, in the case of the host nations, share a contested space as 
both a product and current ally of former Western colonizing powers. Furthermore, though the 
attacks were targeted primarily towards American and Danish nationals, in both instances the 
causalities consisted mainly of local civilian staff. The selected targets represent outposts of the 
attacked countries’ prestige and influence in addition to constituting their primary channel of 
communication with the host society.  
 
2000 USS Cole Bombing vs. 2005 Aqaba Rocket Attacks 
Perpetrated against physical projections of American military might, the attacks targeted US 
naval ships deployed in the Middle East that were not engaged in combat activities at the time of 
attack. Both operations were attributed to one of the primary al Qaeda factions (e.g. the Afghani 
and Iraqi branches), though to differing outcomes; the attack on the USS Cole resulted 
successfully in structural damage and the deaths of American sailors, whereas the Aqaba rockets 
missed their intended target and produced only collateral damage. Executed without state 
support, both cases are viewed by the United States Armed Forces as of key significance within 
the context of attacks against their naval forces. 
 
2004 Madrid Train Bombings vs. 2005 London Subway Bombings 
This pairing is unique to the study in that both bombings were committed by homegrown, self-
radicalized terrorist sects relying on al Qaeda training and/or inspiration against the transit 
systems of major Western European capitals using similar detonating devices and tactics. For a 
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time, each operation was considered the worst bombing in Europe since the Second World War 
as well as the worst terrorist atrocity within each country. Both bombings were shortly followed 
by another failed attempt (a bomb planted under the rail in Spain and a second attempt to bomb 
the London Underground), with the justification for the initial attacks centering on the country’s 
support for the US-led War on Terror. At the time of the bombings both the United Kingdom and 
Spain were considered leading allies of the United States (particularly in counter-terrorism 
matters), though both have long been considered havens or transit points for Islamic radicals 
despite decades-long traditions of handling domestic nationalist terrorism. It should be noted that 
in both instances the grassroots nature of the perpetrating cell resulted in substantial 
bewilderment as to the exact nature of the relationship between the bombers and al Qaeda 
Central. In the case of the London bombings, the confusion accompanying al-Zawahiri’s delayed 
claim (roughly two months after the fact) appears to have been an organizational strategy rather 
than an inability to communicate, given that the group has a documented history of following up 
ambiguous claims with more substantive and credible messages when it so desires (see the 2008 
Danish Embassy bombing or the 2002 Mombasa attacks). 
 
C. Methodology: Justification of the Discourse Analytic Approach 
This study is designed as the initial foray of a larger research agenda that proposes to examine 
the linkage between the media content surrounding claimed/unclaimed terrorist events, public 
opinion, and the formulation of counter-terrorism and security policy. The research utilizes a 
discourse analytic approach modeled off that of Hopf (2009) to investigate the assumed but 
untested variation in the construction of a terrorist identity and that of their target counterpart 
within claimed/unclaimed attacks. If such a distinction exists, the findings of the current 
READING ANONYMITY 32	  
investigation would be advantageous to the application of process-tracing in identifying media 
content and its use of problem-framing as a causal mechanism in influencing public sentiment 
and the formulation of government policy.  
 
Like process-tracing, discourse analysis and the accompanying constructivist framework 
demonstrate a proclivity towards the examination of process and change (Fierke 2003); indeed, it 
has been suggested that an interpretivist research agenda can serve both as a precursor of and 
compliment to a process-tracing research design. Why, in the context of terrorism, is it then 
essential to examine terrorist operations as processes delineated both temporally and discursively 
rather than treating them as separate incidents? As Davis (2005) observes, “[t]hough it may make 
sense for some purposes to conceive of cases as discrete empirical entities, sometimes it makes 
more sense to think of them as complex phenomena, each of which comes with a history” 
(p.175). Simply put, a population’s experience with terrorism cannot be summarized as a list of 
distinct events but more accurately resembles a complex web of sustained relationships, wherein 
the response to every new attack is built upon understandings of and reactions to previous 
incidents and their perpetrators. Within this conceptualization, the use of discourse analysis may 
partially compensate for the loss of certain essential information and the oversimplification that 
Alexander George admits could undermine the validity and usefulness of a more positivist 
process-oriented approach (1979, p.47). 
 
In applying an interpretivist methodology and ontology to the examination of terrorist claim-
making, not only does the current study seek to compensate for the oversights of previous 
scholarship that has limited itself to a purely positivist framework but it also seeks to provide a 
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foundation for anticipated future research. As Lin (1998) has convincingly advised, should 
researchers have the opportunity to combine positivistic and interpretivist research they should 
begin with an “exploratory interpretivist study” in order to suggest hypotheses and mechanisms 
that may serve as the basis for positivist research. The reverse forces researchers to “impose a 
‘plausible’ theoretical structure on the data before they examine it, which could easily leave out 
an important variable or include a nonessential one.” Because a positivist study will by definition 
exclude contextual information that may be relevant to an interpretivist study, the initial use of 
an interpretivist approach will, at the least, allow positivist studies to justify the omitted 
information as nonessential to the relationships under study based upon previous findings (Lin 
1998). Hopf (2009) confirms this assessment: “noninterpretivist methods are most appropriate to 
the analysis of evidence that already has been collected through interpretivist, hermeneutic, 
ethnographic, or discourse analytic means” (p.293). Before examining a link between terrorist 
identity and public opinion in constraining policy formulation, it is necessary to first establish the 
nature of that identity, the alternative discourses available, and how the dominant narrative 
interacts and delineates the corresponding understanding of both terrorist and target.  
 
The research proposed here is intended to answer the “what” of terrorist identity in media 
content and thereby shed light on how such depictions contribute to the cultivation of a certain 
public perspective. Yet as Wendt (1999) has argued, such constitutive questions are in fact 
explanatory and not merely descriptive: “[t]here are always ‘two stories to tell,’10 but they are not 
causal versus descriptive (…) Arguments from disparate sources [e.g. Charles Cross on the 
double-helix model or William Dray on the appropriate role of historians] suggest that theories 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For more on this concept, see M. Hollis & S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations. USA: Oxford UP, 1990. 
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which answer ‘what’ or ‘how possible’ do ‘explain’ the world” (p.86). What follows, then, is a 
discussion of current interpretivist standards of scholarship as they relate to positivist criteria.  
 
One must first recognize the divergence and consequential incomparability of interpretivist and 
positivist criteria of acceptable scholarship. For those in the positivist camp, the standard to 
which one’s results must be compared is the “averaging” effect—the “effect that one might 
imagine a variable having if the world allowed for a series of replication under the same 
conditions”—so as to be representative in the sense of the “typical.” Comparatively, 
interpretivists seek a standard based upon accuracy of detail so as to produce a complete and 
specific representation, representative in the sense of the “faithful” (Lin 1998). There is further 
divergence in the handling of uncertainty within both types of research designs. Positivist 
approaches reduce uncertainty through the comparison of as many observations as possible on 
particular dimensions (those deemed important by the hypothesis), whereas interpretivists rely on 
exacting reportage of the circumstances under study and the thickness of the description to 
produce accurate research (Lin 1998). As such, the primarily constitutive questions investigated 
by interpretivists, critical theorists, and so forth elicit misunderstanding when judged by the 
standards of positivists’ primarily causal investigations (Wendt, 1999, p.85), despite the fact that 
both aspire to and generally succeed in “explaining” the world. 
 
Both positivist and interpretivist researchers utilizing qualitative methods have developed 
sophisticated methods of evaluating and analyzing data to address concerns of validity; both 
traditions require the documentation of research procedures that may be understood by outsiders 
and are justified in terms of the knowledge to be obtained (Lin 1998). The standards of both 
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groups are legitimate standards by which to evaluate the validity and truth of a body of research, 
and their incommensurability makes one neither better nor worse but simply employed for 
different reasons. Within the context of this research, the interpretivist approach is preferred 
given the need for particularized detail; in seeking to establish the nature of terrorist identity as 
an affecting factor, the study relies on an exhaustive and nuanced recounting of such narratives 
to produce a complete and accurate representation. Every detail is important in its ability to 
potentially affect audience interpretation. Positivist approaches, which pass over such fine 
distinction in favor of comprehensive averages, would be unable to provide the necessary depth 
of description. Despite the incomparability of positivist and interpretivist research aims, answers 
to “why” questions necessitate answers to “how” and “what” questions (Lin 1998; Lupovici 
2007; Wendt 1999) so that even positivist researchers must engage in at least implicit 
constitutive analyses. Given that some of the most important natural science theories are of this 
type (e.g. the double-helix model of DNA or the kinetic theory of heat) (Wendt 1999, p.85), the 
value of meticulous interpretivist research has proven essential to expanding the field of 
knowledge.  
 
D. Methodology: Method of Discourse Analysis 
The method of discourse analysis employed in this investigation is taken from Hopf’s procedure 
for investigating Soviet identity using mass texts (2009). Consisting of four distinct steps, the 
design proceeds as follows: 
1. Finding identities: the enumeration of the “we” and “other” identities found in each text 
in terms of who is being represented, and how. 
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2. Contextualizing identities: the process of discerning what an identity means within the 
particular context of the original text. At the end stages of this process, the identities that 
predominate in the literature are quantitatively identified.  
3. Intertextualizing identities: the process of identifying whether an identity holds the same 
meaning across sources. If so, this step renders a powerful case for intertextual consensus 
on a particular identity: “the deepest stability a social structure can attain is when no 
questions of disruption arise, not when ideas of disrupting it are periodically entertained, 
but then rejected after calculating relative costs and benefits, or after deciding one had 
better not” (Hopf 2009, p.284). If not, the revealing of alternate understandings across 
sources given a nominally same identity is equally noteworthy.  
4. Intertextualization to discourses of identity: the process of conveying how the 
intertextualized identities relate to one another in constructing a coherent account of the 
identity in question to form a discourse. A “discourse of identity” is the collection of 
intertextualized identities that appear repeatedly when a certain identity is constructed. A 
discourse predominates to the extent that it is numerically superior to alternate 
discourses; however, true dominance of a discourse means that this superiority must 
prevail over all other discourses across the range of sources. An alternative identity may 
be defined as one that exists across sources and consists of a collection of identities 
forming a counter to the primary view of self. These non-dominant identities may be 
subordinate, marginalized, or silenced as compared to the dominant identity (Klotz & 
Prakash, 2009, p.51) 
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E. Data Sources 
The Use of Large-Sized Newspapers 
Newspapers have often served as a critical medium for social science investigations; prior 
scholarship has faithfully documented their utility as a source, including more detailed content 
(Nacos 2003; Paletz et al. 1982, cited in Altheide 1987), ease of access, and archival 
completeness (Padilla 2007). Though these advantages are important to the investigation at hand, 
newspapers have been selected as the primary medium for another important reason—the 
communicative impetus of their journalists. As David Skok, Senior Producer of Online Content 
for Global News notes, the “ultimate purpose of journalism is to communicate with, and on 
behalf of, the audience” (Hogg 2010). The Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in 
Journalism elaborates on this assessment, endowing journalism with the central aim of providing 
audiences with “accurate and reliable information” that “creates a map for citizens to navigate 
society” for the purpose of functioning in society (2011). The mainstream conceptualization of 
journalism and its practitioners consequently assumes that individuals are able to understand and 
make use of what they read and implies that one of the duties of the journalist is to communicate 
said information in the most readily understandable fashion that both accounts for and is 
sensitive to the culture and experiences of his/her readership. The advantage afforded by such 
mass popular texts—for even if some characterize papers such as The New York Times as elitist, 
there is often an overlap of shared content with smaller, localized papers in the form of wire 
service articles (e.g. Reuters or The Associated Press) or even small newspapers’ reprinting of 
articles authored by their large-circulation counterparts—parallels R. Williams’s assertion that 
the authors of texts aimed at the masses (e.g. novels) “show people and their relationships in 
essentially knowable and communicable ways” (1973, p.165). Thus, it may be said that 
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journalists also “deliberately select words the average reader will immediately recognize as 
communicating enough information about the character. Because of their desire to be 
understood,” such authors act as “unintentional ethnographers for the societies about which they 
write” (Hopf, 2009, p.288). Consequently, the use of newspaper articles provides the researcher 
with an articulate, detailed record of the identities and related assumptions under investigation 
written in a manner accessible to and shaped by elite and popular culture. This prevents an 
investigation restricted to a select few and provides a more accurate and relevant base for future 
research on media content and public opinion. 
 
The case that must be made here is, therefore, justification for the use of large-circulation 
newspapers as a source of analysis. At the most rudimentary level is the quantitative explanation; 
newspapers of this scale simply reach a larger number of individuals in the population, meaning 
that their content is able to both reflect and affect the perceptions of a proportionately larger 
group. Furthermore, in terms of data availability, Pew Research Center’s State of the Media 2004 
Report records that articles in smaller newspaper are shorter in length; 64% of large newspaper 
stories topped 1000 words, whereas only 13-29% of small to medium-sized newspapers did so. 
At the largest papers, the average article length totaled approximately 1200 words, whereas the 
average fell short of 600 at the smallest papers (PEJ 2004). Shorter articles may be less likely to 
yield the detailed accounts that are required for source-intensive qualitative methods such as 
discourse analysis. Aside from content length, it must also be noted that the news reported 
becomes more local and less international as circulation size decreases (PEJ 2004). Given that 
the events under investigation in this study take place overseas—though they may involve 
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American forces or interests—newspapers with a rapport for covering national and international 
events are essential. 
 
Yet in order to compensate for accusations of elitism that have been occasionally levied against 
major newspapers, this study also includes data from the wire services of The Associated Press 
and Reuters. These services supplement national and international coverage not only for large 
papers but also for those with smaller circulations that rely on such sources to complement their 
limited news gathering resources (PEJ 2004). Consequently, the sources that have been identified 
in this study are ones made available to and consumed by all segments of the literate population, 
which strengthens the likelihood that their content would reflect the dominant cultural discourses 
on terrorism. 
 
Justification of Country-Specific Sources 
For this study, The Associated Press, The New York Times and The Washington Post will be used 
as representative measures of American media culture. The New York Times and The Washington 
Post are two of the largest, nationally-circulated broadsheet papers in the country; in the case of 
the former, it is also the most highly-trafficked American news website and boasts the highest 
volume of articles as compared to other papers (PEJ 2004). The Washington Post, headquartered 
in the nation’s capital, produces a superior quantity of articles on national politics and provides 
intensive coverage of US interests abroad. For its part, The Associated Press is the leading 
national wire service; innumerable news sources within and outside of the United States utilize 
its articles.  
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British coverage of the terrorist acts will be collected from Reuters, The Guardian, The Daily 
Telegraph and The Times. Reuters, headquartered in London, is the world’s largest international 
news agency and has a stated policy of “neutral language” when covering terrorist events 
(Thomson Reuters 2011). Also based in London, the left-leaning Guardian is one of the top-
selling broadsheets and the largest English-language newspaper presence on the Internet behind 
The New York Times—in the case of the United Kingdom, it is also the highest-trafficked virtual 
news presence (Reid & Teizeira 2010). To balance the political leanings of The Guardian, 
content from the center-right The Daily Telegraph and The Times will be used in combination, 
given the difference in article output between these sources and their more liberal competitor. 
Both broadsheets are amongst the top three most-circulated of their kind in Britain. 
 
When identifying sources from a non-English speaking nation in which an attack occurred, 
English translations of articles from the primary newspapers in each respective nation were 
gathered via the World News Connection (WNC) service. Prior scholarship has established that 
high-quality English translations of original sources (such as those offered by the WNC) yield 
approximately the same scores under the rigor of content analysis as the originals and thus the 
use of such translations will not distort conclusions drawn from translated documents (Hermann 
1980; Winter 1973).  
 
The Selection of Articles 
News articles span a year from the date of the terrorist incident in order to capture not only the 
immediate aftermath of the attack but also the lingering repercussions of trauma and details of 
the ongoing investigation. In instances where the quantity of articles was of a scope that 
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reasonably permitted an analysis of all relevant articles, the analysis included the entire body of 
stories pertaining to the attack in question. For events where the quantity of articles generated 
surpassed the temporal resources of the investigator and given that selecting a random sample of 
articles would potentially eliminate key stories and bias the resulting analysis, the following 
methods were followed: (1) duplicate articles (the same story released for subsequent editions on 
the same day) were eliminated; (2) articles grounded in subjective opinion (those from the 
“commentary,” “opinion,” or “editorial” sections) were eliminated11; (3) those articles meeting 
the 600-word threshold of the “average article in a medium-sized paper” (according to the PEJ 
2004) were retained, as it was assumed they were among the main features of the paper and were 










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The elimination of these articles was justified on an authorial basis; opinion or editorial pieces 
are generally composed or decided by an Editorial Board, the staff of which are separate from 
the newspaper’s primary news staff (see USA Today or The New York Times) and who are 
generally distanced from news meetings, story assignments, and day-to-day newsroom 
operations (Passante, 2007, p.28). Additionally, many of these pieces were more opinionated 
restatements of news content previously touched upon in the primary news article and therefore a 
narrative to which the audience would have already been exposed. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONSTRUCTIVISM AS A THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
The adoption of a constructivist theoretical framework is predicated upon both the investigative 
limitations established by strictly positivist assumptions as well as the suitability of 
constructivism as an approach to the phenomenon of terrorism. It is noteworthy that a significant 
proportion of relevant scholarship assumes a positivist interpretation of the world, and in so 
doing inherently perpetuates certain contradictions within the theory’s application to claim 
making. First, the limited body of empirically tested claim-related literature relies 
overwhelmingly on the use of quantitative data, which narrows the understanding of terrorist 
events by quantifying only a portion of the elements inherent to an attack (those able to be 
translated into numerical form, such as casualty figures, location, group or single actor, etc.). 
Such datasets tend to be inadequate in their ability to perform a detailed examination of relevant 
factors—for instance, the nature and intensity of public response. 
 
Perhaps due in part to the privileging of quantitative techniques, positivist theory limits valid 
data to that associated with observable phenomenon. This has contributed to the 
conceptualization of violence as a “poor communicator,” in that it discounts the idea that who 
commits a terrorist act is equally significant to the understanding and interpretation of the act 
itself. An IRA bombing in Belfast, for instance, may not inspire the same level of shock and awe 
as the unpredicted detonation of a bomb in sleepy Oklahoma by persons unknown or an airborne 
assault on New York City’s iconic symbol of American economic power. Yet the same 
scholarship simultaneously assumes the existence of a qualitative difference between 
claimed/unclaimed attacks and their potential audience impact that cannot be explained under the 
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positivist framework, given that the primary factor of variance between the two types is, in fact, 
actor identity. Positivism fails to explain the divergence of response to attacks that are similar in 
all considerations except claim status. Where terrorists are concerned, all may not be created 
equal in the minds of the public; the nature of terrorist actors in particular should function as a 
research question rather than an assumption (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p.94). 
 
In ignoring the non-material, positivism additionally excludes elements such as cultural 
difference that previous literature (e.g. Wright 2009) has indicated may affect the utility of 
claiming terrorist attacks. Given the constraints on a terror cell’s material resources and its 
ability to physically inflict harm (Mulaj, 2010, p.20), one of the greatest power reserves such 
actors possess is their potential for coercive persuasion so as to convince others of the threat’s 
reality (Fierke, 2003, p.67), which may or may not involve a physical demonstration. 
Furthermore, positivist theory does not account for change across time and space and thus does 
not explain the fluctuation in public perception a terrorist actor over time (e.g. the perceived 
threat from a relatively unknown al Qaeda in 1998 as compared to that conceptualized by a 
desensitized population following a decade of extensive public dissection of the group and its 
agenda).  
 
In comparison, constructivist theory accounts for both the material and non-material elements of 
terrorist incidents, including the changing awareness of a particular actor in the minds of the 
government and public. It examines an act of terrorism within a framework of socially-
constructed identity and interests that permits the attribution of significance to elements outside 
of the physical through a focus on the interaction between terrorist and audience. Factors such as 
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historical context and processes of knowledge production may help to explain the variation in 
reaction to atrocities that positivist theory is unable to address. The compatibility of the 
constructivist framework with qualitative methods yielding richly detailed data allows for greater 
insight into this phenomenon. Moreover, given that power can be exercised through both 
physical capabilities as well as relationships (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p.11), constructivism’s 
challenge to the positivist conceptualization of power as material resources is particularly 
relevant. 
 
Constructivism provides a means to explore the fluctuating relationship between particular 
terrorist identities and audience response that has been ignored in traditional terrorism research, a 
factor made even more relevant given that the meaning of a terrorist event is collectively 
generated by the interaction between terrorist and audience (Hulsse & Spencer, 2008, p.576; 
Zulaika & Douglass, 2008, p.29). This is even more pertinent in the instance of the unclaimed 
attack, in which the identity of the perpetrator is unknown. When paired with the method of 
discourse analysis, constructivism allows the researcher to inductively develop a pattern of 
meaning from these interactions that accounts for the fact that the complex picture of reality is 
superior to predictive positivist mechanisms.  
 
The use of constructivist theory also addresses a gap in the strategic choice framework used to 
explain terrorist mannerisms, in that the strategic choice model neglects the reality that few (if 
any) sub-state activist groups engage in their struggles solely for strategic power concerns; there 
is inevitably a plethora of social, ideological, theological, and other factors that must be taken 
into consideration (Brannan et al., 2010, p.6). The study of terrorist claim making behavior 
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necessitates constructivism’s ability to account for the influences of language, culture, and 
historical context, as well as its deviation from the over-determination of “structure” in neorealist 
and neoliberal theory (Fierke, 2010, p.180). Constructivist theory incorporates a social 
dimension that is lacking from both the strategic choice framework as well as positivist 
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY NARRATIVES 
 
A. A Brief Introduction to Anonymity 
What constitutes uncertainty depends on “what we want to be able to predict, what we can 
predict, and what we might be able to do about it” (Marris, 1996, p.16). Arguably, uncertainty is 
at its most prevalent when there is urgent need for definitive identification despite the lack of 
evidence and there is little that can be done to alter these odds. Anonymity comprises a particular 
type of uncertainty that is linked with the inability to detect the identity of another individual or 
group—the inability to place an entity within the known pantheon to allow for prediction of 
behavior and appropriate response.  
 
According to Williams (1988), anonymity is a “condition that frees individuals from social 
evaluation or scrutiny” (p.765); having a name for something makes it “knowable” to the 
audience. There “may be individuals with whom we have spoken on the phone, whose names we 
know and on whose behalf we might have had to advocate in some way. In this regard, the 
anonymity of individuals is overcome for us primarily because we know them by name” (p.763). 
Yet thus stated, it may be argued that it is impossible for any entity to achieve true anonymity. 
Human nature dictates the delegation of a name and estimated attributes to unspecified 
phenomenon so as to render them able to be processed and categorized; our knowledge is 
relative, depending upon comparisons with other “knowns” for understanding. In the case of an 
anonymous terrorist bombing, for instance, before the perpetrator’s identity is revealed by 
investigative proceedings, s/he is merely that—the perpetrator, the bomber. An identity, however 
temporary, is constructed to compensate for that which is missing. We may not know activist 
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Dorothy is guilty of a recent string of jewelry robberies, but we do know that the robber snatches 
only diamonds (and nothing else) from establishments accused of selling blood diamonds, which 
allows us to ascribe certain motivations or principles to the thief. In essence, anonymity is a war 
of labels between the sender and recipient underlined by the assumption that the sender derives 
some benefit, whether material or psychological, from the identity that is attributed to him 
(otherwise s/he would find an alternate means of expression). Anonymity is the set of 
characteristics, motivations, and persona that is attributed to a specific actor or actors in the 
absence of his/her given identity; it is the degree to which a message recipient perceives the 
source as unknown and unspecified (Anonymous, 1998, p.387) but it is also the content with 
which the recipient fills said gap and the resulting relationship between sender and recipient via a 
new mediator.  
 
B. Introduction to Case Studies 
Within the context of the following case studies, this research has identified a list of primary 
actors: (1) perpetrators; (2) suspects; (3) general terrorists; (4) al Qaeda; (5) Osama bin Laden; 
(6) the attacked state (the United States, Denmark, Spain, the United Kingdom); (7) the state foil 
(Kenya/Tanzania, Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, the United States). Perpetrators encompasses those 
individuals responsible for the bombings before they are identified as particularized suspects. 
Alternately, suspects describes flesh-and-blood persons possessing unique histories and names 
once they have been detained by authorities. Note that perpetrators and suspects act as 
complements in that perpetrators forms the anonymous counterpart to suspects, just as al Qaeda 
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and Osama bin Laden form the named counterparts to general terrorism12. The aforementioned 
pairs (perpetrators-suspects, general terrorism-al Qaeda/Osama bin Laden), as they relate to the 
present case studies, describe the same actors with varying degrees of specificity; suspects and al 
Qaeda/Osama bin Laden are “known” to the broader audience and therefore the subjects of 
memory recall, while the creation and development of perpetrators and general terrorism must 
be formulated by the receivers at the same time the message is being processed. 
 
Anonymity is, ironically, a fundamentally social phenomenon, requiring an audience of at least 
one person—one cannot be anonymous if no one is aware of his or her existence (Marx, 1999, 
p.100). Rather, it is the recognition that there is “something to predict” and the realization that 
we have limited means by which to do so that creates the condition of flux within which 
anonymity functions. Thus, the analysis also encompasses the attacked state (the primary state 
target of the attack) as well as the state foil (either the nation in which the attack occurred, if not 
the attacked state, or that most frequently mentioned in comparison) as they respond to the 
multi-faceted identity of the bombers.  
 
Analyses examine the case study data by dividing the investigative period into four stages, as 
determined by the shifting terrorist identity: 
• No Claims of Responsibility: no groups or individuals have accepted responsibility for the 
bombing. There is scant evidence illuminating the criminals’ identities and attempts at 
further definition are captured by attributions to the perpetrator. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This is possible given that the “general terrorism” discussed throughout the selected case 
studies is used by the media to refer almost exclusively to Islamic terrorism (except where 
otherwise specified). 
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• Unverifiable Claims of Responsibility: several groups have unreliably claimed credit for 
the attack but a perceived lack of authenticity invalidates the assertions, resulting in 
continued use of perpetrator as bomber. 
• Tentative Arrest of Suspects: authorities detain the first group of individuals whose extent 
of involvement is yet undetermined, establishing a parallel between perpetrators and 
suspects.  
• Formal Arrest/Indictment of Suspects: convinced of the suspects’ involvement and guilt, 
authorities announce certainty of guilt for those detained, theoretically accompanied by 
shifting blame from perpetrators to suspects.  
 
The discourse surrounding the previously identified actors is explored and summarized across 
the four investigative phases for each of the six paired cases; for the purpose of readability, 
unclaimed attacks immediately precede their claimed counterparts. Thereafter, overall themes 
and differences surrounding the identity narratives within all claimed/unclaimed attacks are 
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C. Case Study: 1998 US Embassy Bombings 
What follows is a summary of the narrative discourse surrounding the primary actors in the 1998 
US Embassy bombings, divided by investigative phase to highlight shifting understandings in 
media characterizations. The principally descriptive format presents the reader with a detailed 
accounting of evolving identity roles linked to each actor, the significance of which will be 
evaluated following the presentation of all case studies.  
 
No Claims of Responsibility 
The immediate media reaction to the bombing reads nothing extraordinary into the attack, 
committed by skilled but normal criminal actors against a world superpower well accustomed to 
such antagonistic actions. The unknown perpetrators are seen as untouchable by state 
authorities. Their inability to be apprehended is not so much a product of American investigative 
failure as simply a result of the group’s operative sophistication. The difficulty in identifying the 
bombers can be attributed to four factors: (1) the skill of the terrorist group – careful, 
coordinated, and experienced, the bombers are hardly amateurs (NYT6, WP1, WP2, AP2, AP3, 
AP5, G3, R10, R13, R140); (2) the overwhelming array of possible bombers – the bombers 
could be any of 200,000 suspect individuals or 3,000 groups (NYT3, WP1, DTT2); (3) possible 
government backing – the attack may have been conducted by a combination of terror cells and 
state governments, whose extensive resources assisted in the cover-up of the operation (G4, R7); 
(4) the “superman” complex – the perpetrators are inhuman, equipped with the ability to surpass 
normal security measures and unable to be “stopped by normal means” such as metal detectors, 
armed guards, or concrete barriers (AP2, R5). 
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Barring the less prevalent “superman” discourse, the perpetrators constitute a skilled but normal 
threat. The United States consequently does not respond with panic or hysteria, despite initial 
surprise and concern. Rather, such demonstrations of aggression are “old news”; the recipient of 
30,000 threats annually (WP2, AP4, AP5), the US is “a major power, and people are going to try 
to embarrass us or take us down” (WP3) given the superpower is an “obvious target for anything 
the West is considered responsible for” (AP2, R4).  Grim, deliberate, and decidedly 
statesmanlike, America’s vows to “never give up” and “spare no effort and use all means at our 
disposal” in locating the bombers (NYT4, G6, DTT1, R5, R8, R9) resonate with credibility and 
experience (AP5, G1). The country projects confidence in its ability to deal with catastrophe and 
signals this with the immediate dispatch of aid and investigators (NYT1, AP3, AP4, G3, R3), 
sending knowledgeable teams who embody the “best chance for those trapped in the rubble” 
(AP7).  
 
Given that the perpetrators are seen as a normal threat, Osama bin Laden is likewise framed as a 
moral deviant and social outcast, defined primarily by the absence of “civilized” characteristics. 
An exile rejected by both state and family (NYT1, DTT2), the threat posed by bin Laden is be 
undermined by his marginaled status (DTT2) as a sub-state criminal actor whose argument with 
the American superpower is subject to asymmetric power imbalances. The leader of al Qaeda is 
a matter best handled by law enforcement officials, not the Pentagon.  
 
Unverifiable Claims of Responsibility 
Yet with the onset of attack claims, the contained normalcy of the perpetrator threat is eschewed 
by its more inhuman qualities, causing the United States to falter in its defensive strategy. The 
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bombers now constitute a novel, never before seen danger (AP13) capable of rendering the “end 
of the world” (NYT18) via atrocities far “better than Oklahoma City” (NYT24), the previous 
benchmark of extremist carnage. This far-reaching conspiracy extends beyond the actual 
bombers to a larger web of hostility (NYT20, AP20), made all the more serious as the 
perpetrators are not “crazies” but rational actors who execute deliberate, advanced (WP12, 
AP17), well-planned attacks (NYT8, NYT29, R14) with “audacious timing 
and…breathtaking…logistical skill” (NYT24), facing death with utter calm (DTT3, DTT4). 
Having escaped greater devastation only by luck or chance (NYT22), America’s prior assurances 
of security ring hollow. 
 
Attempts to specify the exact nature of this new evil result in the application of the classic 
“villainous mastermind” archetype. No longer a predictable bombing plot, the attacks are so 
extraordinary that they could have emanated only from one of the “masterminds of international 
terror” or are the brainchild of a rogue state government (WP5). Complimenting this new 
understanding of perpetrators, Osama bin Laden likewise evolves from isolated patron to 
charismatic terrorist leader (NYT7, NYT8, NYT20) whose influence spans the entirety of Africa 
and the Middle East (NYT8, WP5, AP8). 
 
Faced with new insecurities, the US issues repeated vows to deliver justice (WP5, AP8, AP17, 
DTT3, R17, R24) and its presence in Africa adopts a correspondingly martial quality that all but 
eliminates previous humanitarian assistance (WP10, AP21, DTT5, R19, R20, R34). Amid 
accusations of anti-Kenyan bias, “wide-eyed and battle bright” Marines prowl in full battle gear 
as America barricades itself behind razor wire and sandbags (NYT7, DTT5). These images of 
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separation contrast with repeated oaths to forswear isolationism (NYT22, NYT23) which are 
motivated not by aforementioned American bravery and defiance but by a grudging obligation to 
support global peace and democracy (NYT8, AP12, AP20, R26).  
 
Yet the inability of the US to deliver on its promises and identify, much less apprehend, the 
perpetrators calls into question the nation’s credibility as well as its anti-terrorist resources. 
Despite the dedicated thoroughness of American investigators, who continue to “pour (…) over 
repots,” “raking through the grass” on hands and knees in search of evidence (NYT19, NYT22, 
R18, R24, R32), America has repeatedly proven itself second best in handling previous terrorist 
attacks. Unable to gather court-worthy evidence against even known terrorists, the nation has not 
found or prosecuted those guilty of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, the 1996 Khobar Towers 
bombing, or even the 1975 murder of Athens station chief Richard Welch (NYT8, AP8, AP10, 
R18, R28). Worse still, America’s very ability to “understand and nullify Islamic terrorism” was 
lost with the 1983 bombing of the Beirut Embassy (NYT24), implying that the state is incapable 
of apprehending these non-traditional perpetrators.	 
 
Tentative Arrest of Suspects 
An interesting phenomenon occurs during the third phase of the investigation, the first instance 
in which there is a blatant paralleling of known and unknown identities. In the case of 
perpetrators, public outrage is directed at bombers who now are not only skilled executors but 
morally responsible for the tragedy. Even as credit is allotted to their considerable skill (NYT39, 
NYT55, AP25, DTT6, DTT7, R61), technological proficiency (NYT30), and intelligent, 
meticulous planning (WP18, WP45, AP22, G8), perpetrators are condemned as cowards (WP14, 
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AP22, AP23, AP26, AP28, G18, R46, R52), murderers (AP23, AP28, AP49, R39, R75), and 
ruthless killers (DTT7). They are not small-time criminals but rather the new, more vicious 
enemy of Western Civilization with coercive power and reach equivalent to that of a nuclear 
superpower: “not even the Soviets dared to strike at the civilian population of the West as 
bloodily as terrorists have in recent weeks” (DTT11). The morally corrupt perpetrators are 
capable of independent action and constitute a serious threat in their attempts to kill massive 
numbers of people (NYT48, NYT52). They form a criminal conspiracy that has “tentacles 
stretching to other countries” (NYT55) with “threads all over the world” (NYT55, DTT18). The 
terrorists in question are slimy, repulsive, and subhuman, insects that infest manifold places in 
innumerable unseen quantities. When paired with indicators of disproportionate power potential, 
such repulsive qualities lend themselves to a true security threat. 
 
In the case of suspects, outrage is ironically channeled not towards the arrested individuals but 
rather at the nation of Pakistan, the first to make an investigative “break” and issuer of a snub to 
the US Government in transferring the primary suspect directly to Kenyan, not American, 
authorities (AP45, R73). This sentiment is complimented by a good measure of contempt for the 
continued incompetence of African authorities, despite the assistance of “advanced” Western 
nations (NYT31, NYT38, NYT55). Kenya in particular is a backwater (WP16), a web of 
inefficiency and corruption (R45); in what should be the largest case ever handled by the 
domestic police forces, said units are instead “trying to fix a brass padlock on the jail door that 
had frozen in the open position” while suspects are held in a “ramshackle lockup” at the Home 
Ministry (WP26). The fact that the suspects are not, as in the case of perpetrators, similarly 
endowed with herculean qualities renders this failure even more bitter (incongruously, American 
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domestic media paints the US as a victim of rather than colluder in others’ failures). The suspect 
“round-up” by the Tanzanian and Kenyan police is childish, with individuals detained on the 
basis of “suspicious” characteristics such as possessing Arab ancestry (NYT49, AP37, AP39, 
R43, R69, R70). Even the authorities themselves admit their detainees are “not prime suspects” 
and not a credible threat (AP22, AP23). Furthermore, doubt is cast on Pakistan’s contribution 
given the nation’s flexible relationship with torture (NYT38, NYT48)—“American legal niceties 
do not apply [and] a suspect might be tempted to confess to anything” (WP37)—and the lack of 
a follow-up confession to American investigators (NYT49, NYT55, WP38, WP41, AP46, 
AP48).  
 
A final distinction between perpetrators and suspects is the growing tendency to characterize the 
former as autonomous agents, whereas the latter are unfailingly depicted as “disciples” (NYT45) 
of bin Laden or part of a team ultimately controlled by the Saudi (DTT15). The independent 
agency of each suspect as a potential bringer of destruction is therefore inferior to that of the 
more capable perpetrator, who has been established from the first as a complete terrorist unit and 
whose external networks act to augment rather than constrain unilateral action. Suspects are thus 
dependent not only for their resources but for their very status as a threat on their relationship 
with a more intimidating figure.  
 
Bin Laden steps in to fill this position, escalating his transformation from marginalized criminal 
to legitimate, center-stage actor. Terms of separation such as “exile” and “extremist” are 
increasingly replaced by verbiage generally associated with positions of authority in Western 
society. The “president” of a “terrorist university” (NYT46, WP49, G9), his role evolves to that 
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of “supreme commander” (NYT38) of a “financial empire” (NYT30, DTT15). He is further 
outfitted with daunting weaponry (an “arsenal of surface-to-air missiles, mortars, rockets, and 
tanks (WP42)), a private army of Islamic zealots (G8), and thousands of well-trained, seasoned 
terrorists and guerilla fighters (NYT30, WP54, DTT12) commanded by lieutenants worldwide 
(NYT54, NYT66). A formidable foe, bin Laden fulfills the promise of his Napoleonic trappings 
as a “state unto himself” (NYT30, WP46). A skilled executive (NYT30), the Saudi is endowed 
with the ability to declare war (NYT45, NYT46, AP54, G8), alliances with Sudan, Afghanistan, 
and Iran (WP49, DTT7), the means to pursue WMD (NYT44, NYT45), and even a fortified 
mountaintop stronghold linking him to a “diplomatic core” of fanatics posted across the Middle 
East, Asia, Europe, the United States, and Africa (WP38, WP39, WP47, DTT7). The debates in 
American tabloids of whether or not the CIA could legally assassinate the Saudi exile, given the 
presidential stay on assassinations against state leaders, implies that bin Laden has in fact 
become a head of state. An enemy of American creation (given the history between the CIA and 
Afghani rebels in the 1980s), it is arguable that the presentation of bin Laden as a state actor also 
attempts to justify American retaliatory actions of a state-to-state magnitude.  
 
However, Osama bin Laden the statesman now also inherits supernatural attributes akin to those 
of the perpetrators, rendering indistinguishable the real and the fantastic. A legend (WP24), the 
Saudi exile is a “force majeure” (WP32), the “bogeyman” (NYT52) who exists “beyond the 
reach of justice” (WP38). Indeed, he can survive America’s most advanced anti-terrorist 
weaponry, escaping unscathed from an attack by $79 million worth of missiles, each equipped 
with 166 bomblets individually capable of destroying an area the size of a football field (NYT61, 
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WP51). This “enemy of humanity” (WP47) lurks in his mountaintop “lair” (WP39, DTT9), a 
shadowy overlord and vampiric figure that seeks to dim the light of Western democracy.  
 
While bin Laden the statesman may be countered with traditional force, the new emergence of 
bin Laden the myth surpasses even American defensive capabilities. Consequently, the nation is 
cast as a trigger-happy cowboy (NYT53) in a "Wild-West shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later" 
script (AP90), retaliating to “mete out rough justice” (WP52) for the bombings; tabloid 
magazines in New York scream the headlines, “Take that!” (R87). Despite scant evidence and 
weak justifications (NYT45, WP49, G9, R82), the United States lashes out with gratuitous 
violence (NYT49, NYT50, WP46, WP52, G10, DTT15, R53, R81, R94) more befitting a 
cornered animal (NYT51, NYT53, DTT11) than an international superpower. As hyperbolic 
claims of success riddle the speeches of American authorities in increasingly unbelievable 
attempts at reassurance—the US is “far, far away from a dead end” (NYT31) and are gathering 
“the strongest evidence ever obtained in a major terrorist case” (NYT44)—the once poised 
nation appears diminished, closing embassies (WP33, WP41, AP29, AP35, R46), curtailing 
NATO participation (NYT33), and evacuating Americans with “panicky” supplications (NYT40, 
WP41, AP52). No longer a calculating global power, the US is an underdog under siege, striking 
out in a hopeless attempt to forestall the inevitable.	 
 
Formal Arrest/Indictment of Suspects 
The final phase of the investigation sees a complete divorce in the attributes associated with 
perpetrators and suspects; the cosmic battle against the superhuman perpetrators does not 
compare to the normalized threat presented by bin Laden, his al Qaeda organization, or the 
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innocent suspects. Popular outrage turns upon the US Government and its allies, who are seen as 
corrupt and bringers of risk, as it becomes evident that America is incapable of tackling the 
terrorist threat. 
 
Media outlets initiate a complete divorce of personal agency from suspects as well as those skill 
sets and depravities accorded the terrorist actor. In comparison to the morally twisted 
perpetrators (WP55, AP55, AP124, AP125), the suspects as individuals are “devout family men” 
(NYT98) coerced into making confessions (NYT60) by threats to their families and pregnant 
wives (WP59). Nice, honest, and ordinary (NYT59, NYT67, WP64), “nobody had an inkling” 
(NYT56) of any proclivity towards violence. The men could have committed the attack only 
given the assistance and deceptive mechanisms of an outside mastermind (WP57). Since their 
arrest, the suspects have further been the victims of rights violations, stripped of a fair trial 
(NYT85, NYT88), unable to comprehend the charges against them (NYT86, NYT101) and 
isolated from a family for whose welfare they care more than their own (NYT91, WP66). These 
models of upstanding behavior, some even of American origin (NYT82, NYT98, NYT105, 
WP63, WP64, R109, R111), know very little about Osama bin Laden and his organization 
(NYT60); indeed, they would not know the terrorist leader if he “knocked at the door and tried to 
sell [them] cookies” (NYT108). Their roles as terrorists were a product of learned behavior 
rather than innate depravity and required that they be “trained in the tools of terror” (NYT57, 
NYT58, WP55) prior to the commitment of violence. Moreover, the suspects’ roles as 
“followers” or “disciples” (NYT60, WP57, WP70, AP86) ultimately displace responsibility onto 
the shoulders of others; they have been exonerated of guilt in favor of the perpetrators, who are 
the “true” terrorists.  
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Now the preeminent focus of the bombing investigations, Osama bin Laden is confirmed with 
international legitimacy as “emir” of his own nation (NYT83, NYT90, WP57, WP73). A “master 
puppeteer” with “marionettes distributed around the globe” (WP65, WP70, AP100), the Saudi 
directs his armies on worldwide campaigns like a game of Risk (NYT80), declaring war on the 
West (NYT87, WP74, A68) and constructing an anti-Western alliance between the bin Laden 
kingdom, Iran, and Sudan (NYT73, WP68). A hero to his subjects, intelligent, brave, polite, and 
community minded (NYT100, AP56, AP115), to his enemies the once marginalized criminal is 
now the “harbinger of a new era” (WP68), a monstrous legend (AP56). The danger that he poses 
is such that the world superpower is forced to make unprecedented foreign policy concessions 
that are “not the usual way of doing things” (R114). Osama bin Laden’s ability to wield textbook 
coercive power in forcing the United States—the most powerful state in the international 
system—to engage in policies it would not otherwise turns the global hierarchy on its head.  
 
Ironically, now that America has individuals in custody its investigation begins to flag (NYT61, 
NYT89, WP70, G20) as public outcry targets not arrested suspects but bin Laden and the 
mythical perpetrators. The apprehending of “family men” is no longer what the public needs to 
feel safe. Once brilliant American integrity, already soiled by the failure to apprehend bin Laden, 
is further weakened by baseless insistence on the part of investigators that they have made 
“extraordinary discoveries” (NYT62, WP60) and are “convinced beyond a doubt” (WP56) that 
they have mounted  “one of the largest and most successful overseas investigations in history” 
(G19, R106). Alternate leaks of the “real” story from US officials note that the Government 
“can’t say for sure what [is] going on” (NYT103) and is “unsure how much progress has been 
made” (NYT68). The United States has misled the public in its justifications for bombing Sudan 
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and Afghanistan (WP56, WP70, AP61, G19, R110) and can provide no direct evidence linking 
the targets to al Qaeda’s leader (NYT76, NYT89). Compared to America, which has not only 
failed to deal honestly with and protect its citizens but furthermore engaged in grievous rights 
violations (its simultaneous attacks against Sudanese and Afghani “innocents” that bear 
uncomfortable similarity to the Embassy bombings themselves), bin Laden appears positively 
virtuous. 
 
Public outrage for the Africa bombings expands its circle of contempt from American allies to 
the US itself; it is the United States who bears “a measure of responsibility” for the existence of 
bin Laden—“we did spawn a monster” (AP72). Furthermore, had America followed the 1985 
Inman recommendations (referring to security upgrades for American embassies in the wake of 
the Beirut bombing), “you wouldn’t have had this loss of life” (WP83). Collective governmental 
failure to anticipate the terrorist threat as well as brash US action in the aftermath of the 
bombings have forced Americans to “now have to worry about security everywhere” (NYT63), 
even on “safe” home soil (NYT80, WP71, R109). Kenya and Tanzania have facilitated this 
failure; initially praised for their cooperation and foresight (NYT64, WP65, WP75), they have 
been rough-handed in their handling of the investigation, raiding charity offices (AP66) and 
killing the ailing father of a suspect during a house search (NYT77). The Governments now also 
stand accused of failing to implement measures that would have decreased American 
vulnerability; Kenyan authorities previously denied a request to initiate an armed guard service 
(NYT64) (guards wield only long sticks), refused the creation of a special radio frequency 
dedicated to embassy security (NYT94), and refused to order local police to guard the building 
(NYT95). Blame for the bombings is laid at the feet of an adversary both reachable and familiar, 
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whose failures facilitated the materialization of the attack. Incumbent authorities have increased 
the danger through actions likely to draw retaliation, introducing the terrorist threat to the social 
reality of the average citizen. This new enemy could appear anywhere at any time—even next 
door—but the mythical perpetrators who constitute the “real” bombers are so far beyond the 
known reality of most citizens that there is not even the satisfaction of defining what, exactly, is 
to be feared. 
 
Note that the contest between the United States and the al Qaeda organization has changed little 
from a traditional confrontation of state/sub-state or state/state actors; it is expected both sides 
will conform to the tactics and ability levels suggested by previous confrontations. 
Comparatively, perpetrators and general terrorists are exempted from the traditional rules of 
power politics; the threat they pose extends beyond physical security to a moral conflict of 
Biblical proportions that threatens the very fabric of Western society and is not readily defeated. 
Discussions of the al Qaeda threat are grounded in customary understandings of guerrilla bands; 
the group’s structure and aims are recognizable and therefore able to be countered. Al Qaeda is 
depicted as one of two models: (1) a “run-on-a-shoestring” (NYT90) extra-curricular association 
for the socially inept, or (2) a mafia gang (WP82, R65). In the first, the organization is 
comparable to an after-school club and has approximately the same retention rate, as 
membership dips with lack of interest or action: “[al Qaeda] didn’t have a purpose except to 
carry out the jihad, and since nobody carried out the jihad, it lost a lot of members” (NYT103). 
Its affiliates consist of “people who had no success in life and wanted to join just to keep from 
falling on their noses, people who love their religion but had no idea what their religion really 
meant, [and] people who have nothing in their heads but to fight and solve on the problems in the 
READING ANONYMITY 62	  
world with battle” (NYT103). Neither well-organized nor hierarchical (G17, DTT7), al Qaeda 
has been constantly pressured and repeatedly compromised (WP81) and could hardly pose an 
insurmountable threat. 
 
The parallel narrative is no more terrifying than the first; al Qaeda functions as an “organized 
crime family” (NYT78) whose members swear fealty (WP73) to their leader in written contracts 
(WP82). Formidable opponents, they plot attacks against America in secret meetings and seek 
backroom deals with equally shady actors, such as Sudan or Iran (NYT44, NYT73, NYT84, 
DTT7), seeking to drive Western influence from the Middle East and overthrow nearly all 
Muslim governments (NYT53, R14, R107)—a goal that seems out of proportion with al Qaeda’s 
known resources. Similar sentiments have been voiced by previous territorially-conscious rebel 
groups (e.g. the IRA or the Tamil Tigers), and have been kept relatively contained through the 
use of political bargaining or martial force. Regardless which frame is employed, al Qaeda also 
remains ultimately dependent upon bin Laden’s status as a threat, rendering the group a less fear-
inspiring figure.  
 
In contrast, the fight against perpetrators or general terrorists is a cosmic struggle of good 
versus evil that has played itself out through selected representatives, of which America has 
proven itself the weaker. Terrorist acts are more than a violation of the rules of civility, they are 
part of a timeless struggle for the fabric of civilization and the path of righteousness. The 
participants are not social misfits or Italian-style mobsters, but inhuman, cold-blooded killers and 
fanatics (WP55, AP22, AP55, DTT7, R39), cruel beings “eager to kill” innocents (NYT52) and 
depraved in ways that al Qaeda, for all of its bluster, fails to match. The world they inhabit, for 
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certainly such evil cannot be a product of our own, is a “viper’s nest” (NYT95) of cruelty, a 
“netherworld” (WP79) that permits the terrorists to “loom out of the mist and vanish again” 
(DTT17). Able to commence “the end of the world” (NYT18) and bring about divine 
intervention in the form of a “cataclysmic blow over which mortals have no control” (WP22) or 
“the arrival of Satan” (WP48, AP55), these phantasms are deadly adversaries with otherworldly 
powers to match. Organized, educated, and equipped with both worldly and divine powers they 
have “joined the US in battle” (NYT52) with abilities the superpower lacks and has no means of 
acquiring; the punishing arm of the law has no jurisdiction over this confrontation. The collateral 
damage of losing to such an enemy is not merely another bombed embassy but the loss of a way 
of life, civilization, and humanity itself (NYT52, AP95, G9)—the advent of “new dark age” 
(DTT11). The perpetrators pose a threat to the very souls of all who oppose them and will 
perpetuate the battle eternal; America is outgunned by forces it cannot match, sucked into “a race 
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D. Case Study: 2008 Danish Embassy Bombing 
What follows is a summary of the identity narratives surrounding the 2008 Danish Embassy 
bombing; given the unchanging nature of the discourse (and to save the reader from repetition), 
presentation of the four investigative phases was condensed to (1) pre-claims of responsibility 
(“no claims of responsibility”), and (2) post-claims of responsibility (“unverifiable claims of 
responsibility,” “tentative arrest of suspects,” and “formal arrest/indictment of suspects”).  
 
Pre-Claims of Responsibility 
Unlike the 1998 Embassy bombings, al Qaeda is identified as the primary suspect immediately 
following the 2008 attack (NYT116, AP125, AP126, AP131, DTT21, G25, G26, N4). The media 
retraces the group’s recent threats of violence (WP85, DTT20, DTT21, N4) and its “extensive 
justification” of revenge against Danish diplomatic facilities and personnel (AP125, AP126, 
AP131). Given the well-documented nature of these threats, the potential involvement of al 
Qaeda is assumed to be unquestionable (AP127, AP131, DTT21, N4); consequently, it is from 
this group that the perpetrators and general terrorists of the discourse borrow much of their 
narrative attributes. All three actors share a common geographic origin in Pakistan’s tribal areas 
(NYT116), fury over Denmark’s publication of the controversial Mohammed cartoons (AP131), 
and rely upon suicide bomber tactics (NYT117, AP131, DTT20, R128). It is significant that 
unlike the unclaimed attack narrative (in which unnamed terrorist actors are divorced from 
named counterparts), al Qaeda acts as a filter of understanding that presumes whomever is 
ultimately found responsible for the operation will be similarly well-understood by requisite 
authorities and thus able be subdued with existing tactics.  
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Consequently, the motivations attributed to perpetrators are reminiscent of al Qaeda’s ambitions 
to bring about the fall of Western governments and sympathetic regional autocrats. The bombers 
are motivated by a desire to avenge Denmark’s offense against the Muslim nation and to cripple 
Pakistan’s foreign relations and isolate its government (NYT116, WP84, DTT20, R130, CP2). 
Unlike the epic conflict between bombers and targets in the 1998 Embassy narratives, any truly 
damaging repercussions are confined to the target countries rather than the entirety of the human 
race, supposing both a limit to the perpetrators’ power as well as their desire to cause harm.  
 
Tentative initial suggestions of a superhuman perpetrator—bombers that can “slip through” new 
security measures using mysteriously-acquired “inside knowledge,” leaving authorities unable to 
“explain at this moment why this is possible” (NYT116, NYT117)—are dispelled within the 
very same articles. Hardly otherworldly beings, perpetrators are simply skilled criminals who 
have taken advantage of Pakistan’s multitude of security failures. Though a sovereign nation in 
its own right, Pakistan is depicted as a struggling post-colonial society, an abortive younger 
brother attempting to emulate the thriving governmental models of Western nations whose 
patronizing assistance (NYT116) cannot compensate for domestic failures. Overcoming the 
security precautions of such a weakling is hardly a great accomplishment, particularly given the 
deterioration in the national security situation since 2007 (N2, N3, N5) and the provocation of 
terrorist activities by domestic policymakers (NYT116, NYT117, WP84, R128). Against the 
advice of Western allies (NYT116, AP125), the inexperienced and unstable Pakistani 
Government (NYT116, AP125, DTT21, DTT22, R130, R132) entreated radical militants with 
peace agreements such mendacious persons could not be expected to uphold (NYT116, NYT117, 
AP125, G25, DTT20, DTT21, R128, R133). Under such circumstances, overtures to “illogical 
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fanatics” could only result in such an attack (N4, N5). Though talented, the perpetrators are not 
possessed of unnatural skills; rather, the Danes “have simply trusted the Pakistani’s ability to 
protect us too much” (AP131).  
 
Though the recipient of the attack, it was furthermore Denmark’s foreign policy choices that 
constituted the nation as a knowing target for terrorist violence, particularly through the 
reprinting of the controversial Mohammed cartoons (NYT116, NYT117, AP125, AP126, AP127, 
G25, G26, DTT20, R128, N4).  Indeed, the state had already invested in precautionary measures 
and relocated foreign workers from the embassy structure (WP84, G24, G25, G26, N4), negating 
the bombers’ ability to render the desired lethal blow. Unapologetic for its presumed offense, 
Denmark strongly condemns the violence, and its subsequent refusal to capitulate wins it the 
admiration of the larger international community (NYT116, AP126, DTT21, R128, CP2).  
 
Likewise, the attack was not unpredictable (N5) but rather part of an ongoing campaign against 
resident foreigners in Pakistan following the Government’s peace deals with Islamic militants 
(AP125, AP126, G25, G26, DTT21). Certain to increase unease in the foreign community 
(NYT116, NYT117, R130) and prompting the closure of the Norwegian and Swedish embassies 
(AP125, AP126, DTT20, DTT21, R130, CP2, N1), the retaliatory measures in response to 
blasphemous pictures (DTT20, DTT21, R128) constitute an “open and shut case of jihadis 
fulfilling an open-ended threat to attack the embassy” (R130). An Islamist suicide attack against 
Western targets on Pakistani soil is hardly unprecedented or unusual (R130, N1, N3, N4, N5); in 
fact, one might consider this embassy bombing odd given its realization in spite of its 
predictability.  
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Post-Claims of Responsibility 
In spite of al Qaeda’s claim of authorship, the post-claim discourse varies little from the 
previous narrative in which skilled (but not unusually so) perpetrators overcome the security 
measures of a failed government to seek revenge against a nation contemptuous of Muslim 
values—a trope easily recognizable from previous public dissections of bin Laden’s group. Here, 
to, al Qaeda  involvement is logical given the group’s threat posturing over the publication of the 
Mohammed caricatures (NYT120) and oft-repeated oaths of revenge (NYT120, AP133, AP134, 
G27, R131, R132, CP6). Interestingly, the organization’s assurances of pending imminent 
attacks (NYT122, AP132, AP137, R131, R134, CP6, CP9, CP14) do not become speculative 
fodder for press officers given al Qaeda’s questionable ability to deliver such promises in the 
face of organizational disintegration. A crumbling guerrilla troop badly damaged by the 
American “fightback” in Iraq, even al Qaeda leaders are “starting to prepare their people for 
strategic failure” (G28). With one third of its command staff killed in combat (NYT122, G30, 
G31, G32), the group’s integrity is dubious; even now its attacks mostly function as propagandist 
slogans rather than crippling strikes (AP137, CP15). Given that general terrorists derive their 
attributed characteristics from the al Qaeda organization, such characterizations also call into 
question the threat potential of even unnamed terrorist actors (G30, G31).  
 
Moreover, al Qaeda’s legitimacy as a vehicle for retribution on behalf of Muslim populations is 
jeopardized as the discourse of martyrdom (AP133, AP134, AP135) is overwhelmingly silenced 
by the condemnation of suicide tactics (NYT120, AP146, G27, G29, R131, R133, R134, CP9, 
CP12), which locates the act in the criminal rather than the divinely righteousness (Fierke 2009). 
The invocation of “suicide bombing” over “car bombing” not only locates political legitimacy on 
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the side of the targeted but also cultivates a moral superiority that delegitimizes the validity of 
grievance motivating the terrorists. In identifying al Qaeda as the bombers, the narrative 
establishes a model of virtuous victim versus depraved radical other, polarizing the liberal 
democratic West and an oppressive, backwards foe. The attacked nation consequently has no 
need to defend the legitimacy of its own actions given the contrast to the depraved methods of 
the terrorists. 
 
Such an act of savagery is to be expected in a comparatively unprincipled country such as 
Pakistan, given its infantile and unstable system of governance (NYT118, AP132, AP134, G30, 
G31, R132) and repeated failure to improve security (WP86, AP133, AP134, AP135). The 
embassy bombing is the latest in a “wave of bombings” that has rocked the nation in preceding 
months (WP87) in response to authorities’ well-intentioned but naïve attempts to deal with 
insincere tribal militants (AP132, G31). Ironically, in what was once considered “one of the 
safest places in Pakistan” prior to these efforts, residents are now “afraid to come out” (G33). 
Continual comparisons of this degeneration in security imply that were the misguided Pakistani 
Government willing to heed the advice of its more experienced and knowledgeable Western 
neighbors, such security could be easily restored. 
 
Nor are the identities of the detained suspects of an unexpected nature, as they were already 
suspected in a string of previous bombings (AP138, N9) and have well-established links to top 
Taliban commanders in the Waziristan region (AP138). Consequently, both the operation and its 
authors were predictable and the atrocity therefore preventable; the scenario was not so much 
committed as allowed to happen, intimating that it could and should have been stopped. 
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Denmark itself was both an active and aware target, having identified (AP136) and prepared for 
the al Qaeda threat in advance (NYT120, AP133, R132, CP8, CP12, CP13) as its publications 
resulted in a “sharpened [militant] focus” on the country (AP137). In turn, the European nation’s 
blatantly unrepentant attitude (CP6, CP7) is interpreted by the international community as a 
strong defense of free speech in the face of adversity, rendering Denmark—to the consternation 
of al Qaeda leaders—the heroic figure. Given the clarity with which actors in this narrative 
assume their projected identities as well as the resolution presented by both the apprehension of 
the suspects and the recognition of feasible steps to prevent a similar future occurrence, the 2008 
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E. Case Study: 2000 USS Cole Bombing 
What follows is a summary of the discourse surrounding the 2000 USS Cole bombing. Given that 
a claim of responsibility (though considered incredible) was issued immediately after the attack, 
analysis begins at the “tentative claims” phase. The discourse appears to closely match the 
pattern exhibited by the 1998 US Embassy bombings, in that the credibility of the target nation 
and its allies is undermined by all-knowing nameless opponents who form a terrifying 
counterpart to the comparatively normalized and understood al Qaeda organization and its 
agents. 
 
Tentative Claims of Responsibility 
Authorities immediately reject existing claims as false (NYT127, R159, R162, R163) postulating 
that organizations are “expected to claim the attack as their own” and thus implying that none are 
responsible (R140, R141): “traditionally, those who run around claiming credit are not the ones 
doing these things” (WP95). The pool of potential perpetrators is consequently without limit; 
there is no shortage of suspects (NYT126, NYT134, WP95, R144, R165), who may include in 
their ranks collaborating terrorist groups (WP95), hostile governments, or a combination of the 
two (R165).  
 
Safe in their camouflage of confusion, perpetrators possess abnormal abilities to render 
themselves inconspicuous by “disappearing” and “spiriting” themselves about (NYT140, 
WP114, G35); it is unclear how they managed to avoid watchful US Navy lookouts while 
circling the USS Cole in an otherwise empty harbor (NYT123, NYT125, NYT138, NYT142, 
WP90, WP95, AP159, DTT25). Infiltrating the safe haven of their victims (WP94, WP96, 
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WP116), perpetrators are “snakes in the grass” (WP95) able to “sneak up” (NYT140, WP89, 
AP171, AP173) and wreak “crippling” blows against their targets (NYT127, NYT135, WP89, 
AP159). 
 
Such stealth is further enhanced by strategic intelligence; prepared in the art of explosives 
(NYT125, AP150, AP155), perpetrators are well-organized, well-supplied, and endowed with 
excellent connections (NYT125, WP95, AP147, AP154, AP157, AP167) that allow for the use of 
weaponry “more sophisticated [and difficult to obtain] than that used by most terrorist 
organizations” (NYT132, NYT138, G25).  The bombers possessed advanced knowing of the 
USS Cole’s docking schedule, an intimate understanding of refueling procedures (NYT125, 
WP116, AP142), and foiled security officers through the use of classified information (NYT123, 
WP90, WP94, WP96, AP148, AP150, AP187, AP188, DTT25, R141, R144). Their prowess is 
unprecedented—“I can’t think of a major terrorist operation that has involved, essentially, 
hardware of that magnitude” (NYT132)—and unstoppable (R157, R138).  
 
Plotted months in advance and scrupulously organized (NYT123, G35, R165), the attack was “so 
meticulously disguised and carried out…that there was little the crew could have done to stop it” 
(NYT126, NYT127); it “really stands out” from the pantheon of terrorist attacks (NYT125). 
Though of “despicable” and “cowardly” origins (NYT123, WP88, AP139, AP150, R137, R143), 
the level of sophistication inherent to the attack (NYT126, WP114, AP148, R168) is evidence it 
was “not put together in a garage overnight” (DTT23). The magnitude of this expert achievement 
is astonishing; the USS Cole is one of the world’s newest and most advanced warships (NYT138, 
NYT140, WP89, AP139, AP142, AP147, G34, DTT23, R135, R143, R158), a ship that was 
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“built to fight” (AP146) and protect “itself and others against simultaneous attack by planes, 
missiles, and ships” (R137). Not only was this colossus helpless against the “maritime equivalent 
of a car bomb” (NYT123), but said skiff ravaged and absolutely devastated the USS Cole 
(AP104, AP162, AP163, DTT23, R161, R169) with a force so powerful it sent “terrified Aden 
residents fleeing into the streets” thinking the city had been “hit by an earthquake” (R135, 
R137).  
 
Confronted by an unknown and seemingly all-powerful adversary, the United States attempts to 
bolster its confidence by relying on tried-and-true military strength. An “unrivaled military 
superpower” endowed with “precision guided weapons, well trained, troops, and global reach,” it 
will bring the attackers to justice; indeed, it is because the US is “so powerful and [has] such 
good equipment that [its] enemies see that they have to use asymmetric methods” (NYT125). 
Somber reassurances of imminent arrests (NYT123, WP88, AP139, AP140, G34, R135) 
degenerate into “strongman” vows of “American justice” (NYT133) and vengeance (WP111, 
AP175); violent retaliation to “strike a hard blow” is both likely and effective (NYT123, AP150, 
AP155, R154). Reasserting its place in the global hierarchy, the United States commits itself 
again to the role of noble protector, “standing guard for peace, for freedom or stability…around 
the world” (NYT129, NYT133, G35, R138, R144): the USS Cole “not only protects the United 
States citizens, it protects the rest of the world as well” (AP186).13 
 
The promised retaliation is imminent, given that the joint investigation between the United States 
and Yemen is progressing rapidly thanks to “superb support” from Yemen (NYT129, NYT131, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Rare but contrasting references within this section hints at a world-weary, vulnerable 
superpower (NYT123, NYT133, WP93, WP112). 
READING ANONYMITY 73	  
NYT136, WP102, WP107); the investigation has advanced a “quantum leap” (AP170, AP174) 
and progress is “better than we could have thought” (WP116, R160, R161). Yet America had 
only previously averted such tragedy by luck (WP89), visiting Aden two dozen times despite a 
lack of personnel security checks and Yemen’s porous coastline (NYT135). For its part, ally 
Yemen is characterized as savage and backwards, a pre-temporal “other.” Dangerous and volatile 
(NYT129, WP96), it is an “exotic land with reputation for violence” (AP144, AP159) and a 
“place to make Westerners wary” (NYT139).  The gnarled and dilapidated downtown facades, 
once elegant reminders of British imperial rule (WP106), frame a nation now ruled by a shadowy 
secret police whose efficiency results from torture (NYT131, WP107). Lacking a true centralized 
government (NYT129, NYT135, WP90, WP95), the failed state (NYT129) is fragmented and 
anarchic (WP95, AP144, AP147, R140, R153). 
 
The Yemeni pseudo-state is particularly unfortunate given that it is “teeming” with terrorists 
(NYT123, NYT129, WP90, WP102, WP112, DTT24, DTT25, R140, R149), a “hotbed of 
crazies” (WP94): “next to Sudan and Iran, [it] has one of the highest concentrations of terrorist 
camps in the world” (AP155). With its “lax and inefficient” security (WP90, WP96), its 
“crumpled-looking Yemeni colonels in khaki uniforms” hardly compare to efficient American 
personnel with their “stiff salute[s] and immaculately tailored and crisply pressed [uniforms]” 
(NYT139). Yet the Yemeni Government denies this affliction (NYT123, WP90, WP95, AP139, 
AP142) and asserts that the incident was instead the product of an accident aboard the ship 
(NYT127, AP144, G34, R151), a position later reversed in the face of angry American protests 
(NYT131, AP167, AP168).  
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Even in Yemen, al Qaeda remains under the direct control of “[US] public enemy No. 1” 
(NYT131, NYT136, AP155, R144, R165, R167) and thus is of immediate suspicion (AP172, 
AP173, AP174). Accused by the Americans for past terrorist activities (NYT136, AP155, 
AP157, R159, R167), Osama bin Laden himself is frustratingly untouchable, “surviving any 
strike against him” (WP107, AP171, AP172, AP174) and taunting that “the dream to kill [him] 
will never be completed” (AP177). However, it is the unidentified terrorist that here poses an 
even greater danger. An ever-present threat (WP101) and unavoidable risk (NYT125), these 
faceless specters “creep…ever closer” to the shores of a people unable to flee (WP101, R149). 
Savvy and impossible to pin down, they continually probe for America’s “Achilles’ heel” 
(NYT125) and new ways to carry out attacks (WP112, R149, R164): “where you shut them 
down…they go back and cook up a new way” (R164). 
 
Tentative Arrest of Suspects 
The arrest of unremarkable suspects during this phase results in an imagined perpetrator who 
excels far beyond the normal criminal. Organized (AP208) and well-financed (NYT146), 
perpetrators are highly disciplined in maintaining years of  “airtight operational security” 
(NYT143, NYT149, NYT161, AP207, G36, R174, R176). Determined to attack until successful 
(NYT146, NYT149, AP215), these persons are more than “just two guys getting a week’s 
training in the mountains of Afghanistan” (WP131). Utilizing “technological savvy unknown in 
[Yemen]” (WP134), the level of professionalism inherent to the operation (NYT149, AP199, 
R172) identifies it as possibly of state support (WP131, WP134, AP208). As explosive material 
is available in only four nations (of which two are the US and Israel) (NYT146, NYT155), the 
bombing was obviously conducted by resourceful experts (NYT143, NYT161, AP199, AP213, 
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R174). The resulting explosion compares to “David killing Goliath” (NYT146) in crippling one 
of the world’s most advanced combat ships (NYT159, WP132, AP131, AP202, R176, R177, 
R179) and delivering one of the “most violent and humiliating moments in the [US] Navy’s 
peacetime history” (NYT150). 
 
In contrast to these polished figures, the arrested suspects are painfully conspicuous with thick 
Arab accents and foreign appearances (NYT151), Saudi Arabian-born Yemenis from bin 
Laden’s ancestral homeland (NYT159, NYT163, NYT164). Yet geography appears to be the 
only similarity between the al Qaeda leader and the detained, as the suspects are unskilled, 
requiring outside guidance (NYT161, WP121, AP210) and hardly capable of enacting a 
spectacle on the scale of the USS Cole. 
 
In comparison to the viciousness of nameless terrorism (NYT146, WP128, AP212), Osama bin 
Laden is typified as a normalized threat. Commander of a foreign army and architect of a global 
anti-American crusade (NYT144, NYT146, NYT159), the Saudi is linked to the deadliest 
terrorist acts of the past decade (WP125) and poses a continued threat to the American people 
(WP137, R175). His excellent recruiting methods (NYT164, WP121, AP196, G36) have 
propelled bin Laden to the top of the FBI’s “most wanted” list (NYT143, NYT163, AP210). 
 
Its arrests proving unsatisfying, the United States tries instead to reinforce its commitment 
(NYT149, WP135, WP137, AP198, AP212) and role as “unbowed” superpower (NYT146, 
NYT150, WP128) vital to continued global security (NYT165, AP214). A “world of stunning 
technical sophistication and global reach barely imaginable amid the unchanging rhythms and 
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beliefs of life [in Yemen]” (NYT159), American boasts still fail to disguise that the mighty 
superpower was “humbled by two Arab men in a motorized skiff” (NYT146) and limped away 
(NYT150), dependent upon allies for continued safety (NYT164).  
 
Damaged American credibility also dampens investigative progress and casts the attack as the 
fault of political ambition. US officials had played down “two stark warnings” issued prior to the 
bombing (NYT143), and the Pentagon’s top intelligence expert on regional terrorist threats 
resigned immediately claiming safety was sacrificed for stronger bilateral ties (NYT145, WP120, 
AP191, R170). Furthermore, it is revealed that “no conclusive progress” has actually been made 
in locating the conspirators, which may now take “weeks, months, or even longer” (NYT150). 
The “bogged down” state of the investigation (NYT149, AP203, AP209) is heavily influenced 
by Yemeni resistance, as the United States can “muster expertise and sophistication far beyond 
what is possible in Yemen” (NYT149, WP119, WP121, WP126) but has had the “door slammed 
on them” (NYT153, NYT160, AP130, R175).  
 
Initial qualms regarding Yemeni stability and integrity are confirmed by accusations of duplicity. 
The country, given its savagery (NYT143, NYT151), human rights abuses (NYT148, WP125), 
lawlessness (NYT159, NYT164) and deluge of terrorist inhabitants (NYT148, NYT150, 
NYT154, WP120), is incapable of conducting a first-rate investigation. Yemen assumes a 
“haphazard” approach to the matter of criminal investigations (NYT153, WP119, WP199) and 
deliberately hinders the investigation for fear of incriminating government employees (NYT162, 
AP210, AP234); two of the capital’s most influential people were one-time allies of Osama bin 
Laden (NYT164). Police obscure “crucial evidence” (NYT153) and block FBI involvement 
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(NYT148, NYT149) with a maliciousness mirrored by the mass public, who express “a halting, 
half-expressed sense of astonishment, sometimes of satisfaction and even pleasure” at the attack 
(NYT146): “a few men pointed at [the crippled destroyer] and laughed. Women draped in 
chadors watching from windows and balconies shouted that the sight made them happy” 
(AP201). USS Cole crewmembers accuse harbor workers of acting suspiciously on the morning 
of the bombing (WP132), implying a pervasive and far-reaching conspiracy. 
 
Formal Arrest/Indictment of Suspects 
The final stages of the discourse capture a barbaric failed state and its much diminished 
superpower ally, the threat against whom remains continues to thrive and which is incomparable 
to normalized threats such as that posed by al Qaeda and its minions. As in the case of the 1998 
US Embassy bombings, media characterization of suspects builds upon a previous discourse of 
unsuitability that results in detainees’ de facto exoneration. The arrested are but henchmen 
(NYT176) acting on the command of others (AP222, AP225), victims of circumstance that hail 
from “frequently persecuted” Ismaili Muslim areas (NYT168) and who are unable to gain a fair 
trial in a country where defendants are denied lawyers and judges are swayed by bribes or 
government pressure (AP225). Even prime suspect Muhammad Omar al-Harazi, though 
admittedly a potential “main plotter” (NYT166, NYT169), obtained his skills by training at one 
of Osama bin Laden’s many terrorist camps (NYT168, NYT169, NYT174). The fact that he is 
party to an organization “controlled by” bin Laden (NYT166, WP138) and his actions dictated 
by the Saudi exile (NYT177, DTT26) renders al-Harazi’s guilt not entirely of his own making.  
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Moreover, despite the detainment of suspects, perpetrators continue to exist as “clever, 
committed terrorists” able to overcome our security to commit unprecedented atrocities 
(NYT172, AP223, AP224, R183); they are “predators who will always search and look for 
weaknesses” (AP229, AP230). Consequently, as the apprehension of suspects has not notably 
decreased the danger facing the United States, the nation is stripped of its role as global protector 
and superpower. Evidence comes to light that the military of which American authorities had 
boasted so confidently was partially responsible for the attack’s success. Captain and crew of the 
USS Cole failed to follow at least 30 of 62 security procedures prior to the incident (NYT167, 
WP138, WP141, WP142), and the lack of timely intelligence, judgment, or coordinated strategy 
(NYT170, NYT173, AP220) criminalizes the entire chain of command (AP229, AP230, R185).  
 
Furthermore, early investigative breakthroughs have petered out, leaving investigators with 
circumstantial evidence (NYT174) incapable even of assigning blame to bin Laden (NYT166, 
NYT177, WP138, AP232, R182, R183). Yemeni refusal to widen the inquiry to include 
domestic Islamic groups (R188) has confounded progress, while its authorities continue to 
frustrate FBI efforts (AP218): “much of the way the Yemenis have conducted the investigation 
has been troubling” (NYT176). Given its marginal system of governance and plethora of terrorist 
organizations (WP138), the Yemeni Government has “clamped down hard in the one place it 
could – Sana’a International Airport” (WP153). Unable to guarantee the safety of its 
investigators, America is forced to evacuate them (WP147, WP149) in yet another hasty retreat. 
 
In direct contrast is the evermore statesmanlike Osama bin Laden, an icon Arab leaders cannot 
ignore (NYT169) and possessed of his “own Arab kingdom in southern Afghanistan” (WP149). 
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Untouchable (NYT176) and sovereign (NYT176, AP222, DTT26), bin Laden and his foreign 
allies (WP145) “clearly [have] the US military on edge” (WP148). Capable of transnational 
operations (NYT166, AP231), the Saudi’s power stems from singular control over the al Qaeda 
organization (NYT177, DTT26). General terrorists, however, pose a “pervasive and enduring 
threat” to America (AP224, R183, R185) that is more dangerous (NYT173) and encompasses the 
globe (NYT166). Such actors are at this very moment “plotting and conniving…to bring 
destruction” among American forces (R185) and are all the more terrifying given their lack of 
such an icon or controller such as bin Laden. What results is a superpower unable to guarantee 
even the safety of its own citizens pitted against an identified enemy whose minions are 
exonerated as well as an unidentified enemy who grows evermore dangerous but whose 
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F. Case Study: 2000 Aqaba Rocket Bombings 
What follows is a summary of the discourse surrounding the 2005 Aqaba rocket bombings. 
Given that a claim of responsibility (though considered incredible) was issued immediately 
following the attacks, analysis begins at the “tentative claims” phase. Deviating little throughout 
the course of the investigation, the discourse establishes the normalcy of the threat (a contagion 
of existing insurgencies) as well as the competence of Jordanian and American law enforcement 
in arresting those responsibility and thereby eliminating continued risk to both societies. 
 
Tentative Claims of Responsibility 
The investigation’s beginning phase is quick to establish the threat as unoriginal and quickly 
addressed by competent law enforcement officials. As with the 2000 USS Cole bombing, the 
discourse immediately invalidates a bid for responsibility by the Abdullah al-Azzam Brigades 
(G37, G38, G39, DTT27, DTT28, R197) given that many forums “that originally posted the 
claim eventually removed it, citing doubts about its source” (NYT178). Speculation abounds as 
to the identity of the attackers (WP154, AP235, AP236, DTT27), but it is ultimately agreed that 
the perpetrators failed in their attempt to strike American targets (WP154, AP235, AP237, G37) 
due to inadequate preparation (R189). Regardless of accuracy, the perpetrators’ ability to 
smuggle rockets into Jordan and launch them in one of the “most secured cities in the country” 
(NYT178) is a tribute to their dedication. Profaners of the Islamic faith, these persons have 
“distorted the image of Islam and Muslims” in order to obtain “a legitimate cover, to beautify 
[their] ugly acts” (AR1).  
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The targeting failure does not, however, impact the perceived gravity of the operation. The most 
serious attack against the US Navy since the USS Cole (NYT178, WP154, AP237, G38, G39, 
G40), it wrought a damaging blow to Jordan’s reputation for stability, as there “has not been 
such an attack on Jordanian soil in recent memory” (NYT178). The bombing heightened fears of 
militant contagion and raised fears that insurgents are “opening a new arena of combat” 
(NYT178, WP154) given that the attacks were highly coordinated (G38, G39, G40, R194) and 
utilized Soviet-designed battlefield weapons (AP236, G38, G39, G40). Note, however, that this 
characterization expresses not the establishment of a new threat but rather the spread of one with 
which both the United States and Jordan have significant experience. The narrow margin with 
which the rocket cleared the bow of the USS Ashland (WP154, AP236, AP237, G37, G39, 
DTT27, DTT28, R189) given the crude and inaccurate nature of the weapons (NYT178, WP154, 
G37, DTT27, R189, R193, R197), demonstrates the perpetrators’ competency.  
 
The concerned protector, United States declared its intent to “always make every effort to 
support and defend [its] servicemen and women” (R189) and its “serious concern” over said 
incident (WP154). To ensure the safety of its crewmembers, American ships immediately 
departed the Aqaba port (NYT178) in a precautionary measure permitted by the trusted 
reliability of Jordanian investigators. Jordan, whose constancy in an unstable region is grounded 
in its security traditions (NYT178, AP235, G38, G39, DTT27), has long been a close American 
ally (AP235, R189) and pro-Western force within the region, even forming cooperative relations 
with Israel (AP235, R189, R192, R194). The likelihood that the rocket launch was a “one-off” 
attack (G38, G39) is high simply given the dedication of Jordanian law enforcement, who 
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initiated house to house searches and welcomed senior government officials on the ground 
within hours of the bombing (NYT178, R189).  
 
Tentative Arrest of Suspects 
Media sources continue to emphasize the skill of authorities in addressing the normal insurgent 
threat, as investigative findings testify to the accomplished perpetrators; in a “well coordinated 
military operation” (R199), the bombers knowledgeably selected an industrial area overlooking 
the harbor where their equipment would not be suspicious and chose to pose the attack early on 
the Muslim Sabbath when few people would be in the area to identify them (NYT179). They 
likely possess the ability to hit other targets (R200, JT1) in their quest to topple governments in 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan (WP155). Yet regardless of proposed motivation, the criminals 
are without the support of a larger Muslim population (NYT179, R200); they “harm Islamic 
communities” while serving the “enemies of Islamic nations” (AR2). The bombers are “sinners,” 
even if their actions were committed “under the illusion they were serving religion” (AR3). 
Demonstration of investigative competency is evident in the detainment of several probable 
suspects (NYT179, WP155) affiliated with the al Qaeda organization (R199, R200).  
 
However advanced, the attack is comparable to other recent bombings, including that of the USS 
Cole (NYT179) and the 2002 murder of an American diplomat (R199). The bombings 
themselves are significant not for their novelty but as a “grim reminder that Jordan is not 
immune” (NYT179, JT1) from the chaos encompassing its neighbors and as a symbol of the 
“potential damage such an act could inflict on [Jordan’s economy and security] in the long term” 
(R199, JT4). Given the significance of the attack to Jordan, the United States can comfortably 
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rely on its ally’s motivation and investigative prowess while it ensures the security of its own 
personnel (WP155, JT2). Washington’s closest Arab ally (WP155, R199) and preserver of the 
“true message of Islam” (NYT179), Jordan has a strong incentive to minimize its own 
vulnerability to attack (NYT179, R199, JT1): “for us in Jordan, the most serious element is that 
the assailants used Jordanian territory to mount the attacks and this has bearings on everything 
we stand for” (JT4). The irregularity of violent incidents is a product of police experience in 
keeping the “violence in neighboring Iraq and the West Bank at bay” (NYT179, R199, JT4). 
Jordanian security amounts to a civic and religious duty; not only are security services expected 
to “tackle the scourge of terrorism,” but defending the nation is “an act of worship” whose 
responsibility belongs to the entire society (JT1, AR2, AR3). Consequently, it is unthinkable that 
the bombers will not be brought to justice and existing security mechanisms strengthened.  
 
Formal Arrest/Indictment of Suspects 
The final phase of the investigation emphasizes the competence of the Jordanian authorities in 
doing exactly that, confirming the utility of existing counter-insurgency tactics while establishing 
the guilt of detainees and thus negating the possibility of future attack. With a history of 
thwarting terrorist attacks (including several planned within the past year) (NYT180, NYT181, 
AP243), it is a testament to law enforcement officials that the nation has “so far been spared 
major attacks on foreigners despite its proximity to Iraq and popularity as a tourist destination” 
(R201, R203, JT7). Likewise, prime bombing suspects were quickly arrested (NYT180, 
NYT181) given that authorities had predicted an imminent attack since 2004 (NYT180, AP238, 
AP240), and (though unable to prevent the operation) responded with alacrity. Investigative 
commitment and professionalism is underscored by Jordan’s role as an American ally (AP238, 
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AP240, AP243, AP244, R201, R202, R205) and the Arab army most closely allied to the West 
(DTT33), providing crucial logistics for the US-led War on Terror (R201, R204).  
 
The suspects under arrest are worthy adversaries and thus their detainment dismisses the 
probability of more advanced “masterminds” harbored at large. Intelligent and well-trained 
(NYT180), the detainees are members of the al Qaeda organization, one of the “most ruthless 
and powerful insurgent groups” (AP240, AP244, DTT31). Regularly communicating their 
activities back to the sponsoring organization (NYT180, AP238, R201) the suspects formed a 
self-contained “militant cell” (AP247) consisting of a ringleader (R205) and his two sons 
(NYT180, AP238) that autonomously planned and executed the operation. Gripped by “devilish 
spirit[s]” (AP4), the accused knowingly set out to “kill civilians and terrorize peaceful people 
quite oblivious of their actions” (AR4, JT12), a far cry from the misguided and innocent suspects 
of the 2000 USS Cole bombing. The carefully orchestrated assault, which relied on “precise 
intelligence, weapons training and a smuggling run across the border form Iraq” (NYT180), 
posed the most serious threat to the US Navy since 2000 (AP238, AP239, AP240, AP244, 
AP247) and the most serious attack on American targets since the 2002 murder of diplomat 
Lawrence Foley (R201, R202, R203, R205). The terror cell readily identified and exploited a 
weak spot in Jordan’s security (NYT180, JT6), the narrow margin of their targeting failure 
(NYT81, NYT182, WP157, AP238, AP246, R205, JT5, JT6) a testament to their logistical skills 
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G. Case Study: 2004 Madrid Train Bombings 
What follows is a summary of the discourse surrounding the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Given 
that a claim of responsibility (though considered incredible) was issued immediately following 
the attacks, analysis begins at the “tentative claims” phase of investigation. The Madrid 
discourse narrates the deterioration of powerful and credible target nations into progenitors of 
risk and human rights abuses in their efforts to confront an unprecedented and barbarous threat to 
which other insurgent groups cannot be compared. 
 
Tentative Claims of Responsibility 
The perpetrators of the Madrid attack are mysterious (AP254), unnamed and unidentifiable 
(NYT184, G42), though their identity may—if ever discovered—dramatically affect political 
events in Spain (R214, R218). The bombers possess an inhuman proclivity towards violence; 
“ruthless,” “indiscriminate,” and “clearly bent on killing as many civilians as possible” 
(NYT186, G25, DTT44, R208), normal humans could not have committed such an atrocity 
(G43). Morally bankrupt (AP249, AP254, R224), the terrorists are scum (NYT185), murderers 
(AP242, AP263, R213, R218, R224) capable of “butchery on a brutal scale” (DTT35, DTT43).  
The sheer brutality of the attack (AP249, AP256, DTT37) is a “crime against humanity” and God 
Himself (AP249, G41, EM1). 
 
Yet the precision with which the attack was conducted (NYT184, NYT185, WP162, WP164, 
AP24, AP256, AP263, DTT41) birthed a “terrorist holocaust” to “define our age” (G41, DTT37), 
the likes of which are unprecedented (NYT184, WP163). This “monstrous assault on European 
democracy” (AP248, AP249, G45) has other European leaders scrambling to fortify their own 
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security against an unfamiliar threat (NYT184, AP251, AP262, DTT40) in an age of “global 
terror inflation” (G41, G46, DTT38, R209, R210). Nor can one protect against such attacks 
(G46, DTT40, DTT41): “I think it is well for the man in the street to realize that there is no 
power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the 
bomber will always get through” (DTT39, DTT40).   
 
The specter of this “new threat” results in a contrast between nationalist (represented by ETA) 
and Islamist terrorism. The former is “relatively easy to crack,” given that “its aims are concrete 
and well known and it has a political wing with whom to negotiate” (DTT39). Having never 
engaged in an atrocity comparable to the Madrid bombings (G41), ETA is morally salvageable 
and retains “some connection with the moral universe inhabited by the rest of us” (DTT39). 
Comparatively, the political agenda of the Islamists “has no coherence and their leaders have no 
desire to talk” (DTT39); dishonest and wily (NYT185, AP251, AP252, AP256, AP257, AP263, 
R210, R217), they resort to suicide tactics to achieve their aims (DTT40). This characterization 
also applies to bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization, which has “no shortage of states in Europe 
[that it] wants to hit” (DTT39, DTT40, R217) and in pursuit of such has infiltrated Spain’s Arab 
population since the early 1990s (NYT186, DTT38, DTT39).  
 
In response to the attacks, Spain targets the well-known ETA (NYT186, WP164, AP248, G41, 
G42, DTT42, R217). Renowned for its resolute stand against terrorist organizations (AP249, 
AP252, AP256, G42, G46, R222, R223), the Aznar Government has moved “relentlessly against 
the terrorists” by employing “only the law but all of the law” (AP249, DTT44, R209) in a firm 
but legitimate crackdown. A leading US ally and staunch supporter of the War on Terror 
READING ANONYMITY 87	  
(NYT185, WP164, AP256, R208, R209), Spain is “painfully familiar” and “wearily used to” the 
“tremors of terrorism” (NYT184, NYT186, WP163, DTT45) and intimately familiar with anti-
terrorist procedures (DTT37). Spanish police and intelligence services have been “honed by 34 
years experience…and have the support of virtually every civilian” (NYT186, DTT34); they 
have not previously and will not now “give in to the oppressor to which [they have] never shown 
fear” (EM1).  
 
In turn the United States offers sympathy and solidarity (WP164, AP248, AP252, AP263, G42, 
R223, R224), taking steps to review its own security measures (WP162, AP253) and cautioning 
against the hasty assignment of blame (NYT186, AP252). This prudence is particularly relevant 
given the traumatized and disoriented state of the European nation (AP248, G42, G43), who is 
“engulfed” with pain and fear and “submerged in grief” (NYT184, AP254, AP255, AP257, 
AP258, AP263, R214) and thus of questionable rationality and judgment. 
 
Tentative Arrest of Suspects 
As the investigation continues, the credibility of Spain and the United States is shaken as both 
nations begin to pose a risk to allies. This phase furthermore evokes a contrast between the 
criminal perpetrators/general terrorists who are beyond the reach of government forces and 
innocent suspects potentially hailing from the al Qaeda organization, against whom the West has 
won past victories. Despite the arrest of suspects, the reputation of the perpetrators builds itself 
to more incredible heights; mysterious, unidentified enemies (WP166, AP292, G47, DTT49, 
DTT83, R225) who may “still be out there on the offensive” (G75), the ingenious bombers 
devised a novel tactical shift (NYT210) in executing their attack (NYT210, WP171, R235). The 
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operation itself—the sheer scale of which necessitated months of planning, advanced technology, 
and local knowledge (WP182, G55, DTT60)—was tightly choreographed and complex 
(NYT188, NYT196, WP165, WP166, WP171, AP266, AP267). Enduring, hostile elements to 
freedom and democracy (DTT78, R259), the perpetrators are counter-terrorism officials’ “worst 
fear” (WP176, DTT83), political actors (WP172) who have “defeated the government” in a 
“clear-cut victory” for extremism (WP174, DTT57, DTT67, DTT68). The bombing raised the 
possibility of future terrorist machinations that would undermine the political systems of the free 
world (NYT203, WP180, G52, DTT51), throwing the Spanish election “wide open” (AP270, 
AP271, AP273, AP274) as the first operation to directly affect a Western electoral outcome 
(G52). 
 
Murderers (G48, G51, DTT47, DTT49, DTT52, R225) and assassins (NYT188, WP167, 
AP264), perpetrators “have no heart” (R230) but will continue to kill for their own enjoyment 
(DTT87, R229). Comparatively, detained suspects are decent, friendly young men (NYT194, 
WP175, G54, G70, DTT80). They are entrepreneurial (NYT194, WP175, AP272, AP275, 
AP277) and not notably religious (NYT194, WP175, G70, DTT85); attractive, fashion-forward, 
and without the beard or clothing to mark them as Islamists (G54, G70, DTT85, R245, R246), 
the fun-loving bachelors are frequent disco patrons (NYT214, WP175, DTT93) who have been 
arrested unfairly (WP175). It is unthinkable such youths could have been involved in executing 
such brutality (AP272, AP275, AP277, G54); their  “ability to maneuver on the fringes of 
scrutiny is hardly unique” (NYT210), and it is plausible the men are “totally innocent” (G53).  
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If any possibility of suspect involvement exists it is the fault of Spanish authorities, who acted in 
an enabling capacity. Zougam, the only truly plausible suspect of the detainees, was scrutinized 
by law and intelligence officials in France, Spain, and Morocco the previous year (NYT202, 
NYT210, WP171, AP275, G60) and was under surveillance for months before the attacks 
(NYT195, WP175, AP272, AP273); yet he was permitted to “consort with militant leaders” 
across Europe and Northern Africa (NYT210, AP288, DTT80) despite evidence of radicalism 
found in his apartment in 2001 (NYT207, NYT209, WP171, AP290, AP293, G60, DTT93). 
Collectively, the suspects appear incapable of independently executing the bombings and thus 
must be under the tutelage of an unidentified mastermind (AP312, AP313, AP314, DTT85); even 
in the case of Zougam, “leader and coordinator of the people allegedly implicated” does not 
“suggest that he was overall organizer of the attacks” (AP317, AP318). 	 
 
It is impossible for authorities to connect such sheep-like figures with the “animal barbarism” 
that was “Madrid’s Guernica” (NYT191, NYT195, WP166, AP282, G47, DTT48, DTT60, 
R227, R229). An act of such hatred requires extraordinary resources—“an alliance with the 
Devil” (NYT192)—and gives rise to a new conceptualization of terrorism (NYT189, NYT195, 
NYT196, NYT200, WP166, WP183, AP276, DTT89, DTT94) that “alter[s] our lives forever” 
(NYT203, WP178, DTT91). More concerning is Western intelligence agencies’ inability to 
prevent future massacres (WP168, G53, G61, R234, R249): even “knowing your enemy doesn't 
always mean you can stop him from acting” (AP290). Not only can the authors of such attacks 
strike anytime, anywhere (AP280), but they will attack “whenever and however they can” 
(AP266). The perpetrators are impossible to appease (WP186, AP299) because they desire 
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nothing less than the complete destruction of Western society (NYT210, DTT51, DTT62, 
DTT90). 
 
The characterization of al Qaeda evolves relative to this new understanding of the terrorist threat 
with a few significant differences. First, members remain beholden to Osama bin Laden and his 
political vision (NYT210, WP167, WP172, AP271, AP295, G64), which seeks not the extinction 
of the West but rather the toppling of particular governments (WP157, WP170, AP269, AP280, 
DTT50, DTT59). There is further debate as to al Qaeda’s organizational integrity, given the 
liquidation of its command structure and weakening recruiting power (WP193, AP279, G64 
DTT74) despite the mutative ability that has allowed the network to survive until now (WP171, 
AP279). Most importantly, as compared to the general terrorist threat Western authorities have 
been successful in thwarting al Qaeda attacks for the past several years (R231); unfortunately, 
this also means that the organization cannot serve as a useful model for understanding the new 
“unstoppable” terrorists. 
 
Spain’s counter-terrorism credentials diminish in light of its “unequivocal” accusation of ETA 
(NYT190, NYT191, WP171, G48, G49, DTT55, DTT67), the product of a deceitful political 
class (NYT195, NYT197, NYT201, WP166, WP181, AP268, G52, DTT48, DTT76, R233) who 
exploits tragedy for political gain (WP174). Yet with the Aznar Government’s electoral defeat, 
Spain’s reputation as a “tough partner that fights its corner hard” (G58) in an uncompromising 
stand against terrorism (NYT193, WP167, WP168, WP172, DTT57, R234, R236, R239) is 
compromised by political naivety (NYT199, NYT211, WP182, DTT77) and terrorist 
appeasement (WP184, AP294, G61, G62, DTT88). What was formerly a model of free and fair 
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elections was “overshadowed by terror bombings” (NYT203, NYT205, AP273, AP278, AP287) 
and the product of fear and anger rather than judicious deliberation (NYT215, AP277, AP286, 
AP287, AP294); Spain has the dubious honor of becoming the first Western power owing its 
political leadership to terrorists (AP293, G60, G64). The country caved more quickly than even 
the terrorists had anticipated, given that only one attack (rather than two or three) was required to 
instigate a change in policy (R244). This weakness is mirrored in a selfish citizenry, as Spaniards 
validate the use of terrorism and invite more violence for all nations (AP314, AP315, DTT90). 
Panicked, helpless, and incapable of rational judgment (NYT188, NYT191, WP167, WP170, 
AP264, G56, R261, R262), “the loudest, most raucous city in Europe [has grown] suddenly 
mute” (G47). The people’s chosen leadership is the “weak link” in the Iraq coalition (DTT68), a 
stark contrast to Bulgaria, America, Japan, and Britain, who protect international security in 
defiance of danger (AP280, AP281, DTT89, R251).  
 
Moreover, the much-vaunted Spanish intelligence apparatus failed to act on previous warnings 
(NYT213, AP288, AP306), raising questions over the effectiveness of intelligence efforts 
(NYT202, WP174, AP290). Police admit they “would be lost” without the undetonated bomb 
mistakenly left by the attackers (EP4). This inefficiency is pervasive and longstanding, as the 
country has provided a regular transit route for al Qaeda (G3) and staging ground for the 
September 11th attacks (WP171).  
 
As Spain poses a danger to its allies in its validation of terrorist strategy, the United States is 
similarly of questionable benefit to its international partners. Deferring to the Spanish 
Government’s claim of ETA culpability despite evidence to the contrary (NYT190, NYT198, 
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NYT200), the United States increasingly poses a danger to its friends; any ally of the United 
States is automatically a target (AP287, AP289), sacrificed on behalf of a nation that does not 
account for the wishes or interests of others (NYT190, NYT191, NYT198, WP174, WP177). 
The US furthermore possesses vulnerabilities which terrorists “may choose to exploit” in a 
similar attack (NYT187, WP165) and must now fight the perception that acts of terror against 
American allies can sway nations from their alliance promises (NYT193, DTT68, R241). 	 
 
Formal Arrest of Suspects 
In the final investigative phase, Spain and the United States are ultimately determined too 
dangerous for their alliance partners, particularly given their accusation and detention of 
innocent men and the potency of an unidentified new terrorism to which the al Qaeda is 
incomparable. Media sources continue to shelter suspects from accusations levied against them, 
as the “truly dangerous” men have either perished or are yet to be identified and detained (M25). 
The former category includes the operational leader (NYT217, WP194, DTT100), who had been 
planning another grandiose attack (NYT219, NYT222, WP194, AP325, G76, G78): their 
“radicalism was total (…) feelings towards the West (…) of complete and absolute rejection” 
(EM18). The counterparts of the departed, shadowy masterminds who are yet an enigma (AP324 
AP236, AP344, AP353) are of greater concern, the “pinnacle[s]” of a bombing outfit that has not 
yet been apprehended (EP15, EP28); media sources continue to question “where is the real 
mastermind of 11 March?” (M20). In comparison, those detained are good, friendly people 
(WP196, EM26, EP23), model neighbors (NYT220) who have never set foot in a mosque (EM8) 
or engaged in suspicious activities (WP196). Hardworking and successful (NYT220, WP196) the 
men are “fully Westernized, keen on football, fashion, drinking and hashish and their Spanish 
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girlfriends” (G76). They are foot soldiers (AP33), immigrants who were “recruited and 
brainwashed” (WP196, AP249, AP329) and bear childlike nicknames “like Mowgli, the boy in 
‘The Jungle Book’” (AP329). These are not individuals capable of felling the government of a 
preeminent Western nation (WP199, WP200, AP363) and committing a hellish massacre with 
such flourish that it “shook Spain and the rest of Europe” (NYT224, NYT236, AP353, EM16).  
 
The possibility of continued attacks is made more significant by references to the new and 
inexhaustible “wave” of terrorism that is “sweeping” Europe (NYT218, NYT220 NYT230, 
WP208): “whenever one terrorist gets arrested, one, two, three or more men will fill his space 
somewhere else” (NYT218). “Enemies of freedom” (AP330, AP331, AP332), this “militant 
underworld” (R265) whimsically selects targets (AP349, R278) and poses a catastrophic danger 
to the continent (AP352, EM15, EP15). The Free World’s attempts to dispel these actors are 
hampered by national rivalries, fragmented intelligence services, and bureaucratic obstacles, 
open borders, and an unwillingness to share intelligence (WP211, WP213), diminishing the 
likelihood of effective preventative action. 
	 
This shadowy menace stands in sharp contrast to al Qaeda, whose potency has been 
compromised by US retaliation (WP208, AP352). In his role as negotiator (NYT223, WP197, 
AP327, R268, EM19), Osama bin Laden plays on fears that Western governments’ pro-
American policies place them at greater risk of attack (R267) (which does not require much 
reinforcement as the US is accomplishing this of its own volition). Paranoid of its own 
vulnerability, America has “not offered a solid piece of evidence to back its warnings” of 
impending doom (NYT241, AP234): it “can’t see clearly anymore” the threat of terrorism 
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(WP210). In its attempts to curb terrorist activity, the US has engaged in a “witch hunt” 
(WP201), cutting constitutional corners (NYT233) and violating individual rights (WP199, 
AP254) while rejecting evidence that proves suspect innocence (NYT235). Heeding an “arrest 
first and ask questions later” policy (NYT232, WP199, WP336, WP337, WP338) authorities 
detain a mild-mannered army veteran and Muslim convert who had not left America in over a 
decade and had never visited Spain (WP199, WP200, AP334, AP335, AP336, AP337, AP338, 
R273). Nor does America accept blame for its mistakes bur rather faults the “inadequate efforts” 
of its allies (NYT233, NYT235, WP202, WP212, AP340, AP342), despite doubts raised by said 
countries early in the process (NYT233, NYT234, WP200, WP202, WP212, AP341). 
 
Spain’s intelligence services are likewise willfully neglectful, as their observance of early 
warnings would have prevented the tragedy (NYT224, NYT226, WP207, AP347, G80, EP8). In 
a place where “al Qaeda operated ‘with ease’” and a “haven (…) for Islamic militants” (WP204, 
AP369), the attackers plotted under the very nose of a police force who claims to have been 
monitoring Islamic extremists for a decade (AP329); ironically, several of the suspects were paid 
police informants (EM7, EM8). Guided by “rage and impotence and fear” (NYT240, WP194) 
the politics of Spain have developed into emotional dictates (WP195) issued by a cowering 
government (NYT225, AP361) whose actions have even been chastised by the Iraqi Vice 
President (EP14). Unqualified and inexperienced (NYT239, WP197, AP328), the Government 
retreats even “more hastily than expected” (DTT106), demonstrating a “clear error of judgment” 
(EM12) that has cost Spain its international credibility (R266, R269, EM12). In accommodating 
the attackers and giving credence to the idea that terrorist violence inspires policy change, Spain 
has invited greater risk not only to its own society but also to the entirety of Europe.	 
READING ANONYMITY 95	  
H. Case Study: 2005 London Train Bombings 
What follows is a summary of the discourse surrounding the 2005 London train bombings. Given 
that a claim of responsibility (though considered incredible) was issued immediately following 
the attacks, the analysis commences with the “tentative claims” phase of the investigation. The 
resulting narrative depicts the victimization of both suspects and a hysteric public at the hands of 
the United Kingdom, whose human rights abuses constitute a threat as potent as that of the 
unknown perpetrators, who pose a danger so unprecedented that it cannot be quelled by even as 
experienced a government as that of Britain. 
 
Tentative Claims of Responsibility 
The media reaction immediately following the bombings details the United Kingdom, a country 
with one of the world’s best counter-terrorism traditions and steadfast citizenry, pitted against a 
sophisticated evil that surpasses the known evil of Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization. 
Whether “lily whites” (locals with no police record) in the employ of “professionals from 
abroad,” (WP231), foreign fighters (G94), a homegrown group or sleeper cell (NYT257, 
NYT276, WP231, AP380, AP402), or an organization such as al Qaeda (DTT136, R295), the 
bombing perpetrators remain at large and will kill again (NYT248, NYT263, WP221, WP223, 
AP386); murderers who have “such evil in their hearts” do not care who they kill (NYT247, 
NYT248, AP377, G97, DTT141) and have no reservations over a repeat attempt (DTT138). 
“Animals” deprived of “feelings or humanity” (R287), perpetrators seek to degrade the 
underpinning of Western society to something more uncivilized and base (NYT250, WP215, 
WP231, DTT117, DTT140). These persons are guilty of “slaughter irrespective of age, religion, 
[or] social status” (WP372, AP385, AP403, G98) and “devilish” crimes against “all nations and 
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(…) civilised people everywhere” (NYT247, AP372, AP375, AP379, G92, G97, DTT120, R284, 
R287, R289, R290).  
 
Despite its depravity, the refinement of the attack must be acknowledged. Painstaking, clever, 
and highly trained (WP231, AP383, AP404, G95, DTT129, DTT135), its authors made use of 
high explosives (AP401, AP402) to perpetuate explosions of such destructive magnitude the 
authorities have been unable to identify a single body (NYT247, AP400) from the nightmarish 
scenes of “blood and bodies [raining onto] the pavement” (NYT249, NYT262, WP215, WP223, 
WP226, WP229, G91, R282). Highly complex (NYT248, G88, DTT126, DTT127, R281), the 
operation was well-researched and almost certainly overseen by a trained professional (WP231, 
G98 AP380, R291). 
 
Against such a threat, the British Government and public are fortunately well-experienced and 
prepared. The country boasts the “best antiterrorism tradition in Europe” (NYT247) and London 
the most “sophisticated security system in the world” (DTT123) regulated by security services 
that are “the envy of the policing world in relation to counter-terrorism” (WP225, DTT127). 
Backed by decades of experience combating IRA guerillas, their skills are finely honed and 
cutting-edge (NYT248, WP225, AP386, R281). Additionally, given the perceived inevitability of 
an attack (NYT267, DTT117, DTT121, R282), London had already rehearsed countless 
emergency drills that swung smoothly into action following the bombings (NYT245, NYT247, 
NYT249, G86, DTT118).  
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Given years of domestic terrorist activity the British public took the bombing in stride (NYT247, 
NYT249), exhibiting an impassivity (NYT245, G89, R293)—a “British steel” (AP393, DTT119, 
DTT120, R283)—that could have come only from one of the world’s most vigilant publics 
(NYT260). Londoners remain united in their determination to defend a way of life (NYT245, 
NYT247, AP372, AP375, G92, DTT117, DTT120) held “dear in this country and in other 
civilized nations throughout the world” (WP215). Past encounters with IRA bombers (NYT247, 
WP223, G96, DTT130) and the blitz of WWII German bombers (NYT255, WP226, AP384, 
AP387, AP381) have endowed the British public with a particular resilience to terror, as 
exhibited by the reaction of the average man and woman: “yes, you’ve tried it now bugger off. 
We’re not scared, no, you won’t change us. Even if we are scared, you can still bugger off…this 
is London. We’ve dealt with your sort before. Don’t try and pull this on us.” (DTT133). 
 
Moreover, the United Kingdom shares an “unshakable” strategic and cultural alliance (NYT244, 
WP215, WP223, AP215, DTT119, R283) with the United States as the superpower’s “foremost 
ally” (NYT255). America is the “ultimate bulwark against world terrorism” (NYT244, WP217); 
an icon of liberty and freedom (NYT247, NYT251, AP215, AP373, AP378, R285), it has proven 
its potency by “smash[ing] up the…structure of al Qaeda pretty effectively” (DTT121). With 
such an ally—who has offered any assistance necessary (AP405, AP07)—to complement its own 
strengths, the United Kingdom cannot fail in the face of the terrorist threat.  
 
Yet there is a key weakness in the United Kingdom’s seemingly flawless defensive front. The 
nation’s own culture of tolerance has turned it into a “Star Wars bar scene” for Islamic radicals 
(WP232), a breeding ground for terrorists (NYT267, WP232, AP405, DTT24) with 
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“Londonistan” as its capital (DTT134, R293). Nor is the British public quite as emotionally 
contained as the state might wish; the backlash against British Muslims begins almost 
immediately despite the absence of a perpetrator identity (G86, G97), and Prime Minister Blair 
is required to “convince his own people of their own fortitude—and it is not yet clear whether he 
has succeeded” (NYT245). 
 
One of the recognizable figures of this “bar scene” is that of Osama bin Laden, who acts as both 
executive and recruiter for his cause (DTT141, R297).  The Saudi has persuaded dozens of youth 
to join the jihad (WP224) and has prevailed upon British openness to establish a political and 
media office in London as early as 1994 (WP232). His forces, more ruthless and cruel than 
known domestic terrorist organizations (G86, G93, DTT131), seek extreme policy concessions 
(DTT141)—nothing that the British Government could deliver “even if it wanted to” (DTT122). 
A charismatic leader, bin Laden enlists vulnerable citizens (WP224, AP389) into his army to 
mount attacks alongside his chosen lieutenants (WP224). Al Qaeda, however, is a group of 
questionable ability; much of its hierarchy has either been captured or killed (NYT267, WP234, 
DTT121), and its ability to conduct transnational attacks is diminished (WP224, AP389, G94). 
Unlike the IRA, al Qaeda does not provide prior warning for its attacks and thus it is more 
difficult to authenticate its claims (G93).  
 
The group’s ruthlessness (G86), however, pales in comparison to the threat posed by its 
unidentified comrades. These elusive terrorist actors are a cancer-like plague on society 
(NYT247, NYT266), a “scourge against humanity and against civilization” (AP378, R284, 
R286, R287) that must be combated by all nations. Mimicking the mutative capabilities of a 
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virus, the terrorist threat in Europe has undergone a transformation (NYT267) that renders it too 
widespread to be quarantined (G92, DTT121, DTT141) yet no known measures can defend 
against its poison (WP217, AP380, AP383, DTT132, DTT136): “there will always be one that 
slips through the net” (R291). Capable of striking “everywhere and against everyone” (DTT19, 
DTT123, R287), its triumph over the West is inevitable and future attacks a case of “when, not 
if” (AP402, AP404). 
 
Tentative Arrest of Suspects 
Following the unimpressive arrests of mule-like suspects, British security forces are seen as 
failing their frantic public in combating the masterful and depraved threat posed by the 
perpetrators, which may prove more than the European nation can handle. Suspects detained by 
British security possess neither the technical nor the intellectual expertise to have autonomously 
instigated the bombings; they “may have blundered, blowing up the wrong target and 
accidentally killing [themselves]” (AP415, AP417), “mules” led to believe “they would be able 
to plant their devices and make their escape” (R300, R304). In comparison, perpetrators as the 
true “faceless killers” (G107)—ironically also referred to as the “face of evil” (WP235)—are 
possessed of the ingenuity, deviousness, and technical expertise (NYT269, NYT273, NYT276, 
R304) to conduct such an operation (NYT273, WP233, DTT147). These mystery men willfully 
propagated a barbaric assault on the civilized world (WP233, WP236, AP408, G101, G102, 
R299) that even al Qaeda supporters say “were the wrong thing to do” (AP409, DTT145), 
resulting in the worst attack since World War II (NYT269, NYT273), the worst ever seen by 
London (NYT277), and the “end of the world” (NYT280) for many.  
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Faced with the extraordinary, British security forces are proving unequal to the task. Unable to 
identify the enemy and thus incapable of taking definitive counteractions (NYT269, NYT280), 
police have “desperately” made “urgent plea[s]” to the public for leads (NYT269, WP233, 
DTT156). The nation has sought unprecedented investigative assistance from the United States 
and twenty-four European allies; European officials have been “struck by how little was known” 
and equally stunned at the “call for help” coming from the United Kingdom, which is regarded as 
having “access to more and better quality intelligence” than other European nations (NYT273).  
 
The stoicism of the British public in “just getting on with it” (NYT274) given the familiarity of 
terrorist violence (WP236, G105, G107, R299, R300) has deteriorated; individuals are “reeling” 
and anxious (NYT269, NYT276, R302), perpetuating senseless violence against British Muslims 
based on suspicion of Islamist involvement (NYT275). This anxiety is not entirely unjustified 
(though the recrimination against innocents is unwarranted) given that 3,000 British-born or 
British-based individuals have passed through Osama bin Laden’s training camps, and 
approximately 200 home-grown terrorists “willing and able to slaughter innocents” reside in 
domestic territory (G101, G109).  
 
As when confronted by the totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century, the United States will stand 
with Britain to defeat terror using the “unstoppable power of freedom and democracy” (NYT278, 
WP236, R299). Yet the nature of the threat has changed; London’s “model [security] system” 
allowed the detonation of four explosive devices within city limits (NYT271). Even al Qaeda, 
whose patterns of activity are well-established, has developed the ability to “change its 
characteristics, recruitment patterns and mode of operations more swiftly than any other terrorist 
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group in history” (G145). These fungus-like terrorist cells (WP234) are not content to topple a 
single government but instead seek to “break the will of the world’s democracies” so as to 
remake the world “in their own grim image of tyranny” (WP236, AP408, G105, R299).  
 
Formal Arrest/Indictment of Suspects 
The aftermath of the bombings has transformed the United Kingdom into a nervous, trigger-
happy weakling who seeks vengeance on British citizens and fails to confront those forces 
continuing to plot Western Civilization’s ruin in a new chapter of terrorism that has rendered 
Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization irrelevant and outdated. The demise of the 
suspects during the conduct of the attack does not hamper attempts to displace blame for the 
incident, and may in face intensify such efforts. Multiple arguments are given in defense of the 
bombers’ innocence; they are “footsoldiers” (NYT337, WP249, WP252, AP421, AP429, AP430, 
G130, G132, DTT163, DTT167), “at the end of some kind of a totem pole” (AP422) and 
receiving orders, spiritual guidance and logistical support from an outside source (NYT296, 
DTT184). Given their youth (NYT332, AP420, AP486), the men may have been duped 
(NYT332, AP471, G135) or brainwashed (NYT304, AP444, AP419, DTT156, DTT158, 
DTT169, R305, R324) to be a “tool…of somebody else’s evil ideology” (AP445, G135); the 
“fragile minds” (WP296, DTT205, R331) of the youths could have belonged to “any of our 
children” (WP276). Under the influence of an evildoer, the young men were “perverted” and 
“groomed” to commit the atrocity (AP124, AP495, DTT227).  
 
Besides lacking the intellectual fortitude to conduct such an event (NYT304, NYT346, WP243, 
R353), the suspects were perfectly normal, well-adjusted boys who enjoyed Elvis Presley songs 
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(NYT282) and sporting events (NYT290, NYT300, WP240, G116, R373). Sweet, gentle, and 
loving (NYT292, DTT153, DTT154), the “suicide bombers next door” (DTT169) were well-
adjusted and “British to the core” (NYT281, NYT286, G237). Despite security camera evidence 
to the contrary, friends and relatives continue to protest the deceased’s innocence: “the idea that 
he was involved in terrorism or extremism is ridiculous” (WP240).14  
 
Regardless of authorship, the bombings signify an unprecedented “new chapter of terrorism” 
(NYT341, NYT345, G119) that will force “the outlines of life [in Europe to] change” (NYT283, 
R322), particularly given the novelty of suicide bombings in the region (NYT282, NYT364, 
WP238, WP252, AP421, G115, R305, R312). An “entirely new manifestation of terrorism” 
(NYT134) that has placed a strain on the “rules of engagement” (NYT295, NYT231, NYT328, 
G129), the meticulously planned attacks (NYT325, WP243, G211, R327) suggest experienced 
authors (R327) with the power to reconfigure reality (NYT339, NYT350, G212)15, thereby 
eliminating the aforementioned suspects. Still at large (NYT292, WP242, AP421, AP422, 
AP451, G124, DTT196, DTT197), the suggested perpetrator “masterminds” (WP252, G120, 
DTT169) upset the certainty of identification as they make it impossible to “yet say who carried 
out the attack” (NYT320, NYT360, WP298). There may be a “third, fourth, fifth cell” (AP444, 
AP463), a “fifth man, or a sixth man, a seventh man” (WP242, AP423, AP428, G122), “would-
be killers” who move freely throughout the region (G170, G172). Given the possibility of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 An occasional side narrative contradicts this innocence with retroactively applied evidence of 
radicalization, citing suspects’ increasingly unsociable behavior (NYT341, NYT256), religious 
zeal (NYT301), outrage over the War on Terror (DTT157), and collusion with Pakistani 
militants (NYT329, AP430). If indeed the true culprits, the men complete a “journey from 
perfect son to suicide bomber” (G237).  
 
15 It is worthy to note here that a large part of these “new rules” refer to the shoot-to-kill policy, 
which is in fact not new but was employed against the IRA in previous years (R333). 
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impending strike, it is a “race against time” for security services (WP273, WP274, DTT202)—
yet British intelligence has demonstrated itself incapable of pinpointing the bombers: “where are 
the plotters and planners? Where is the person with the expertise to trigger it? And is the 
capability still out there? It could be anywhere” (G114, DTT151).  
 
These perpetrators are the compatriots of general terrorists, those who would destroy the social 
fabric of European societies (NYT284, NYT334, DTT235) with their “evil ideology” (NYT295, 
NYT304, WP252, AP445). A “new breed” of terrorist  (NYT292, NYT345) who has lost even 
the support of publics in Muslim countries (NYT291, WP247, AP426), they constitute “a 
permanent threat from which nobody is safe” (NYT311, WP244, DTT240, R331) and one that 
does not abide by national boundaries (NYT298, NYT303, G144). Finding such individuals is 
“like looking for a needle in a haystack” (R373); they constitute a unique evil (DTT183, 
DTT227) with the power to conquer the human soul (AP427). 
 
It is in comparison to these minions of iniquity that the figures of al Qaeda and Osama bin 
Laden are evaluated, and the latter are understandably found wanting. Once the premier sponsor 
of terrorism and “beloved sheik” (NYT356, NYT358), bin Laden’s popularity has “dropped 
significantly” in pivotal Muslim nations (WP247, AP426) despite the Saudi’s bids to 
demonstrate control over his organization (WP266, R367). Bin Laden has “fallen behind younger 
followers worldwide” (WP85), and his influence over his empire wanes as al Qaeda leadership 
opts to conserve their resources (NYT283, NYT320, DTT240). Despite expectations of a clear 
link to the group, the possibility of al Qaeda involvement has been either inconclusive (NYT325, 
NYT364) or flatly negated (NYT359, WP300). 
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With the involvement of the most familiar Islamist group invalidated, the United Kingdom’s 
record of counter-terrorism accomplishments becomes extraneous (NYT284, NYT300, NYT312, 
R326). The self-confidence of a jittery, nerves-on-edge public (NYT314, NYT328, WP280, 
AP458, AP459, A460) has “seesawed between bravado and bewilderment” (NYT313) as tested 
countermeasures proven irrelevant by both the novelty of the atrocity and the very demographics 
of the British citizenry: “almost all the people voicing that sentiment [“we’re children of the 
Blitz. This is nothing.”] hadn’t even been alive during World War II, much less survived the 
bombings” (NYT297). The exposure of British stoicism as myth is paralleled by revelations of 
security ineptitude over years of neglect. Despite a law enforcement body taken to be “more 
sophisticated than its [American] counterpart” (NYT231) and the “envy of the policing world in 
relation to counter-terrorism” (NYT347), and given that “no city in the Western world is better 
equipped to deter terrorist bombings,” the fact that two attacks were conducted in London dispels 
the myth of invincibility (NYT318). Instead the “model” police force must rely on the goodwill 
of other nations (NYT292, NYT298), “pleading (…) for help” in an unprecedented manner 
(NYT288, NYT316, NYT333, WP251, WP261, WP272, AP422). Having looked “the wrong 
way for years” (DTT173, DTT174), the gap of knowledge concerning Islamist terrorism among 
British law enforcement is “even bigger than was previously apparent” (AP458, G205). For 
instance, top intelligence authorities downgraded the threat level facing the nation less than a 
month before the bombings (NYT303, G146, R320), while bureaucratic ineptitude (AP432, 
AP448, DTT166, DTT228, DT229) allowed suspicious persons to flee the country (NYT292, 
NYT303, DTT195, DTT196).  
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The continuing possibility of attack has turned the United Kingdom into a terrifying police state, 
wherein law enforcement rivals its terrorist counterparts as the object of public fear. Overzealous 
(WP263), trigger happy (DTT186), and having crossed a “once-unthinkable line” in its anti-
terrorist activities (NYT313, R331), policing has become a fixture of social anxiety (NYT319, 
G153). Guilty of barbaric murders and “execution style” slayings (WP268, WP271, DTT187), 
police action could kill more innocents and even children (G174) who are in the “wrong place [at 
the] wrong time” (NYT324, NYT326, AP469, G154, G155). The nation as a whole no longer 
pays credence to human rights norms, displaying increasing irritation with European rights 
legislation (NYT367) and British Muslims suffering a 600 percent increase in hate crimes in the 
bombing aftermath (NYT321, AP421, AP447, AP480, G117, G120). London has “become 
Belfast or Tel Aviv” (G151), and their Muslims population “not looked on as human beings” 
(R309). 
 
The general public must also fear another impending terrorist attack (NYT284, NYT314, 
NYT229, AP453, G178, G236, R371, R376, R377). Threatened by a yet unidentified enemy 
(DTT200) with attacks that are unavoidable and unstoppable (NYT285, DTT235, G212, R240, 
R344), the threat could come from anywhere; even Britain’s own Muslim population “made 
clear they shared the same sense of otherness…[and] understood [the bombers’] anger” 
(NYT293, WP238, WP243). Despite having prevailed in previous circumstances (NYT283, 
G182, R323), Britain’s American ally also suffers from the same risk (NYT322, NYT349) and 
cannot take success for granted. 
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The Uniqueness of the 2005 London Bombings 
Despite al Qaeda’s claim of responsibility, the 2005 London bombings exhibit patterns of 
discourse remarkably similar to those of unclaimed attacks. This deviation from the typical 
“claimed case” narrative is explainable for two reasons; first, as with any act of terrorist 
violence, the majority of media articles are issued in the first months pending the incident, 
followed by a decline in later weeks as interest wanes. In looking at the 2008 Danish Embassy 
bombing and the 2005 Aqaba rocket attacks, both were claimed within five days of the incident. 
The London bombings, in turn, remained without a credible claim of responsibility until two 
months after the bombings; furthermore, while the al Qaeda video claim was confirmed 
authentic, the alternating cut-and-paste video segments by al-Zawahiri and the suicide bombers 
generates ambiguity over the nature and extent of al Qaeda’s involvement (did the organization 
merely provide advisors and resources, or did it function in an active planning and participant 
capacity?). Consequently from July 7, 2005 until September 1, 2005, the London bombings 
were, de facto, an unclaimed act of violence. The discovery of unclaimed narrative patterns thus 
does not invalidate the distinction between claimed/unclaimed cases but rather confirms the 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY OF NARRATIVE TRENDS ACROSS CASE STUDIES 
 
What follows is an examination of the narrative trends evident in the unclaimed attack cases, as 
the element of anonymity is of primary interest; where relevant, the patterns have been 
contrasted against their claimed counterparts. Summarily, the tendency within unclaimed attacks 
to render the threatening and threatened indistinguishable destabilizes the mutually exclusive 
identities of civilized/barbaric, innocent/guilty, attacked/attacker that generally populate terrorist 
narratives, while at the same time confirming and reinforcing the possibility of harm. In contrast, 
claimed cases tend to reinforce existing identities and relationships16, validating assumptions 
inherent to the model of state/criminal actor confrontation. As compared to the increasingly 
radical tenor of unclaimed narratives, the claimed attack discourse sees little fluctuation, 
rendering the aforementioned relationships stable and thus of predictive value. 
 
A. Civilization vs. Barbarism 
Though the meaning of “civilization” has shifted according to the ideology of the dominant 
group, it has consistently represented a standard that determines the boundary of a particular, 
often European, community; “barbarism” is itself understood as a lack of “civilization” (Salter 
1999, p.44-5). Both “barbarism” and “civilization” are defined by those characteristics attributed 
to “civilized” society; as “barbarism” is merely the absence of these features, the differentiation 
between “civilized” man and the “barbarian” relies on the continued preservation of these 
features, meaning that the “civilized” world is in constant peril of degeneration. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 As discussed previously, the 2005 London bombing presents an exception to otherwise 
consistent claimed/unclaimed attack narrative tendencies and in the majority of instances tends to 
reflect unclaimed patterns.  
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“Barbarism” is gendered, impulsive, dishonest, dangerous, irrational and animalistic. 
“Civilization” is grounded in secular rationalism, emotional and political stability, mastery of 
impulses, complexity in technology and science, and urban development. The world of the 
“civilized” further monopolizes moral and ethical superiority, the legitimacy of which forms the 
foundation of its institutions and systems of knowledge. Consequently, when “civilization” is 
undermined it is not simply a loss of trust in fellow individuals but a loss of faith in the system 
itself, the fundamental identity governing the social pact (Hosking, 2009, p.483). The 
“barbarian” thus functions as a site on which to project the “civilized” self, fashioning both a 
pre-temporal and inferior other. “Civilized” and “barbarous” identities are consequently mutually 
exclusive; the “civilized barbarian” does not exist, though there is debate over the degree of 
barbarism amongst “non-civilized” peoples (see Salter, 1999, p.53). We accept this duality as 
constant despite historical variation in standards of “civilized” and “barbaric” behavior. 
 
As a general rule, terrorists fall into this latter category, anti-democratic hordes that wish to drag 
us “back into the dark ages” and are contemptuous of enlightened principles such as rule of law, 
the rules of war, and human rights. They perpetuate attacks against civilization, indicating they 
must be separate from such. The perpetrators of unclaimed attacks fit the same “barbarous” 
mold; animalistic, they are “snakes in the grass” (WP95), predators without feelings or humanity 
(WP142) that originate in vipers’ nests (NYT95) and cast tentacles across the globe (NYT55, 
WP82, DTT18). They are irrational actors, mad savages (AP282, G15, DTT62). 
 
This narrative calls on a historic discourse that compels the enlightened to use the full force of 
their civilizing power to keep barbaric forces: their well-trained and superior troops (NYT7, 
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WP2, AP73, R245), force of law (DTT44), rationality and deliberation (WP12, AP3), stunning 
technological advancement (NYT123, WP126), worldly experience (WP122, AP349, R234, 
R245) and the very doctrine of freedom and liberty upon which their reputation rests (G35, R51, 
R162, EM1). Based upon established social doctrine, these strengths should easily overwhelm 
the crude savagery that is the only weapon available to the terrorist. Yet these same “barbarians” 
are not only animalistic but also masters of beasts. They “butcher” (G43, DTT35) and 
“slaughter” mindless animals (AP123, AP124), herding the unfortunate creatures through a 
“slaughterhouse” to their deaths (DTT43). These “dumb animals” are not lesser beings but rather 
“civilized man,” given that it is he who is the terrorist target. Such verbiage calls to mind the 
killing of animals for market and consumption, implying the “barbarians” are not only masters of 
the “civilized” but that “civilization” can be devoured as easily as a rack of lamb. The 
perpetrators are at once both masters of “civilization” as well as its destroyers. 
 
In conquering “civilized man,” perpetrators are endowed not only with characteristics that have 
traditionally have distinguished “civilized society” but also the moral legitimacy accorded such 
values. Perpetrators are: (1) ingenious, using tactics unknown to “civilized man” that so 
overwhelm his existing resources that he is powerless against them; (2) advanced, capable of 
operations of a complexity and sophistication rivaling state-sponsored action; (3) deliberate and 
rational, with the foresight to plan coordinated, organized and rehearsed operations in a calm and 
calculating manner years in advance; (4) capable of utilizing sophisticated technology for 
intelligence gathering and bomb-making of a professional caliber; (5) dedicated, highly 
motivated with the discipline to undertake necessary training and follow through with the plan of 
attack. As these qualities embody the controlled, rational model of the “civilized” being, their 
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application to the terrorist undermines their role as icons of our own civilization, which indeed 
the perpetrators appear to do in a very real material sense. Perpetrators “cripple” (WP114, 
AP163, DTT23, R159) the most advanced warship (NYT172, R135) of the world’s most 
powerful military (AP188), mute Europe’s loudest, most raucous world capital (G47), and 
demolish diplomatic enclaves, traditional symbols of Western power. Adding to this, in 
committing the worst European atrocities since 1945 (NYT185, NYT195, AP277) the 
perpetrators are paralleled with WWII era German society, arguably one of the most 
academically and technologically advanced nations at the time. Bombers are even likened to 
“David killing Goliath” (NYT146), casting them not only as Biblical heroes and divinely 
selected sovereigns but subsequently implying that the opposition (here, the United States) is a  
“savage, unenlightened pagan.” In a significant role reversal it is the terrorists, not the self-
proclaimed guardian of global freedom, who are bringing the international community out of 
darkness into light. 
 
This divinely-favored figure is fleshed out by phrases that attest to the perpetrators’ ability to 
negotiate celestial dealings; they can bring about the “end of the world” (NYT18), strike blows 
beyond mortal control (WP22), and command the Devil’s appearance at will (NYT192, WP48, 
AP55, AP84). These abilities are augmented by other “magical” talents; perpetrators “spirit” 
themselves out of harm’s way (G35), confound investigators with their mysterious powers 
(AP166, AP254, DTT83, R225), and are unable to be stopped by normal security measures 
(AP2). These supernatural abilities endow the perpetrators with the means to force change in 
Western societies, as following their attacks “nothing will be like before” (DTT37); such events 
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will “alter our lives forever” (WP178, DTT91) and “define our age and annotate its calendar” 
(G41). 
 
In this way there is an unresolved tension between the perpetrators as pre-temporal, inferior 
others and perpetrators as divinely empowered superhumans. Ultimately, it is the “superior to 
self” other that dominates the narrative of each unclaimed attack. By casting the terrorists as not 
only having “civilized” characteristics but as perfecting them to an degree unattainable by 
“civilized man,” we leave open the possibility for civilization to degenerate into barbarism, 
stripped of those qualities which rendered it superior. Certainly this appears to be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy; Western societies are portrayed as incapable of objective judgment, panicked and 
guided by pain, anger, fear, and helplessness that translates into real political capital (NYT184, 
NYT191, WP29, WP100, WP170, AP34, AP254, AP255, AP258, AP263, G47, R214). 
Untrustworthy and deceitful (NYT190, WP46, WP166, G11, G52, DTT76, R82, R233), 
cowardly (AP315, DTT68, DTT90, R244), and imprudent (NYT143, WP120, AP220), the state 
lashes out with gratuitous violence (G11, R87, R96) that betrays the doctrine upon which rests its 
legitimacy as a free nation (NYT233, WP181, WP201, AP254).  
 
Compared to the role reversal of unclaimed narratives, the perpetrators of clamed attacks are 
neither base animals nor divine beings but routine criminals. Certainly, an element of rumor 
initially circulates as to their possible mystical qualities; they are “phantoms” (AR1), able to slip 
past improved security measures in fortified cities (NYT178, NYT179) with a stealth that 
bewilders authorities (AP116). Yet as the narrative presence of the perpetrator figure extends 
only through the first two investigative phases (until the arrest of suspects), this speculation is 
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laid to rest by revealing seemingly inexplicable feats as the product of cleverness, solid planning, 
and insider knowledge. The terrorists’ experience in executing well-coordinated military 
operations (R199) is indicated by their selection of favorable attack conditions and exploitation 
of classified information (NYT117, NYT179, WP132, R179). Furthermore, these actors are 
hardly infallible; considerable emphasis is placed on errors within the conduct of the operation, 
despite their realization. In the case of the Danish Embassy bombings, perpetrators are highly 
illogical in attacking a building “merely named as an embassy with no Dane or Norwegian 
actually present” (N5) (staff had been previously evacuated). Those who ambushed the USS Cole 
“had not properly prepared for the attack” (R189) and consequently missed their targets (WP154, 
AP237, G37, R201).  
 
Nor are the perpetrators, readily identified as followers of al Qaeda (NYT125, AP236, DTT27, 
DTT32, AR1) heroes to an earthly constituency; they instead attempt to create “a legitimate 
cover, to beautify [their] ugly acts” (AR1). Their actions identify them “as sinners” (AR2, AR3), 
just as any discussion of martyrdom (AP133, AP135, CP9) is eclipsed by references to suicide 
(NYT120, G27, R131, CP9, CP12). As Fierke (2009) notes, the distinction is significant because 
the depoliticized use of “suicide” terrorism “constitutes the agency of states vis a vis a moral 
deviant and an abject other who is outside politics and is thus the object of legitimate violence” 
rather than a “moral agent in pursuit of justice” (p.157). Consequently, rather than destabilizing 
assumed identities, claimed attack narratives tend to reinforce accepted understandings of good 
cop/bad criminal that tend to accompany popular crime discourse.   
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B. Attacked vs. Attacker: The Exoneration of Suspects 
In addition to the continual threat of attack from forces unknown, the attacked state is unable to 
win a victory on the security front even given the arrest of suspects, as accompanying discourses 
exonerate said individuals of responsibility. This, in turn, criminalizes the attacked state for 
detaining “innocents” and further problemitizes the exercise of moral authority by Western 
societies. The exculpation of detainees follows several models: 
 
Suspects as lacking the intelligence and capability to conduct attacks 
Unclaimed attack narratives frequently typify suspects as mentally deficient and thus requiring 
the assistance of some unnamed “mastermind” to conduct the operation, a tactic that introduces 
the possibility of a future atrocity. Suspects are naïve and simple (AP495), assisted by experts 
who assembled the explosive devices (WP121); perhaps duped into planting the bombs (G135), 
they may have accidentally caused the device to detonate (AP415, AP417). Their lack of 
independent agency is demonstrated in a particular case by the failure to remember to activate 
the pay-as-you-go mobile on an explosive that would have eliminated the trail of evidence 
(DTT85). 
 
Suspects as soldiers under orders17 
Suspects are low-ranking “foot soldiers” (NYT337, WP249, AP253, AP421, G130, DTT163) 
having no knowledge of  “the whole plan” (AP210, AP225, AP422, R300). Infantry of a stronger 
power, suspects exist at the end of the chain of command and are deprived of responsibility for 
following orders as their position mandates. Their status confers upon them the legitimacy due 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Note that this section is exceptional that it incorporates data from the 2005 London bombings, 
for which this particular technique was extraordinarily well-represented (refer to Footnote 14).  
READING ANONYMITY 114	  
the armed forces as well as applicable Geneva Rights, which renders their abuse at the hands of 
the attacked state even more grievous. Suspects’ actions are thus acts of war rather than civilian 
massacres, and it is the battlefield that is so often considered the scene of heroism. Indeed, the 
soldier in Western culture is a romantic and noble figure (particularly since the end of the Second 
World War) who takes suffering onto his own shoulders for the greater good. The self-sacrificing 
figure bears an uncomfortably close parallel to the “martyrdom” often referenced by terrorist 
compatriots.  
 
Suspects as originating from a position of persecution 
As if to explain their current predicament, suspects in unclaimed narratives are frequently 
typified as coming from backgrounds rife with discrimination. They are from religious minorities 
abused in countries such as Yemen (NYT168) or have been subject to torture during their 
detainment (WP37, WP59), the authorities overseeing which threaten not only detainees’ 
personal security but also that of their families (WP59). It is not nations such as Pakistan or 
Sudan that so callously discard rights precedents but rather powers such as the United States and 
Spain whose very distinctiveness is based upon guarantees of freedom and liberty. Suspects are 
remanded even though their guilt is questionable and it is unlikely they would have been 
involved in planning or carrying out the attacks (WP175, AP272, AP275, AP277, G53, G54); 
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Suspects as brainwashed, childlike figures18 
Suspects are characterized as having ingenuous characteristics, whether immaturity, gullibility, 
or proclivity towards brainwashing. They are young, emotional, and ignorant (AP329, AP486), 
“just a kid” like any other (NYT332, WP276, AP420). Even the Madrid attack, which killed 191 
people and wounded over 1800, was blamed on a man bearing a nickname from a childhood 
fable (AP329). Befitting their adolescent tendencies, the suspects are easily tricked and 
manipulated into participating (NYT204, NYT332, WP196, AP329, AP471, DTT156, R324) as 
“tools of someone else’s evil ideology” (AP445, G135). Moreover, these individuals have been 
“groom[ed] to carry out such evils” (WP253, AP444, AP468, AP469, DTT227). The use of 
terminology such as “grooming” to refer to suspects, given its frequent association with 
pedophilic discourse (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2009, p.82), further emphasizes the maltreated 
suspects and their inability to be held to account 
 
Suspects as Western and morally upstanding  
The discourse of unclaimed attacks frequently portrays suspects not only as morally upstanding 
but also as fully Westernized. They are kind and cheerful, “not the type you’d think of as an 
Islamist” (G70). Quiet, model neighbors (NYT220) and devoted family men (WP66, R109), they 
are perfectly normal (NYT290, R373), infinitely likable and gentle individuals (NYT290, 
WP246, DTT153).  To compound such flattering characterizations is the notion of suspects as 
subscribing to Western lifestyle and mannerisms. Materialistic, they are the first to embrace new 
fashions (DTT85) and high-end labels (R245, R246), socialites who are not “Islamic extremist[s] 
but (…) fun-loving figure[s] who liked discos, fast cars and drinking” (WP175, G76, DTT93). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Refer to previous footnote. 
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Attractive (G70, R246) and hardworking (NYT194, WP175, AP275), suspects are interested in 
the “religion” of capitalism (G70, DTT85, EM8). Either married to or dating American and 
British women (DTT93, DTT95), most are “charmer[s] who like to flirt” (AP418) and “eye up 
girls” (G70).  
 
In the rare instance that suspicious characteristics are ascribed to the detainees, the accusations 
generally center around one individual (e.g. Zougam or al-Harazi). Though perhaps not as 
comparatively blameless, their responsibility is waived by designating such persons as  “low on 
the totem pole”; for instance, “leader and coordinator [of the bombing squad] does not suggest he 
was overall organizer of the attacks” (AP317, AP318). Furthermore, blame for the attack falls 
upon security services who failed to prevent the bombings. Such “main plotters” had been under 
surveillance for months (NYT195, WP175, AP272), known to intelligence officials around the 
world (NYT210, G60) and yet were permitted travel without restriction or dedicated surveillance 
(AP210, AP288, DTT80).  
 
Note also that the portrayal of the “Western man” is not overly flattering. What emerges is that to 
be “Western” and thus “civilized” is to be obsessed with a partying lifestyle (including substance 
abuse), materialism, physical appearance, turning a profit, and crude objectification of the female 
as an object of sexual liberty. In turn, the “Islamist” is understood to be unattractive, disdainful 
of “fun,” never happy and disinclined to exhibit “neighborly” qualities. Yet to be an “Islamist” is 
also to possess self-restraint, a strong moral compass and a penchant to place stock not in 
Armani brands but in the tenacity of one’s familial bonds. When measured against “civilized” 
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principles, it is ironically the “Islamist”—unattractive “stick in the mud” though he may be—that 
embodies to a greater extent the controlled, moral actor underpinning “civilized” society.  
 
The aforementioned depictions of suspects further destabilize the categories of terrorist/non-
terrorist. Suspects are identified not by their criminal proclivities but by titles that the average 
individual shares—family men, children, sports lovers, Westerners. They are decent people who 
have been conned and otherwise taken advantage of based upon a lack of common sense and 
worldly experience. They are our neighbors, our children—any of us could be susceptible to such 
radicalism, much as anyone is susceptible to the addiction of drugs or alcohol. Consequently, 
attacked societies must now not only share the title of victimhood but also the possibility of 
blame as progenitors of the attackers.  
 
Comparatively, suspects as detailed in claimed attacks are not exonerated of guilt but confirmed 
as mature criminal actors; the attacked state is thus validated as protector of the public good in 
preserving order and the rule of law, and its society remains unique in its victimhood. Suspects 
attack largely of their own initiative, demonstrating themselves cognizant and competent. Their 
affiliation with criminal groups such as al Qaeda (DTT31, R189, R198), in addition to extensive 
training and intelligence gathering (NYT180) render them skilled offenders. Despite a shared 
vision authored by Osama bin Laden, these actors are “in charge” of both designing and 
executing the attack (AP238, NYT180) and are thus morally culpable; gripped by “devilish 
spirit[s],” they knowingly murder innocents for their objectives (AR4).  Moreover, their criminal 
activities are not limited to the current offense—the suspects have been previously involved in 
committing acts of terrorism (AP138, AP235, N9), compounding their guilt. Rather than unjust 
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imprisonment, the attacked state is to be lauded in removing such individuals from the 
vulnerable public sphere, which functions as recipient rather than producer of terrorist violence.   
 
C. Attacked vs. Attacker: The Attacked State and State Foil 
In the discourse of unclaimed attacks the attacked state is often cast not as mediator but as 
source of risk and a danger to its own society, a contradiction further emphasized by the 
previously discussed typifying of suspect figures. In such instances, the characterization of the 
state foil follows that of its criminalized ally and reinforces both as doer of harm. 	 
 
The state as attacker 
More than their claimed counterparts, unclaimed attacks tend to call into question not only the 
attacked nation’s myth of invincibility and capacity to defend its population but also its status as 
a member of the “civilized” world. Prior to the arrest of suspects, the attacked state constructs 
itself as a bastion of anti-terrorist sentiment, experienced and battle-ready. It is painfully familiar 
with threats of violence (NT184, NYT186, DTT45) given that its preeminent international 
standing solicits thousands annually (WP2, AP4). Consequently, police and intelligence 
apparatuses are alert and honed by years of deflecting antagonists (NYT186, DTT34); 
capitulation to or negotiation with such forces is unthinkable (R94, EM1). The attacked state has 
unrivaled power at its disposal with which to confront this new threat; in fact, it is because the 
country is so impregnable that its enemies were forced to use asymmetric tactics (NYT125). 
Bold phraseology and action-oriented verbiage reinforce the nation’s willingness to employ this 
power and fulfill its protective obligation. Resolute, determined, and focused (WP162, AP252, 
G42, R217, R223), the attacked state is relentless and dismissive of compromise (DTT44, 
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R209). It is swift and decisive in its strategy (NYT123, G42), leaving no doubt that a hard blow 
to enemy forces will restore security and normalcy (AP150, R154).	 
 
Not only is the attacked state possessed of unlimited power and the resolve to employ it in full, 
but it also wields superior moral/ethical authority. The United States is the guardian of global 
stability and peace, world superpower and a lynchpin of “civilizing” force. Its resources not only 
protect its own citizens but the entirety of the free world, safeguarding the existence of freedom 
and democracy (AP186, G35, R4). Spain’s role as a democracy born of civil strife and staunch 
American ally confers credibility upon it in kind by extending the mantle of democratic 
repository.  
 
As the singular perpetrator narrative divides into the duality of guilty perpetrator/innocent 
suspect, the discourse surrounding the attacked state likewise evolves. Media continues to laud 
the military superiority of the targeted nation, with its “stunning technological sophistication” 
deployed on a “barely imaginable” scale that reaches to the corners of the earth (NYT159, 
NYT165). The attacked state remains steadfast, unquestionable in its ability to deliver justice 
(NYT149, WP128, WP167, WP168, G58). However, the discourse of the “new” or 
“extraordinary” terrorist threat erodes these claims; if an attack is truly novel, the current skill 
sets of security forces may not apply, rendering boasts of superiority severely diminished in 
importance.  
 
Furthermore, the nation’s ability to adapt to the threat is plagued by weakness, the efficiency of 
its security apparatus called into question not only given the most recent attack but also due to 
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repeated intelligence failures. The attacked state as a secure fortress is undermined by evidence 
that terrorist actors may have used it as a regular transit point or staging ground (G53, WP171) 
or, in the case of the USS Cole bombing, infiltrated secure areas prior to the attack (WP132). 
Having failed to heed others’ warnings and in the absence of essential intelligence, the attacked 
state’s attempts to “make up ground” are hasty and sloppy (WP181, DTT77). 
  
The country’s moral authority is also challenged by its response to the attacks. The retaliation of 
the attacked state in meting out “rough justice” (WP52) is rash and gangster-like (the very 
phrase repeatedly employed to describe certain politicians) (DTT12, R102). Reluctant to admit 
mistakes, government figures mislead populations (NYT150, WP166, G49, DTT67) as the 
fearful society (NYT188, AP209, AP264, G56, R258) compromises its integrity as a rational 
actor and allows politics to become a product of emotionality rather than calculated deliberation 
(NYT215, AP277). Within this environment that the terrorist actor accumulates victories, forcing 
policy changes with seemingly trivial effort (NYT146, R244) that humble the great power 
(NYT146, DTT468).  
 
During the final investigative phase the line between attacker and attacked is comprised and the 
attacked state fully established as a source of threat. Mendacious and unreliable (R269), the 
nation is beset by accusations of imperialist ambitions, humanitarian neglect and intentional 
denial of aid (NYT239, AP52, AP53, AP238) that undermine its legitimacy. It is further plagued 
by allegations of misleading or lying to its citizenry either through a political cover-up or by 
intentionally voicing inaccurate threat predictions. The erosion of human rights is further 
perpetuated by the attacked state’s repressive actions. The government is cast as the detainer of 
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innocents, with the specific abuses suffered by those arrested examined in great detail: secret 
trials of questionable fairness (R111), collusion with torture (NYT60), issuance of baseless 
accusations (WP201, DTT16) and the withholding of constitutional rights including failure to 
explain levied criminal charges (NYT85, NYT86).  In the case of Spain, the Government even 
comparatively legitimizes certain nationalist terrorism through continual comparisons 
characterizing a few organizations as “more civilized” and legitimate than Islamist groups (G47, 
DTT60, DTT61, DTT94).19  
 
In the employ of an oppressive state, the military—an extension and projection of state power—
becomes a danger rather than protector. Not only does it invite greater risk to itself and others by 
failing to follow proper security procedure (WP138, AP229, R185) and committing severe lapses 
in judgment (NYT170, WP8, AP220, G80) but it strikes against innocent civilian targets (WP56, 
G19). More concerning, the ranks of the security forces actually produce terrorists who attack 
domestic targets (WP71, R125, EM7, EM8). As handler of the military, the attacked state is 
guided by rage, impotence, and fear (NYT240, WP194) of which consequent policy decisions 
are unpredictable and absurd. The trope of the attacked state as a beacon of Western 
enlightenment is dismantled as the country instigates humanitarian emergencies and propagates 
abuse against domestic and foreign populations. It is not only physical security that has been 
yielded to the terrorists (NYT225, EP14), but the state itself evolves into a source of cruelty that 
both produces and perpetuates abuse against terrorists and citizens alike, undermining the 
validity of its institutions, its role as victim, and its place within “civilized” society.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This tendency is also predominates in the discourse of the 2005 London bombings. 
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In the case of claimed attacks, the attacked state continues to function as a moderator of threats, 
in part due to the affirmed guilt of the suspects; authorities can hardly be criticized for fulfilling 
their legal obligations. Concerned shepherd and people’s protector, the attacked state takes 
precautionary measures to diminish the risk facing its citizens (WP84, AP127, DTT20). Despite 
the reality of the catastrophe, this effort reassures the population of the government’s benign 
commitment to make every effort in their defense, proof of which is the apprehension of the 
bombers themselves (WP154, AP238, R189). The attacked state is indignant and forthright in 
issuing its condemnation (NYT116, AP127, AP236, R128) from a position of strength and moral 
supremacy (G25, G26). A powerful actor, it denies “victory” to terrorists by steadfastly 
maintaining a normal political agenda (AP126, DTT21, CP2, CP3, CP11). Moreover, the very 
actions suggested as possible provocations for the attacks (e.g. the publication of the 
controversial Mohammed cartoons) are depicted not as foolish or inflammatory but rather in 
defense of basic human freedoms (DTT20, CP6, CP7). Consequently, far from undermining its 
reputation as a lauded member of international society, the nation has demonstrated its loyalty 
and commitment to the doctrine of Western liberal order even under siege. 
 
The state foil as mirror 
Interestingly, the state foil complements and to a great extent follows the characterization of the 
attacked state. For claimed attacks, the reputation of the attacked state as virtuous defender 
remains unchallenged; under such circumstances, the state foils (the United States, Jordan, and 
Pakistan) are portrayed as longtime (AP235, AP238, R202) and loyal allies (WP215) who supple 
the targeted nation with crucial support and services (R201, R204). Like their ally, the state foils 
are bastions of freedom and anti-terrorist mandates (NYT244, AP279, DTT33, R285) with 
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established traditions of security (NYT179, JT4), stability (AP235, G38, DTT27), and extensive 
experience in thwarting terrorist plots (NYT181, AP243, G182, R323). Highly proficient both 
militarily and politically, these are nations who will stand with their allies to face down the most 
“murderous ideologies” (NYT178, NYT278, WP236); even Pakistan, who—though naively 
optimistic in its insurgent negotiations (NYT116, G26, R130)—has successfully conducted anti-
terrorism operations (AP86, AP135) and proven themselves a key supporter of the War on Terror 
(AP133). The unwavering moral “good” of the state foil bolsters the attacked state’s own 
authority and its ability to confront danger with due recourse to the rule of law.  
 
This is not so in the case of unclaimed attacks, where the state foil (the United States, Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Yemen) also see a shift from attacked to attacker. Initial offers of friendly support 
and resources (NYT4, WP2, WP164, AP248, G42, R5, R223) quickly degenerate as the state 
foil’s internal weaknesses compromise its efforts and render it a danger to the international 
community. The state foil is duplicitous in “assisting” the attacked state; it has obscured 
evidence (NYT153, AP210), hindered the investigation (NYT176), and may even have actively 
participated in the bombing conspiracy (WP132). Refusing to engage in supportive actions that 
may reveal its dishonesty, the state foil rejects blame for investigative errors (NYT235, WP212, 
AP342) and fails to examine suspicious persons within its own citizenry (NYT176, R188). The 
country furthermore musters hostile sentiment towards the attacked state; in the case of the US 
Embassy bombings, this resentment results in a lawsuit against the American Government, 
despite Kenya’s continual refusals to provide requested increases in security prior to the 
bombings: “why should we suffer on [the Americans’] behalf?” (NYT94, NYT95).  
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A growing danger to its alliance partners, the state foil is uncontrollable (WP153), unable to “see 
clearly” (WP210) and thus prone to vulnerabilities which “terrorists may choose to exploit” 
(NYT187, WP165). Consequently, its allies also become a target of terrorist actors that the state 
foil already harbors domestically (WP13, WP138, AP287, AP289). It cares little for the wishes 
or interests of its international partners (NYT198), who voice “alarm and despair” over its selfish 
wielding of global influence (WP174).  
 
Finally, the state foil of the attacked state-turned-attacker is also an uncivilized nation, cutting 
constitutional corners (NYT233) and violating the rights of its population (WP199, AP254). A 
web of “bureaucracy, inefficiency, and corruption” (R45), it is prone to arbitrary torture 
(AP125), chaos, civil war (NYT151), lawlessness (NYT159), “witch hunts” (WP201) and an 
over eagerness to convict (NYT235). The state foil mirror the reputation for cruelty introduced 
by the attacked state’s newfound pariah status and further diminishes confidence in the 
administration of justice.  
 
D. Inability to Demarcate Relevant Information 
Unclaimed attack narratives exhibit a tendency to render either too many details relevant 
(displaying an inability to distinguish those which are significant) or conversely to suggest the 
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An endless pool of potential terrorists 
Not only does the continuing presence of the perpetrator and claims of a “mastermind at large” 
perpetuate doubt as to the guilt of the remanded suspects in unclaimed narratives, this is further 
compounded by authorities’ inability to typify the actor responsible. The threat may stem from a 
single group, a state government, a combination of terrorist groups and governments (R165), or a 
collaborative effort between multiple terrorist organizations (WP95)—there is no shortage of 
possibilities. Heavy emphasis is placed on the magnitude of annual threats received by the 
attacked state (WP12, AP5); the United States alone has a list of more than 200,000 individuals 
and 3,000 groups who wish it harm (WP1). Under such circumstances, it is impossible to 
determine “who is fighting who or what they are fighting for” (NYT3). Conversely, within 
claimed attacks the pool of actors is limited to a division between the wider field of Islamic 
militancy and the particularity of the al Qaeda organization, dramatically narrowing the scope 
investigators are forced to cover.  
 
Constituting the “extraordinary threat” via denial of the “normal” state-centered threat model  
Within claimed attack narratives, the al Qaeda organization is first and foremost understood as a 
product of Osama bin Laden (AP399, R297). Though “worse” than other terrorist organizations 
in terms of cruelty and ruthlessness (G86, G93, DTT131), the group is a failing organism; with 
one-third of its command staff killed in combat (NYT122, G30, G31) and the majority of its 
attacks committed solely for propaganda value (AP137, CP15), al Qaeda is a spent force 
(NYT267, WP234, AP389, DTT21). The group remains of interest only insofar as it is a 
bombing suspect; even the infamous Osama bin Laden is practically nonexistent except in his 
capacity as founder (WP266, AP239, DTT141). As his influence in pivotal Muslim countries is 
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lost to younger and more technologically adept insurgents (AP246, AP247, AP285), bin Laden 
and his terror organization serve little function outside limiting the pool of possible antagonists.  
 
Within unclaimed discourses the Saudi exile’s narrative value is most appreciable in the 1998 US 
Embassy bombings when the mass public was introduced to his radical agenda. Here Osama bin 
Laden’s presence overshadows mentions of his organization (which exists as a shadowy 
extension of the Saudi), in contrast to later cases where bin Laden is relevant only as al Qaeda’s 
founder and international delegate. Bin Laden evolves from a guerrilla leader with limited 
geographic and demographic reach to commander of a terrorist empire, a state unto himself. 
Though his role becomes increasingly marginal, al Qaeda—which continues as a direct product 
of bin Laden’s ingenuity and influence (NYT210, WP121, G64, DTT126, R97)—builds upon his 
statesmanlike reputation to assume the mantle of a normalized state power. Al Qaeda possesses a 
fully-developed network of alliances (though Iraq, Iran, and Sudan have garnered the group no 
favors with the international community) (NYT73, WP68, WP72, WP145, R112), led by its emir 
(NYT83, NYT90, WP57, WP73) and armed with a diplomatic ideologically-based agenda 
expressed through Islamist “ambassadors” (NYT73, WP71, AP171, AP279). This conferment of 
pseudo-statehood endows al Qaeda with privileges reserved for sovereign nations, such as the 
right to declare war (NYT176, AP222, G8) in pursuit of its policy agenda, which seeks to 
overthrow of nearly every Muslim government, curtail of Western influence, and suppress 
democratic values (NYT199, WP57, AP63, DTT70, R106). Al Qaeda attempts to achieve this 
goal with a combination of ruthlessness and sophistication that places it far ahead of other 
terrorist organizations such as ETA or IRA (WP176, G53, R244).  
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The power of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden within unclaimed attack narratives stems from 
their presentation as a “normal” enemy in comparison to the atypical general terrorism, which is 
more terrifying, strange, and forbids the attacked state from using prior experience as an 
interpretive lens. It is significant to note that claimed cases display an almost total lack of 
rumination over the characteristics of general terrorism20, excepting the occasional reference to 
irrational “fanatics” (NYT116, AP131, CP6). The tendency of unclaimed attacks to parallel the 
“normalized” bin Laden and al Qaeda threat with unspecified terrorism allows for a further 
estrangement of the universal danger that reemphasizes the helplessness of the attacked state, 
ensuring imminent harm while denying the existence of a means to handle the threat. 
 
In contrast to al Qaeda, general terrorism is unlike any threat in existence (WP171, WP180, 
DTT89, DTT94); its agents will strike “whenever and however they can” (AP266), without 
warning (DTT62) and employing a shockingly intimate knowledge of Western intelligence 
services (NYT24, WP15). Given the “global terror inflation” that necessitates murder on a 
grander scale (G41, DTT38, R209), the average man has no defense against such violence: 
“there is no power on earth that can protect [him] from being bombed (…) the bomber will 
always get through” (AP2, DTT39, DTT40, R249). One cannot run from this ever-present threat 
(WP94, WP101), nor can it be mediated through law enforcement or military means (WP168, 
AP290). Its resources are infinite (NYT218, WP112, R164) and no concession will blunt its 
hatred (WP186, AP299). The attacked state and its population are thus at the mercy of a superior 
fighting force, whose proclivity to rage and violence will be satisfied with nothing less than the 
annihilation of both.	 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The 2005 London bombings again present an exception for reasons discussed previously.  
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Homegrown bombers: the normal made strange 
Homegrown terrorist narratives exhibit a particular strategy of broadening the signals of 
impending aggression. The depiction of suspects as normal individuals “led astray,” particularly 
the possibility that they could be “any one of us,” denotes the idea of a “journey away from the 
ordinary” (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2009, p.88). Within this context a morally upright individual 
gradually acquires certain tendencies that force him or her from the “straight path.” This turn 
from normalcy is accompanied by the estrangement of common, everyday activities so as to 
retroactively impose “otherness” upon the bombers (claiming that one “missed the signs” is 
preferable than admitting there were none to miss). Meeting a group of friends for religious study 
or a sporting match becomes planning for the jihad; guiding children on a fieldtrip to London is 
scouting a potential attack location; declining to take part in social activities is antisocial 
radicalism (NYT151, WP58). Ordinary “business abroad” turns into cavorting with radical 
insurgents (DTT85)—even donning “blue jeans, T-shirts and running shoes [and] baseball caps” 
and looking for all the world like “backpackers heading off for a vacation” or a “hiking holiday” 
(WP251, G114, DTT151, DTT169) is taken as the uniform of a suicide bomber. In this sense, 
fear is not generated from a macro-level attack but from the ground-up, meaning that literally 
any action could be a “movement towards jihad” that has yet to be recognized as such. 
 
E. Possibility of Future Attack as Legitimizing State Action  
Within unclaimed discourses the continual possibility of a future attack legitimizes the present 
actions taken by the attacked state, situating the narrative consciousness in a very different 
temporal relationship compared to that of claimed attacks, which tend to focus on the connection 
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between similar past events and current circumstances. This trend is apparent not only in the 
proclivity of unclaimed discourses to employ premediation but also through a statistically 
significant disparity in the media’s choice of verbiage.    
 
Narrative instability due to the continued existence of the perpetrator 
The presence of the perpetrator figure throughout all four investigative phases despite the arrest 
of numerous suspects (exculpable though they may be) injects an element of narrative flux that 
maintains the possibility of a future attack, particularly given the aforementioned suspects’ 
seeming incapability of autonomously executing attacks. The perpetrator destabilizes what 
should have been an “open and shut” criminal case by suggesting the possibility of additional 
conspirators, replacing assurances of justice with paranoid conjectures: “where is the real 
mastermind?” (EM20). As claimed narratives depict a suspect detained, guilty, and proficient in 
the means of attack, further speculation over other imminent dangers is rare despite the survive 
of the larger al Qaeda network.  
 
Ultimate importance of the attack as herald of “new terrorism” rather than devastation wrought 
 
While it would be inaccurate to say that unclaimed attacks are not concerned with the damage 
caused by an act of violence, the true significance of the bombings is viewed in light of the “new 
era of terrorism,” of which the current attack is only the beginning. This is partly achieved 
through the use of premediation, which refers to the “manner in which media speculatively 
envision possible futures so that, should any disaster emerge, publics are not shocked and normal 
life disrupted” (Grusin 2004, cited in Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2009, p.83). The realization of this 
pattern within unclaimed cases is actualized in three ways: the perpetrators as significant based 
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upon their potential to cause harm, the means by which said perpetrators will accomplish their 
goals, and the attacked state as acting in the immediate present in response to a future attack that 
has yet to occur.	 
  
Those who conducted the terrorist attack are significant not only given the damage they wrought 
but also given the damage they could have rendered; the attack could have been “even more 
devastating” had minor deviations (such as accessing an underground parking garage as opposed 
to the adjacent lot) been achieved (NYT22, AP23). The new terrorism follows a “dirty-bomb of 
an ideology” (DTT64) and seeks to acquire biohazard materials that would produce an attack of 
untold devastation (R80). For example, the terrorists involved in a shoot-out during the 2004 
Madrid bombing investigation posed a threat not due to their role in the rail bombings but given 
that they were plotting “more attacks which could have been catastrophic” (AP324, AP325, G78, 
DTT100).  
 
Attacked states are very inventive in imagining the ways in which the terrorist actor will gain the 
upper hand, even if this may involve use of another nation’s resources. Morocco, for instance, is 
postulated as Europe’s “biggest terrorist threat (…) seething with as many as 1,000 adherents 
capable of suicide attacks and skilled at slipping through the continent’s southern gateway” 
(AP248). Alarm is sounded that an attack in another major European city is “only a matter of 
time” (NYT236) and that the region “might become the next front in the war against terror” 
(AP302). Hostile elements may use vulnerabilities such as the open rail networks of a region 
heavily dependent on rail transport (NYT189) or they may “turn democracy into a weapon” to 
undermine the Western political system (NYT203, DTT70) and thus introduce a “new quality of 
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threat” (NYT195, NYT196, WP171, WP180, WP183, DTT47). These scenarios even detail the 
collapse of the global superpower: America will “become increasingly vulnerable to hostile 
attack on our homeland and our military superiority will not entirely protect us,” meaning that 
“[we are] likely to die on American soil, possibly in large numbers” (R149).  
 
In response to an attack that has yet to occur, the attacked state and its allies engage in 
immediate policy changes, evident in Germany’s panicked calls for an “immediate emergency 
gathering of officials” (NYT195, NYT196) or “huge anti-terror sweeps and arrests” in Britain, 
Belgium, France, Canada, and South Africa following the 2004 Madrid bombings (NYT218). 
Spain even withdrew its troops from Iraq on the principle that it “might get a kind of immunity 
from future terrorist attack by disengaging” (NYT199). In the aftermath of the 1998 Embassy 
bombings, the United States pursued an opposite tactic, ordering cruise missile strikes on targets 
in Afghanistan and Sudan to thwart “imminent plans for new attacks” (R78). The importance of 
these actions is that tactics of premediation narrate such catastrophes in a manner “almost 
indistinguishable from the way the future will be mediated when it happens” (Grusin, 2004, 
p.29). Consequently, premediation is “not about the future at all, but about enabling action in the 
present by visualizing and drawing on multiple imagined futures” (Amoore 2007, cited in de 
Goede, 2008, p.159).  
 
Nature of the past-present-future relationship 
The presence of an impending future atrocity does not imply, in any way, that unclaimed 
narratives do not recourse to past events in an attempt to contextualize or understand the damage 
wrought by the current attack. It is simply that unclaimed cases appear to find these events less 
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helpful in making sense of the present catastrophe, limiting the applicability of historical 
experience as one of the “tools” in the “toolbox” to fight terrorism. Two Chi-Square tests of 
statistical significance were performed in order to examine the nature of the relationship between 
past, present, and future attacks; the first test sought to determine the nature of past-future 
references within the discourse, while the following test examined the relationship of the past-
present references. 
 
In the construction of the first Chi-Square test, claimed/unclaimed references to future attacks 
were compared to allusions of past attacks (such as World War II, the Lockerbie bombing, 
etc.).21 As indicated by the data, references to previous atrocities do significantly factor into 
terrorist narratives; indeed, at first glance, they appear even more numerous than references to 
future attacks. However, it is not insensible that in the aftermath of any act of violence 
comparisons will be made to previous events—it is the nature of such comparisons that is 
particularly relevant, and will be explored in the subsequent test. It was mentioned previously 
that the 2005 London bombings, though a claimed attack, exhibit unclaimed narrative 
characteristics given the sizable lapse between execution and claim. When the data from the 
London bombings is factored into the claimed cases, no significant difference is found between 
the tendency for claimed and unclaimed attacks to reference future or past events in their 
attempts to understand the present. However: when the London data is removed and the 
subsequent totals for claimed attacks compared to their unclaimed counterparts, a strong 
disparity can be observed; here claimed attacks appear to reject the forecasting of future attacks, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Appendix III. 
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while the tendency for unclaimed attacks to do so appears almost as strong as their attempts to 
reference previous events.  
 
To understand the nature of this past-present relationship, a second Chi-Square test was 
conducted to determine in what way past events were related to the current attack.22 Historical 
comparisons may be divided into two categories: (1) absolutes, which make a break with and 
repudiate the usefulness of the past in understanding the current situation, and (2) relatives, 
which establish the current situation as comparable to a past event. In the case of the former, the 
comparison denotes the current attack as something entirely novel; the latter denotes the current 
tragedy as part of an existing pattern, implying that—just as its predecessor was overcome—the 
management of this latest catastrophe is within the realm of possibility for government, law 
enforcement, and security services. Even with the inclusion of the atypical London data, a 
statistically significant difference is observable in the two attack types’ inclination to use 
absolute references; unclaimed attacks characterize the present situation as something 
incomparable that exceeds current investigative and defense resources. Such assertions within 
claimed attacks are dominated by assurances of ordinary and familiar danger that allow for a 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See Appendix IV. 
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CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS 
The previous section examined points of distinction between unclaimed and claimed terrorist 
attacks. Yet how do we make sense of these patterns in a way that renders them applicable to the 
terrorist authors of the spectacle as well as the political decision-makers who are forced to 
respond? The distinctions between claimed and unclaimed attacks are relevant in that they affect 
the relationship between the terrorist, target population, and state through the framing process 
inherent to political problem solving. As will be discussed below, claimed terrorist attacks tend 
to be cast within a framework of uncertainty, whereas unclaimed terrorist attacks are cast within 
a framework of ambiguity. The two concepts have very real implications for the way in which 
the terrorist threat is understood and confronted.  
 
A. Risk and the Notion of Risk Society 
Risk can be understood as the “unambiguous assignment of definite probability to each and 
every event” (Dequech, 2000, p.5). It is measurable through the use of probabilistic calculations 
(Knight, 1946, p.233) and acts as the dominant form of calculative reasoning in modern society 
(Best, 2008, p.5). Consequently, the notion of risk functions around the idea that in a given 
situation, the individual decision maker is able to account for every possible outcome, assign a 
likelihood to each based upon the probability that it will occur, and the resulting data informs the 
decision that can thereafter be made.   
 
A current strand of literature holds risk to be a foundational state for civil society (Pain & Smith 
2008, p.1) and risk management as the primary mode of agreement between citizens and 
governments (Isin, 2004, p.219), redefining the nature of the social bond that relates a citizenry 
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and its government. Theorists have suggested that state societies, whose behavior was hitherto 
driven by fear resulting from uncertainty of the capabilities and intentions of other states (Nelson 
2010), have instead become risk societies as “subjects govern their conduct through risk and 
governments primarily constitute themselves as safeguarding their subjects from [transnational] 
risks” (see Isin, 2004, p.318). In other words, “being at risk is the way of being and ruling in the 
world of modernity; being at global risk is the human condition at the beginning of the twenty-
first century” (Beck, 2006, p.330). 
 
B. Why Risk is Not an Appropriate Framework for the Terrorist Attack 
Though undoubtedly of use in explaining certain decision-making situations, the notion of risk is 
less applicable as it pertains to the terrorist attack. First and foremost, risk assumes a continuum 
on a scale of zero to one hundred, thus rendering possible a situation in which there is no risk. 
Such a certainty does not exist in the world today, and the effort to strive for such in the face of 
the impossible is one of the contingencies allowing for the birth of the neurotic citizen (see Isin 
2004). Moreover, within the context of decision-making or problem solving, the distinction made 
between the idea of risk and uncertainty is false. The principle of Knightian Uncertainty assumes 
that the latter is “unable to be managed through probabilistic calculations because the situation 
being dealt with is in a high degree unique” (Knight, 1946, p.233). However, the decision-maker 
never knows with absolute certainty that an objective probability distribution exists, nor does 
s/he understand the exact characteristics of this distribution. Consequently, in order to make a 
decision at all, the decision-maker decides on what s/he considers a useful representation of 
reality (Schrader et al., 1993, p.7) and attributes subjective probabilities to events (Dequech, 
2000, p.4).  
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Beck (2006) also acknowledges that risk is largely the anticipation of catastrophe, and risks are 
“topical only to the extent that they are anticipated. Risks are not ‘real’, they are ‘becoming real’ 
(Joost van Loon). At the moment in which risks become real – for example, in the shape of a 
terrorist attack – they cease to be risks and become catastrophes” (p.332). If such is the case, than 
states are not guarding against real threats but rather possibilities; possibilities and their 
actualization bring the problem into the realm of the uncertain and ambiguous rather than the 
definitive and exact category of risk.  
 
C. The Distinction between Uncertainty and Ambiguity23 
Uncertainty and ambiguity refer to two related but distinct concepts. Uncertainty stems from a 
lack of information and refers to a situation in which the problem solver considers the structure 
of a problem (including the relevant variables) as given but does not have the details necessary to 
determine the value of said variables (Martin & Meyerson, 1988, p.122, cited in Schrader et al., 
1993, p.5). In other words, the framework of the problem is defined, the relevant variables within 
the problem identified, and the set of possible future outcomes understood; however, until the 
value of the variables and their associated probabilities are discovered, the likelihood of each 
outcome cannot be calculated. Uncertainty may thus be remedied by gathering more information 
about each variable. A mental model already demarcates the boundaries of the problem, 
determining what is relevant for understanding the phenomenon and identifying the specific 
tasks necessary with greater precision than occurs under ambiguity: a well-defined mental model 
“implicitly predetermines the relevant solution space for a problem” (Clement 1989, cited in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Though scholarship offers several interpretations, the distinction utilized here is primarily that 
as described by Schrader et al. (1993). 
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Schrader et al., 1993, p.4). Furthermore, framing a problem as one of uncertainty reduction 
implies that the resources necessary to solving the crisis are similar to the ones that have been 
used previously (Schrader et al., 1993, p.18) and thus already exist within the decision-maker’s 
“toolbox.” Given that tasks are already specified within the mental model they are also well-
defined, meaning that is it possible to describe precisely the “content of specific roles that need 
to be fulfilled” in order to overcome the issue (Schrader et al., 1993, p.16).  
 
In comparison, ambiguity can take one of two forms: (1) a situation in which the set of 
potentially relevant variables are identified but the relationships between variables and the 
problem structure are in need of determination, or (2) a situation in which the set of relevant 
variables themselves as well as their functional relationship and relationship to the problem 
structure are in need of further definition (Hubbard 2007; Martin & Meyerson, 1988, p.112, cited 
in Schrader et al.,1993, p.4; Schrader et al., 1993, p.5). Not only does ambiguity stem from a lack 
of information, it also stems from a lack of clarity. Ambiguity may be introduced into a situation 
in multiple ways, the most common of which is the existence of seemingly conflicting and 
irreconcilable information (Kosnik 1986; Meyerson & Martin 1987, cited in Schrader et al., 1993, 
p.12). Burns and Stalker (1966) provided evidence demonstrating how lateral (horizontal) 
communication networks (in comparison to vertical, top-down communication patterns) promote 
the communication of information outside the problem solver’s direct realm of expertise and 
tend to introduce greater amounts of such information (Schrader et al., 1993, p.12-3); modern 
media communication patterns strongly favor this trend. Furthermore, problem-solving behavior 
is strongly influenced by past experience; challenging a model used previously for solving what 
appears to be a similar problem implies that the decision-maker questions its existing 
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assumptions about which variables are important and their relationship to one another (Schrader 
et al., 1993, p.11). Finally, problem-solving under ambiguity requires not only gathering more 
information about the relevant variables, but first specifying the variables under consideration as 
well as their relationship to each other and the problem model. If the problem is framed so as to 
include an element of ambiguity, it is assumed that resources not been employed in the past may 
be required (Schrader et al., 1993, p.18) and moreover suggests that the tools currently available 
are not suitable for handling the issue. Problem-solving tasks within this environment can only 
be described in generalized terms, as it is still unclear what their content will be (Schrader et al., 
1993, p.17). 
 
D. Claimed/Unclaimed Terrorist Attacks as Framed Under Uncertainty, Ambiguity 
Preventing or weathering an act of terrorism very much poses a problem solving dilemma for 
policymakers and publics alike in terms of formulating a response to the violence. This study 
suggests that claimed attacks tend to be framed as situations involving uncertainty, whereas 
unclaimed attacks are framed in terms of ambiguity.  
 
Claimed Attacks as Problems of Uncertainty 
Claimed terrorist attacks are discussed as situations of a familiar nature, with defined boundaries 
that demarcate the scope of the terrorist threat. The targets of violence are therefore able to 
understand the threat in its entirety, including the set of possible resolutions. There is no 
“surprise element” within a claimed attack; the perpetrator, able to upset the assured purveyance 
of justice within unclaimed narratives, ceases to exist in claimed narratives upon the arrest of 
suspects. No references are made to the possibility of an outside “coordinator” or “mastermind” 
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who continues to evade investigative efforts, eliminating the potential for an unknown outcome 
to upset the predetermined path of the state in rendering justice and restoring normalcy. The 
decisive lack of premediation and speculation on future attacks further negates the possibility of 
an “infinite number” of possible conclusions to the terrorist act, allowing the current disaster to 
be understood in the singular; the attack is clearly temporally demarcated rather than 
compounded by the effects of a future attack realized in the present via state response. 
 
With this definition comes an understanding of what variables are to be included or are relevant 
to the problem at hand. Al Qaeda and its founder are well-known criminal actors with whom law 
enforcement officials have an established history; yet even before al Qaeda claimed 
responsibility, claimed narratives narrow the pool of possible perpetrators to those practicing 
Islamist terrorism. More importantly, there are no ambiguous actors within such discourses; 
states and their allies are unquestionably endowed with ethical authority as just protectors and 
guardians of Western values in the face of danger; they act as a bulwark against the forces of 
terrorist barbarism to defend “civilized” society. Detainees are, in contrast to unclaimed 
narratives, mature criminal actors capable of autonomously plotting and executing skilled 
operations and having proven their depravity through participation in previous terrorist activities; 
their culpability is unquestionable and thus the moral legitimacy of the state confirmed. Even 
prior to the arrest of suspects, postulations of the perpetrators as superhuman are immediately 
dispelled by rational explanation, rendering the detainees ordinary (albeit proficient) actors able 
to be addressed through normal law enforcement measures.  
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The implementation of a tried-and-true model of police vs. criminal implies that existing 
resources may be utilized in the apprehension of those responsible, which lends itself to the 
scripting of particular problem-solving tasks and thus investigative progress. Boasts of state 
power, technological superiority, and experience in the handling of insurgencies are thus 
applicable to the present situation, increasing public confidence in authorities’ ability to fulfill 
their security contract. The nature of past-present comparisons in framing the current attack as 
the newest incarnation of an old threat implies it will be handled successfully in the manner of its 
predecessor.  
  
Unclaimed Attacks as Problems of Ambiguity 
Unclaimed attacks are comparatively modeled as problems of ambiguity, which is introduced 
both through conflicting actor identities as well as through challenging the existing model of 
placating the terrorist threat. First and foremost, unclaimed attacks exhibit a lack of clarity with 
regard to the primary actors and their associations. As Dingley (2005) notes, “if an agreement is 
ambiguous, it is not an agreement” (p.176); consequently, if there is not clear agreement on who 
is or is not a source of threat, either everyone or no one is a danger. Given that an attack has 
already occurred—along with the ongoing possibility of a repeat performance—everyone 
becomes a prospective terrorist. Actor ambiguity proceeds among several veins: confusion 
between “victims” and “attackers” (via the exoneration of suspects and the attacked state-as-
attacker through the detaining of innocents and production of terrorists), and a blurring of the 
“civilized” and “barbaric.” This latter theme is explored through the characterization of 
perpetrators as masters of “civilized man” and embodying to a greater extent the principles of 
“civilized” behavior, as well as the moral degradation of Western society and its abandonment of 
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rational principles. Attacked nations become models of “uncivilized” behavior: untrustworthy, 
deceitful and foolish, their use of gratuitous violence, support for torture, and unjust 
imprisonment undermines their identity as part of the Free World. 
 
With the invalidation of the old framework a new model is required, yet it is impossible to 
demarcate the boundary of the new threat. The current security insurance paradigm in Western 
society is based upon “scientific calculus and group profiling” (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007, 
p.103); this is impossible in an environment where estrangement of the normal provides for 
anything and everything as suspicious. Unclaimed attack discourses offer an endless pool of 
possible perpetrators whose continual presence wreaks instability despite suspects’ arrest. Note 
that the superhuman abilities of the perpetrator and his desire to do harm are consistent and 
unchallenged throughout the discourse, rendering the identity—according to Hopf (2009)—
among the strongest and most salient. Furthermore, the labels used to describe said suspects are 
indeterminate from the ones employed by the targeted population—family men, brothers, 
Westerners, sports lovers, charmers—implying that we are a source of threat as well as its 
victims. Continued references to a “mastermind” at large contribute to the inability to define the 
problem scope, with the statesmanlike Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda posed in stark contrast to 
the uncontained and virulent nature of general terrorism. Finally, the use of premediation resists 
any and all attempts to describe even the temporal boundaries of the danger; the importance of 
the terrorist act rests in its potential, with ambiguity introduced via the imagination of infinite 
futures (as imagination is inherently interpretive and thus always open to ambiguity) (de Goede, 
2008, p.156,159; Salter, 2008, p.248, cited in Best, 2008, p.7). In turn, states are forced to react 
to a possible future attack, something that has not, and may not, ever occur; as such, the effects 
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of a future attack in terms of policy response and popular fear have already been realized, a 
terrorist attack that requires absolutely nothing on the part of the terrorist. In such a way, 
premediation becomes the catastrophe (Countin 2008, cited in de Goede, 2009, p.171) as it 
mediates multiple futures in a manner indistinguishable from the way the future will be mediated 
when it is realized (Grusin, 2004, p.29).  
 
This new model, indefinite as it is, requires resources outside of the state’s possession. The threat 
is new, unique, and wrought by all-powerful, divinely favored perpetrators; boasts of military 
prestige and previous anti-terrorist accomplishments are irrelevant. Narrative focus is on a 
present that cannot be linked in any meaningful sense with previous experience, except to 
distinguish it as distinct from such; as Cooper (2006) notes, “if the catastrophe befalls us, it is 
from a future without chronological continuity with the past…no mass of information will help 
us pin-point the precise when, where and how of the coming havoc. We can only speculate” 
(p.119). What is more, problem-solving tasks towards the resolution of the threat can only be 
issued in general terms; consequently, states and their allies never appear to make real progress 
in the investigation as the true attacker, the perpetrator, is untouchable given that s/he is a 
figment of our own creation. Descriptions of the attack as “extraordinary” and “unthinkable” 
further depoliticizes the event, as “unthinkable becomes unspeakable, and so we are excused 
from further enquiry” (Edkins, 2003, p.176, cited in de Goede, 2009, p.167). Consequently, there 
is no one to be held accountable for the security threat posed not only by the terrorists, but by the 
state and society itself.  
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E. Ambiguity as Applied to Claim Scholarship 
Given the tendency of the unclaimed attack to employ an element of ambiguity, it is beneficial to 
review scholarly explanations surrounding claims of responsibility so as to determine those that 
appear applicable in rendering a terrorist advantage. 
 
The New Religious Character of Terrorism 
Al Qaeda, through generally propagated as an exemplar of the “new religious terrorism,” is 
presented within the case studies as a primarily political actor in that its ultimate goal is realizing 
the downfall of Western governments and pro-Western regimes in the Middle East. Moreover, a 
vast proportion of the accompanying commentary issued by al Qaeda (or its leader) exhorts 
young men to commit acts of terrorism on its behalf. Consequently it would be hasty to assume 
that terrorist groups utilizing religious verbiage to accomplish political outcomes are not 
targeting an earthly population; the fact that al Qaeda has conducted both claimed and unclaimed 
attacks indicates that there is utility to be found in both strategies. 
 
Media Coverage and the Establishment of Legitimacy 
Both claimed and unclaimed attacks without question cast the act of terrorist violence as 
illegitimate and without possible rational justification. However, whereas the terrorist actor is 
also criminalized in the case of claimed attacks, unclaimed attacks construct a duality between 
guilty perpetrator/innocent suspect that exonerates the arrested individuals of responsibility. In 
addition, though culpable, perpetrators are ultimately viewed as a “superior other” who 
ironically embodies to a greater extent the values of “civilized” society, particularly given the 
state’s demotion from protector of freedoms to illegitimate actor and source of threat. Thus, 
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while the terrorist act itself may never be justified, the insurgent organization is able to make use 
of a lawful, superior “other” while simultaneously bringing into question the moral authority of 
state in determining the bounds of legitimacy. 
 
Interpretive Power of Audience 
Given the misattribution of responsibility for the terrorist act in the case of the 2004 Madrid 
bombings, the inability to determine either actor or motivation in the 1998 US Embassy 
bombings, and the reality that in both cases determination of the culpable group was made only 
by luck or chance, it is unlikely that in the current globalized environment where a terrorist 
attack could originate from any number of transnational actors, a group would fail to claim an act 
of violence based solely on the assumption that the audience will understand the desired 
message. 
 
Embarrassment of Failure 
Considering that the 2005 Aqaba attacks were claimed despite the terrorists’ failure to hit US 
Navy targets and in light of the fact that the failed July 21 London bombings served to heighten 
public anxiety and reinforce a psychology of vulnerability, failed attacks appear to serve a 
purpose in the terrorist arsenal. Failure to claim credit simply based upon success of outcome 
thus does not appear to be a significant consideration of terrorist organizations. 
 
Fear of Retaliation by Authorities 
It is important to note that al Qaeda was the subject of counter-terrorism measures regardless of 
claim status; for instance, America launched retaliatory rocket attacks following the 1998  US 
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Embassy bombing despite Osama bin Laden’s denial of authorship. Certainly, a delay in credit 
claiming to allow one’s compatriots to escape from harm’s reach (as occurred in the 2005 Aqaba 
rocket attacks) is strategically understandable; ultimately, however, an attempt to claim credit 
was made by the perpetrating organization. The plentiful pool of false claims made for each 
attack furthermore assumes a certain utility of having one’s name attacked to an attack regardless 
of the possibility of state recrimination. 
 
Public Relations Maintenance 
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the plethora of false claims attached to each case study 
assumes the existence of a certain advantage in associating one’s name with an attack. The fact 
that al Qaeda claimed the 2005 London bombings, the most atrocious of all cases in terms of 
death toll as well as shock value, perhaps also indicates a lack of concern for an “overly bloody” 
reputation. 
 
Greater Fear-Inciting Potential 
Of the possible explanations offered by current literature (with the exception of establishing 
actor legitimacy), the disparity noted between unclaimed/claimed attacks appears to support the 
fear hypothesis. Schmid and Jongman (1988) concede that terrorist groups are rarely capable of 
keeping a whole population in a permanent state of fear (Rapin, 2009, p.167); Horgan (2005) 
notes that terror will not be achieved unless we, personally, are the subjects of an attack (p.14), 
and even then that the duration of this fear is limited (Rapin 2009). This lends itself to the 
conundrum that terrorists desire to propagate fear amongst the target population, but: (1) it is 
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limited to the subjects of attack (2) it fades rapidly after an attack (3) continual attacks result in 
mass desensitization and adaptation to violence.  
 
As Norman Cousins points out in his Modern Man Is Obsolete, “where man can find no answer, 
he will find fear”; likewise, “where man has already found fear, he will find answers” 
(Overstreet, 1951, p.105). The unclaimed attack offers a solution in that it opens new narrative 
space in which the terrorist actor can perpetuate the reach and lasting effects of his attack; 
response by the government to a future attack affects the entirety of the population, and given 
that the location of a future attack remains unspecified, everyone is a potential victim. By 
destabilizing mutually-exclusive categories of “attacker” and “victim,” the terrorist creates new 
sources of fear (e.g. the government, neighbors, family), violating the most intimate levels of 
trust while reinforcing the surety of the coming attack. Consequently, society suffers from an 
inability to identify the attacker while at the same time convinced of its impending annihilation 
at the hands of said attacker. The type of fear perpetuated by the unclaimed attack also differs 
from its claimed counterpart; rather than a “hierarchical fear” built by a national-level event and 
subject to top-down distribution (most intense at the site of the attack with a “trickle-down” 
effect as it radiates out) (Pain & Smith, 2008, p.8), unclaimed attacks create a web of “grass-
roots fear” built from the ground up in which fear is perpetuated among all members of the 
population and found in the conduct of everyday life; new sources of fear are identified and 
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Impact of Environmental Characteristics 
Despite a wide variety of geographic locations for the attacks, the cultural heritage of the 
targeted audiences (the United States, Denmark, Spain, and the United Kingdom) is not radically 
diverse. Consequently, the impact of the target nation’s socio-demographic characteristics on 
claim utility cannot be evaluated. However, the setting in which the attack is conducted does not 
appear to exercise a significant influence over the claiming of responsibility, as both claimed and 
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CHAPTER 8: IMPORTANCE OF FINDINGS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
The framing of terrorist attacks is of note primarily because, given that the nature of the problem 
and the identities of the actors are constructed, defined, and understood through the narrative 
selections identified by the decision maker, it stands to reason that politicians and their media 
counterparts can recast the unclaimed attack narrative in order to minimize the fear-provoking 
and legitimizing effects offered the terrorist by the discourse’s destabilization of mutually 
exclusive categories and prompting of grassroots fear mechanisms.  
 
Future research might expand the number of terrorist groups included in the study to determine if 
the patterns identified here hold true for a variety of religiously motivated insurgent groups; one 
might also broaden the range of targeted nations to include those not considered part of Western 
society and not beholden to the strict human rights norms that bind such countries. Given the 
shift of claiming patterns over the past half-century, later studies might benefit from examining if 
such narrative discrepancies existed during the height of terrorist claiming in the 1970s, or if the 
disparity is a product of changing media tactics and the evolving media-public relationship. The 
application of positivist methodologies such as process-tracing may also be useful in determining 
if the selection of problem framing consistently manifests itself in the choice of particular 
political measures that would strengthen the terrorist cause. Most importantly, this study suggests 
that the length of time between execution of a terrorist act and the claim of responsibility be 
treated as a variable of interest, given its perceived influence on frame choice. 
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Appendix I 
 
CLAIMS ISSUED FOR ATTACKS 
UNCLM: Unclaimed Attack 
CLM: Claimed Attack 
 
1998 US Embassy Bombings, Kenya/Tanzania (UNCLM) 
August 7, 1998 
 
Date Claim Issued Claimant Credible (Y/N) 
Aug. 8, 1998 Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places N 
Aug. 8, 1998 Army for the Liberation of Holy Shrines N 
Aug. 19, 1998 Platoon of Martyr Khaled al-Said N 
Dec. 25, 1998 Osama Bin Laden Denial of Responsibility 
Mar. 20, 2007 
Walid Muhammad [Tawfiq] bin Attash, al 
Qaeda operative, confesses under interrogation 
at Guantanamo Bay that he organized the1998 
Embassy bombings and the 2000 USS Cole 
bombing 




2008 Danish Embassy Bombing, Islamabad (CLM) 
June 2, 2008 
 
Date Claim Issued Claimant Credible (Y/N) 
June 5, 2008 Yazid, commander of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, claims credit via website Y  
July 22, 2008 Yazid claims credit in an interview with Pakistan’s Geo TV program Y 
 
 
2000 USS Cole Bombing, Yemen (UNCLM) 
October 12, 2000 
 
Date Claim Issued Claimant Credible (Y/N) 
Oct. 13, 2000 Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan N 
Oct. 13, 2000 Mohammed’s Army N 
Oct. 13, 2000 Islamic Deterrence Force N 
Nov. 13, 2000 Osama bin Laden Denial of Responsibility 
Mar. 20, 2007 
Walid Muhammad [Tawfiq] bin Attash, al 
Qaeda operative, confesses under interrogation 
at Guantanamo Bay that he organized the1998 
Embassy bombings and the 2000 USS Cole 
bombing 
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2005 Aqaba Rocket Bombings, Aqaba, Jordan (CLM) 
August 19, 2005 
 
Date Claim Issued Claimant Credible (Y/N) 
Aug. 19, 2005 
Abdullah al-Azzam Brigades of the al 
Qaeda Organization in the Levant and 
Egypt 
N 
Aug. 23, 2005 Al Qaeda in Iraq (led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) Y 
 
 
2004 Madrid Rail Bombings, Madrid, Spain (UNCLM) 
March 11, 2004 
 
Date Claim Issued Claimant Credible (Y/N) 
Mar. 11, 2004 Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades N 
Mar. 12, 2004 Abu Dujan al-Afghani, al Qaeda’s “spokesman in Europe” N (actor not on record) 
2006  
Appears that there is no evidence that al Qaeda 
Central helped plan, finance or carry out the 




Cell may have been trained by Mustafa 
Setmarian Nasar, who was once affiliated with 






2005 London Subway Bombings, London, United Kingdom (CLM) 
July 7, 2005 
 
Date Claim Issued Claimant Credible (Y/N) 
July 7, 2005 Secret Organization Group of al Qaeda of Jihad Organization in Europe N 
July 9, 2005 Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades N 
Aug. 13, 2005 The Independent reports initial findings of investigation that bombers acted independently -- 
Sept. 1, 2005 Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed 7/7 attacks via video recording 
Y  
(believed to be al Qaeda’s video, 
but the organization’s role as 
either active sponsor or source of 
inspiration is not yet clarified; 
video thought to be edited after 
attacks) 
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Appendix II 
 
BREAKDOWN OF ARTICLES BY NEWSPAPER 
 













Times 1-115 116-122 123-177 178-183 184-243 244-371 
Washington 
Post 1-83 84-87 88-153 154-160 161-213 214-300 
Associated 
Press 1-124 125-138 139-234 235-247 248-371 372-506 
The 




1-19 20-22 23-26 27-33 34-116 117-245 




-- 1-15 -- -- -- -- 
The Nation -- 1-9 -- -- -- -- 
Al-Ra’y -- -- -- 1-4 -- -- 
The Jordan 
Times -- -- -- 1-13 -- -- 
El Mundo -- -- -- -- 1-30 -- 
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Appendix III 
 
CHI-SQUARE TEST OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE, PAST-FUTURE ATTACKS 
 
 Unclaimed Attacks Claimed Attacks 
Future Attacks 171 232, 0** 
Past Attacks 243 394, 25*** 
 
Chi-Square value (including London): 0.198 
Chi-Square value**, *** (excluding London): 13.962+ 
Critical value at p = 0.05: 3.84 
 
1 NYT71, NYT199, NYT215, NYT236, WP51, WP78, WP79, WP75, AP325, G47, G61, DTT40, 
DTT41, R36, R37, R249, R280 
 
2 NYT253, NYT339, NYT322, WP221, WP223, WP236, AP402, AP451, AP453, AP497, G107, G109, 
G148, G170, G196, G227, G236, DTT147, DTT198, DTT240, DTT241, R335, R377 
 
3 NYT24, NYT39, NYT123, NYT127, NYT131, NYT133, NYT185, NYT195, NYT235, NYT243, 
WP170, WP213, AP2, AP6, AP147, AP148, G85, DTT24, DTT60, DTT62, DTT93, DTT103, DTT109, 
R172 
 
4 NYT178, NYT179, NYT247, NYT270, NYT273, NYT274, NYT276, NYT281, NYT288, NYT297, 
NYT348, WP84, WP87, WP154, AP125, AP127, AP133, AP134, AP237, AP238, AP239, AP240, 












** Without 2005 London bombing articles 
 
*** Without 2005 London bombing articles: NYT178, NYT179, WP84, WP87, WP154, AP125, AP127, 
AP133, AP134, AP237, AP238, AP239, AP240, AP244, G25, G26, G38, G39, G40, DTT20, R199, 
R201, R202, R203, R205 
 
+ Statistically significant  
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Appendix IV 
PAST-PRESENT ATTACKS: BREAKDOWN OF ABSOLUTES VS. RELATIVES 
Absolutes 
 Unclaimed Attacks Claimed Attacks 
Deadliest Ever 161 22 
First Ever 63 214 
Unprecedented 125 26 
Worst Ever 437 148 
 
1 NYT220, WP25, WP31, WP196, AP25, AP29, AP36, AP47, AP331, AP351, AP359, AP371, DTT42, 
DTT61, R275, EM25 
 
2 R295, R297 
 
3 NYT125, WP191, AP12, AP281, G52, DTT70 
 
4 NYT282, NYT284, NYT320, NYT332, WP238, WP243, WP245, WP252, WP332, AP417, AP419, 
AP422, AP492, G115, G237, R300, R304, R305, R364, R373, R377** 
 
5 NYT18, NYT184, NYT200, WP166, AP4, AP276, G2, G4, G53, G76, DTT37, DTT38 
 
6 G119, DTT198 
 
7 WP175, WP181, AP248, AP250, AP252, AP254, AP259, AP264, AP265, AP267, AP268, AP270, 
AP271, AP278, AP292, AP297, AP300, AP301, AP308, AP309, AP313, AP317, AP319, AP345, DTT45, 
DTT46, DTT61, DTT67, DTT108, DTT109, DTT110, DTT114, DTT115, R208, R213, R225, R232, 
R236, R237, R245, R247, R279, R280 
 
8 NYT277, NYT300, NYT364, WP240, WP242, WP246, WP250, WP300, AP501, G86, DTT120, 
DTT125, DTT143, DTT228 
 
**Note that all data for “First Ever” in this section was drawn from references to “first ever suicide 
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Relatives 
 
 Unclaimed Attacks Claimed Attacks 
Deadliest Since 171 52 
First Since 113 64 
Most Serious Since 0 105 
Next in Series 0 226 
Worst Since 397 238 
 
1 NYT185, NYT195, NYT209, NYT235, NYT243, AP194, AP196, AP197, AP277, AP302, DTT62, 
DTT93, DTT103, R233, R238, R243, R248 
 
2 AP125, AP127, AP133, AP134, NYT304 
 
3 AP2, AP11, AP139, AP142, AP152, DTT74, R235, R236, R254, R256, R263 
 
4 NYT178, WP154, AP237, G38, G39, G228 
 
5 AP238, AP239, AP240, AP244, AP247, G40, R201, R202, R203, R205 
 
6 NYT116, WP84, WP215, WP221, AP125, AP126, AP379, G25, G26, G29, DTT20, DTT21, DTT121, 
DTT122, R128, R129, R132, R281, R285, R286, R295, R357 
 
7 NYT123, NYT127, NYT131, NYT133, WP96, WP164, AP142, AP147, AP148, AP154, AP158, 
AP159, AP162, AP163, AP165, AP166, AP167, AP168, AP169, AP171, AP172, AP173, AP174, AP176, 
AP177, AP179, AP254, AP256, AP257, AP308, DTT24, DTT34, R206, R211, R213, R218, R221, R224, 
R231 
 
8 NYT247, NYT255, NYT269, NYT273, NYT276, NYT281, NYT288, WP225, WP226, WP229, 
WP289, AP379, AP381, AP384, AP387, AP391, AP392, AP393, AP394, AP406, AP444, AP466, 
DTT117 
 
CHI-SQUARE TEST OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE, PAST-PRESENT ATTACKS 
(ABSOLUTES VS. RELATIVES) 
 
 Unclaimed Attacks Claimed Attacks 
Past Absolutes 77 39 
Past Relatives 67 66 
 
Chi-Square value: 6.510+ 
Critical value at p = 0.05: 3.84 
 
 
+ Statistically significant  
